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The Eisenhower Curve

Keywords

war-on-disease, 1-percent-treaty, medical-research, public-health, peace-dividend, decentralized-trials, dfda, dih, victory-bonds, health-economics, cost-benefit-analysis, clinical-trials, drug-development, regulatory-reform, military-spending, peace-economics, decentralized-governance, wishocracy, blockchain-governance, impact-investing

The United States is the country with the largest defense budget in human history. It is also the country losing strategic ground, year after year, to a country that spends less than half as much on defense. These two facts are the same fact.

The Paradox in One Sentence

The country with the smaller peacetime military and the larger productive economy wins the real war, because real wars are won by the productive economy that the peacetime military either supports or eats.

The Model

A nation’s Wartime Power is, to a first approximation, the product of four things:

Wartime Power = Readiness × Economy × Pivot Speed × Competence

where:

• Readiness is how prepared the standing peacetime military forces are.
• Economy is the size of the civilian productive base that gets converted to wartime output.
• Pivot Speed is how fast that civilian economy retools for war.
• Competence is the operational and strategic skill of the people doing the converting.

Increasing peacetime military spending has four effects on these terms:

• Readiness increases. More peacetime spending buys more standing forces.
• Economy decreases. Every dollar going to defense is a dollar not going to civilian production.
• Pivot Speed decreases. When defense is the high-status sector, the engineers and managers who would lead a wartime pivot go to defense in peacetime instead. Cost-plus procurement habits destroy the pivot reflex. A workforce that has spent forty years building one F-35 per month does not know how to build one B-24 per hour.
• Competence decreases. When defense becomes the prestige sector, talent flows there for status, lobbying access, and clearance value, not for productive competence. Over decades the meritocratic signal weakens. The country that picked Henry Ford in 1942 now picks people who can extract congressional earmarks.

So Wartime Power is a product of one term that grows with defense spending and three terms that shrink with it. At low spending, the gain in Readiness wins, and more defense produces more wartime power. At high spending, the losses in Economy, Pivot Speed, and Competence win, and more defense produces less wartime power.

There is an optimal level of peacetime defense spending. Beyond that level, more spending makes the country weaker, not stronger. This is a Laffer curve for defense.

The argument in this chapter is that the United States is, and has been for decades, well past that optimum.

The Historical Anchor: WW2

In 1939 the United States spent approximately $29 billion per year on defense (constant dollars). By 1945 the United States was spending approximately $1.42 trillion per year. The mobilization scaled defense output by roughly 83x in five years. The country won the war.

The mobilization was possible because:

• Economy was huge. Ford, Boeing, General Motors, US Steel, Bethlehem Steel, DuPont, the rail network. A civilian industrial base that exceeded every other country’s combined.
• Pivot Speed was high. Ford converted the Willow Run plant from passenger cars to B-24 bombers and reached, at peak, one B-24 per hour off the line. General Motors converted to tanks and aircraft engines. Singer Sewing Machine made bomb sights. Civilian factories pivoted because the people who ran them knew how to build things.
• Competence was high. The best engineers, managers, and operations researchers were in the productive sector by default. When the war demanded their talent, they were already trained on real production.
• Readiness was small. The peacetime US military was tiny by modern standards, which left almost all of the country’s resources in the productive Economy that the war then drew on.

The United States won World War II precisely because the peacetime military had been small enough not to cannibalize the productive economy. The 83x mobilization had room to run.

Now project this forward. To replicate a WW2-style 83x mobilization from today’s defense baseline of $886 billion, the United States would need to scale to approximately $73 trillion per year. That exceeds the entire global GDP. The WW2 mobilization is mathematically impossible to repeat from current baselines. The country has spent eighty years cannibalizing the Economy, Pivot Speed, and Competence that made it possible.

After winning the war, the United States cut military spending by 87.6% in two years. The period that followed produced the largest sustained economic expansion in American history. The country was strong because it had stopped spending its strength on weapons it did not need.

1939 vs 2026, Side by Side

The clearest way to see the curve at work is to compare the two end states of the same country.

	1939	2026
Military spending (real)	~$29 billion	$886 billion (30.6x the 1939 level)
What the spending bought	A peacetime military that scaled 83x in five years and won the largest war in human history	A peacetime military that cannot produce enough munitions for a proxy war or scale chip fabrication without Taiwan
What the productive economy looked like	Ford, Boeing, GM, US Steel, Bethlehem, DuPont. Largest industrial base on Earth	Manufacturing employment down from ~28% of workforce in 1960 to ~8% today. Leading-edge chips fabricated abroad. Most precision shipbuilding capacity outside the US
What the procurement system rewarded	Competence in production. Henry Ford reached the top of Ford by building cars	Competence in bribery. Talent rises by capturing earmarks, navigating clearance pipelines, and managing congressional staff
Pentagon audit failures	Not applicable (no modern audit framework)	$2.46 trillion in unaccounted transactions; failed every audit since one was required
Cost per unit of capability	Civilian-comparable	5-20x civilian comparable; F-35 program lifetime cost >$1.5T
Time to convert civilian factory to wartime production	Months (Willow Run: 1 B-24 per hour at peak)	Years to decades, if at all (no civilian factory base to draw on)
Strategic outcome	Won WW2; longest sustained economic expansion in American history followed	Losing strategic competition to a country that spends a third as much in absolute terms

Same country. One peacetime military at a small fraction of the modern budget, one peacetime military at the largest absolute budget in human history. The smaller one produced the country that won World War II. The larger one is producing the country that is losing strategic competition. The Eisenhower Curve is the mechanism by which a country with more spending ends up with less power.

The Contemporary Trap

The United States currently spends approximately 30.6x the pre-World War II baseline in constant dollars. In exchange, the country has:

Hollowed manufacturing base

Most precision manufacturing capacity now sits outside the United States. Chips are fabricated in Taiwan and South Korea. Ships are built in Korea and China. Rare-earth processing is in China. The country cannot scale production of chips, ships, missiles, batteries, or drones at wartime speed without foreign supply chains that would be cut on day one of any real conflict. The civilian E that the WW2 mobilization drew on no longer exists in the form it did in 1940.

Defense procurement at five to twenty times civilian cost

The F-35 program has accumulated lifetime cost projections exceeding $1.5 trillion. The Constellation-class frigate program is years behind schedule and over budget by orders of magnitude. The Sentinel ICBM program has experienced a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Cost-plus contracting reliably produces products that cost an order of magnitude more than civilian equivalents while delivering less. The defense industry has become, by civilian production standards, structurally bad at production.

Pentagon audit failures totaling $2.46 trillion

The Department of Defense has failed every audit since auditing was required. Approximately $2.46 trillion in unaccounted transactions and assets are missing from the public ledger. This is not “waste” in the colloquial sense. It is money that exists nowhere, produced nothing, and is mathematically unrecoverable. The country built it, spent it, and cannot find it.

The selection function has inverted

This is the deepest of the four problems and the one most often missed.

The free market is, when functioning, a competence-selection mechanism. A firm that produces better products at lower cost wins customers, captures market share, and reinvests in further productive capacity. The talent inside the firm rises by demonstrating production competence. The CEO of Ford in 1942 reached that position by being good at building cars. When the country needed bombers, the country had a CEO who knew how to build things.

Government procurement at scale, particularly under cost-plus contracting, inverts this selection function. A firm that captures more federal contracts wins regardless of whether its products work. Cost overruns are absorbed by the customer. The skill that wins contracts is not the skill that produces better weapons; it is the skill that captures the procurement officer, the congressional appropriator, and the relevant committee staff. The talent that rises inside a defense contractor over the past forty years has been selected for competence in bribery, not competence in production. Competence in lobbying, regulatory capture, earmark engineering, security-clearance navigation, post-government revolving-door placement, and the social management of congressional staff.

This is not a moral failing of the individuals involved. It is a structural feature of the system. When the dominant customer is a government that pays cost-plus regardless of outcome, the firm that excels at managing the customer’s procurement bureaucracy wins. The firm that excels at building the actual product, but is less good at managing the bureaucracy, loses or gets acquired. Over decades, the bureaucracy-management firms acquire the production-competent firms, and the entire sector reorganizes around bureaucracy management. The competence-selection signal that picked Henry Ford has been replaced by a competence-selection signal that picks people who can secure a meeting with the chair of House Armed Services. Eisenhower warned about exactly this dynamic in his 1961 farewell address. The country listened, nodded solemnly, and proceeded to spend the next sixty years building the system he warned against.

A country whose defense industry has been selected for bribery competence is structurally less capable of winning a real war than a country whose defense industry has been selected for production competence. The bribery-competent industry can extract money. It cannot, by the time a war starts, retool quickly enough to build the weapons the war actually needs. The country that wins is the country whose civilian economy still has production-competent firms that can be pivoted in eighteen months, the way Ford was. The country that loses is the country whose entire industrial talent pool has spent forty years optimizing earmark capture in a Crystal City office park.

This is the deepest reason the WW2 mobilization cannot be repeated from current baselines. It is not that the dollars are unavailable. It is that the talent that knew how to convert dollars into bombers has been re-trained to convert dollars into appropriations. Reversing this requires shifting the country’s selection function back toward production competence. Every percent of spending moved out of cost-plus government procurement and into market-disciplined civilian sectors shifts the selection function incrementally back toward production competence. The country that selects for production competence wins the next real war. The country that has spent eighty years selecting for bribery competence does not.

The country is paying more for defense and getting less defense, because the spending is destroying the underlying productive capacity that defense ultimately depends on.

What the Empirical Literature Says

The Eisenhower Curve is not just a theoretical model. The cleanest empirical estimate available was published in 2025 by Luqman Saeed at the University of Liverpool in Defence and Peace Economics. Saeed used two new instrumental variables, arms imports during peacetime and the count of neighboring states experiencing interstate conflict, to break the long-standing endogeneity problem that had hobbled fifty years of earlier work in this field. Across a panel of 133 countries from 1960 to 2012, the result was robust across 2SLS, LIML, and GMM specifications:

An increase in military expenditure as a share of GDP of one percentage point reduces economic growth by approximately 1.10 percentage points.

Saeed 2025, Defence and Peace Economics 36(1): 86-101.

That is the empirical Eisenhower Curve. One percentage point of GDP spent on the military costs the country approximately one percentage point of growth. Applied to the United States: cutting military spending from 3.4% of GDP to 2.4% of GDP would, in the central estimate, raise the long-run growth rate by ~1 percentage point per year. Compounded over twenty years, that is roughly a 22% larger US economy in 2046.

The supporting evidence from the rest of the field:

• The CBO has produced periodic analyses showing that defense spending has lower fiscal multipliers than civilian R&D and healthcare investment. These multiplier estimates underpin the 0.6x (95% CI: 0.4x-0.9x) and 4.3x (95% CI: 3x-6x) parameters used elsewhere in this book. They are not contested.
• The theoretical mechanism (crowding-out of civilian investment, talent reallocation toward rent extraction, productive-base atrophy, selection-function inversion toward bribery competence) is widely accepted across the defense-economics literature regardless of which empirical estimate any individual author prefers.

Saeed (2025) is the rigorous answer to the question “what is the effect of military spending on growth?” The CBO multipliers explain why. The Eisenhower Curve is what these tools have been describing all along.

Older work in the field reported contested or null results: Dunne & Smith (2020) found “no strong relation” between military expenditure and investment or growth in a developed-country panel; Alptekin & Levine (2012) meta-analyzed 32 studies and reported small positive effects in developed countries. These findings predate the instrumental-variables methodology Saeed used to identify the causal effect and are best read as evidence that the older methods could not detect what the rigorous method now finds. The next section explains specifically why.

Caveats on the Literature

The empirical literature looks more contested than the underlying mechanism warrants. This is worth surfacing honestly.

On methodology. The older “neutral effect” findings suffer from problems the modern instrumental-variables work was built to fix.

• Reverse causation. Countries that grow fast can afford more military spending. Naive panel regressions see military spending and GDP rising together and attribute the GDP growth partly to the military. This is backwards. Saeed’s instrumental variables (arms imports during peacetime, neighbor-state conflict counts) exist precisely to break this. When you properly identify the causal direction, the strongly negative effect emerges. The older “no effect” findings are most likely reverse-causation bias inflating the apparent effect toward zero.
• Threshold averaging. Military spending at very low levels (1% of GDP) may genuinely have neutral or modestly positive effects: enough deterrence to prevent costly wars, some civilian R&D spillover. Spending at high levels (4%+) is negative. Studies that pool across all spending levels report “no effect on average” because the positive low-level effect cancels the negative high-level effect. This is statistically real and substantively misleading: it cannot speak to the policy-relevant question, which is “are we above the threshold?”
• Time horizon. Negative effects compound slowly. Crowding out of civilian R&D shows up as fewer patents two decades later. Talent migration shows up as a hollowed manufacturing base after thirty years. The Soviet collapse took forty years to manifest. Studies on 5-10 year horizons systematically miss the most important effects.
• Accounting artifact. GDP is defined to include government spending. Cut military spending by 1% of GDP and measured GDP falls by 1% before any reallocation effect shows up. Studies that look at short-run GDP without controlling for this systematically undercount the negative effect on the productive economy.
• Aggregation. “Military spending” lumps together nuclear deterrent, R&D, procurement, personnel costs, and overseas deployments. These have very different multipliers. Treating them as one variable obscures everything.

The methodological answer to “how could military spending have no impact” is: it doesn’t, but the techniques that find no impact are systematically obscuring the impact. The most rigorous recent identification strategy (Saeed’s IV) finds a strongly negative effect. The older neutral findings should be treated as a null hypothesis the field has been failing to reject, not as positive evidence that no effect exists.

On funding. The literature has selection pressure from the defense funding ecosystem that is worth being honest about.

• RAND is a federally funded research and development center primarily funded by the US Department of Defense. The Air Force, Army, and Office of the Secretary of Defense are RAND’s largest clients. RAND has institutional incentives to produce findings that do not threaten defense budgets. Their work is typically careful and nuanced; it is not typically where one finds strongly negative findings about US military spending. The historical studies (1870-1939 great powers) are academically distant from current policy and consequently easier to publish honestly. The reports closer to current policy are where the funding pressure is highest.
• CSIS, AEI, Heritage are think tanks with substantial defense industry donor relationships. Their defense-spending work systematically supports more defense spending. This is not corruption in the criminal sense; it is selection. Donors fund work consistent with their interests; researchers who produce that work get more grants; researchers who do not, find different careers.
• Academic economics has dramatically weaker conflict-of-interest disclosure norms than medical research. Most defense-economics papers do not disclose consulting relationships, government grants, or industry funding. Peer review screens for methodology, not for whether findings serve defense industry. The selection into publication happens upstream: which questions get asked, which methods get used, whose graduate students get hired.

Saeed (2025) is, by contrast, produced outside the US defense funding ecosystem (University of Liverpool), uses methodology that directly addresses the dominant identification problem, and is the most rigorous recent estimate available. Its convergence with the theoretical mechanism (crowding-out, productive-base atrophy, selection-function inversion) is therefore informative. The “no effect” tradition has not converged on anything except an artifact of weaker methodology and stronger funding pressures.

A Note on the “% of GDP” Metric

The empirical literature reports military spending as a share of GDP because that is the academic convention. The convention is convenient but conceptually wrong, and it deserves to be flagged.

Defense needs are mostly absolute, not relative to economic size. They are determined by the threats the country faces, the cost of deterring those threats, and the infrastructure required to maintain that deterrent. They are not a function of how good the country’s widget factories are. If the American economy doubles in real terms over the next twenty years, the number of nuclear weapons required to deter strategic adversaries does not double. The number was sufficient at the smaller economy and remains sufficient at the larger one. Tying defense spending to a percentage of GDP smuggles in a hidden assumption that defense is a normal good that should rise with prosperity. It is not. It is a threat-response variable whose appropriate level is set by the threats and the deterrence math, not by the size of the civilian economy that funds it.

The “% of GDP” framing also creates a ratchet. NATO’s 2% target is the canonical example: it pegs the spending obligation to GDP, which means the obligation rises every year you do better at making widgets, regardless of whether the threats grew. The metric naturalizes growth in defense spending without anyone having to justify it.

For the rest of this chapter, where the academic literature is being cited, “% of GDP” appears because that is how the empirical work is reported. Elsewhere, the comparisons are in absolute dollars or as multiples of historical baselines, which are the metrics the question actually demands.

The China Comparison

China spends approximately $300 billion per year on its military. The United States spends approximately $886 billion per year on its military. That is roughly three times more in absolute terms, against an adversary that conducts its strategic competition by investing the difference into infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, R&D, education, energy capacity, and supply-chain dominance.

China is not winning strategic competition because it spends more on defense. China is winning because it is not making the mistake the United States is making. The Chinese economy compounds; the American economy is partly self-cannibalized by defense overspending. Over 20-30 years, this difference becomes decisive. The country that spent less on defense ends up with more total power because the productive base that defense ultimately depends on is larger.

This is not a hypothetical projection. It is observable in current shipbuilding capacity (China builds roughly 230 times more commercial shipping tonnage than the United States), in chip-manufacturing capacity, in installed solar and battery capacity, in graduating engineers per year, and in patents per year. The pace of Chinese industrial capacity growth is the pace at which the United States is losing the next war it has not yet fought.

If the goal of American defense policy is American strategic position, the current allocation is the worst possible allocation: it is the one that maximizes peacetime spending and minimizes the long-run economic base from which that spending is paid.

The Soviet Precedent

The Soviet Union spent enormous fractions of its GDP on military, possibly as much as 15-25% at peak. The Soviet civilian economy was hollowed by this allocation. By the 1980s the country could not produce shoes for its citizens but could produce intercontinental ballistic missiles. The military spending continued, the productive economy collapsed under it, and the country fell apart in 1991. The military spending did not save it. The military spending was what killed it.

The American trajectory is a slower version of the same curve. The United States is not yet at Soviet-level defense burden, but it has been on the same path for eighty years. Each decade the productive economy shrinks slightly relative to defense, the audit failures accumulate, the procurement costs balloon, and the strategic position erodes against rising competitors that have not made the same mistake.

The Soviet Union was the natural experiment. The Soviet Union proved the curve.

What Optimal Looks Like

The model says the optimum is where additional military spending stops increasing wartime power and starts decreasing it. To convert that abstraction into a dollar figure, look at the convergence of five honest anchors:

Anchor	Implied annual US military budget
Pre-WW2 baseline (the budget that funded the country that won the largest war in human history)	~$280 billion
Peer democracies with comparable threat profiles (UK, France, Germany, Japan, averaged)	~$450 billion
China’s current allocation, scaled to US economy size	~$420-560 billion
Deterrence-required floor (100-200 warheads sufficient for nuclear winter; conventional capacity for allied defense; intelligence and cyber sufficient for current threats)	~$300-500 billion
Saeed (2025) implication (every additional percentage point of military/GDP costs ~1.1 percentage points of growth)	the minimum consistent with deterrence; well below current levels

The anchors converge. Optimal US military spending is somewhere in the range of $300 billion to $550 billion per year, depending on how generous you want to be on the conventional and intelligence side.

Current US military spending: $886 billion.

The Eisenhower-Curve-optimal allocation therefore implies a cut of approximately 35-65% from current levels. That sounds enormous, and it is. It is also historically normal. The post-WW2 cut was 87.6% over two years. The period that followed produced the largest sustained economic expansion in American history. The country was strong because it had stopped spending its strength on weapons it did not need.

The country that finishes this math is the country that reverts to something like the spending levels that won WW2, won the Cold War, and produced the longest economic expansion in American history. Those are the actually-defensible peacetime defense budgets. Everything above them is the Eisenhower Curve in action: spending more, getting less, and watching China win.

The Implication

You are worried about China. You should be. China is spending less on its military as a share of GDP and growing faster. You are spending more and growing slower. The Eisenhower Curve explains why: you are cannibalizing the productive economy that your deterrence depends on.

The human who has been arguing for more spending, more procurement, more capacity, more readiness has been arguing for a position the math no longer supports. The empirical estimate is that the current allocation reduces Wartime Power, not increases it. Any policy that redirects current military spending toward the civilian productive base, in any amount, raises Wartime Power. You do not need to agree on which specific policy. The analytical conclusion survives regardless.

Sources and Related Analysis

Empirical literature

• Saeed, L. (2025). “The Impact of Military Expenditures on Economic Growth: A New Instrumental Variables Approach.” Defence and Peace Economics 36(1): 86-101. The headline finding cited in this chapter: ≈ −1.10 pp growth per +1 pp military/GDP. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2023.2259651
• Dunne, J.P. & Smith, R.P. (2020). “Military Expenditure, Investment and Growth.” Defence and Peace Economics 31(6): 601-614. The agnostic developed-country finding. ideas.repec.org/a/taf/defpea/v31y2020i6p601-614.html
• Alptekin, A. & Levine, P. (2012). “Military expenditure and economic growth: A meta-analysis.” European Journal of Political Economy 28(4): 636-650. The contrarian meta-analysis. ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v28y2012i4p636-650.html
• RAND (2001). “Military Expenditures and Economic Growth,” MR-1112. Great-power historical comparison 1870-1939. rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1112.html

Related chapters in this book

• Eisenhower’s military-industrial complex warning (1961): Proof
• Pentagon audit failures and the $2.46 trillion figure: Pentagon Audit Failures
• The civilian-multiplier comparison underlying the Economy term: Peace Dividend
• The full GDP trajectory modeling that the strategic-competition argument draws on: GDP Trajectories¹⁵⁷

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13.

U.S. Department of Justice. The false claims act. (2025).

14.

United States Supreme Court. State farm mutual automobile insurance co. V. Campbell, 538 u.s. 408. (2003).

15.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. CPI inflation calculator. (2024)

CPI-U (1980): 82.4 CPI-U (2024): 313.5 Inflation multiplier (1980-2024): 3.80× Cumulative inflation: 280.48% Average annual inflation rate: 3.08% Note: Official U.S. government inflation data using Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). Additional sources: https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm

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16.

James Surowiecki. The Wisdom of Crowds. (Surowiecki, 2004).

Explores the aggregation of information in groups, arguing that decisions are often better than could have been made by any single member of the group. The opening anecdote relates Francis Galton’s surprise that the crowd at a county fair accurately guessed the weight of an ox when the median of their individual guesses was taken. The three conditions for a group to be intelligent are diversity, independence, and decentralization. Additional sources: https://archive.org/details/wisdomofcrowds0000suro | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wisdom_of_Crowds | https://www.amazon.com/Wisdom-Crowds-James-Surowiecki/dp/0385721706

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17.

ClinicalTrials.gov API v2 direct analysis. ClinicalTrials.gov cumulative enrollment data (2025). Direct analysis via ClinicalTrials.gov API v2 https://clinicaltrials.gov/data-api/api

Analysis of 100,000 active/recruiting/completed trials on ClinicalTrials.gov (as of January 2025) shows cumulative enrollment of 12.2 million participants: Phase 1 (722k), Phase 2 (2.2M), Phase 3 (6.5M), Phase 4 (2.7M). Median participants per trial: Phase 1 (33), Phase 2 (60), Phase 3 (237), Phase 4 (90). Additional sources: https://clinicaltrials.gov/data-api/api

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18.

ACS CAN. Clinical trial patient participation rate. ACS CAN: Barriers to Clinical Trial Enrollment https://www.fightcancer.org/policy-resources/barriers-patient-enrollment-therapeutic-clinical-trials-cancer

Only 3-5% of adult cancer patients in US receive treatment within clinical trials About 5% of American adults have ever participated in any clinical trial Oncology: 2-3% of all oncology patients participate Contrast: 50-60% enrollment for pediatric cancer trials (<15 years old) Note:  20% of cancer trials fail due to insufficient enrollment; 11% of research sites enroll zero patients Additional sources: https://www.fightcancer.org/policy-resources/barriers-patient-enrollment-therapeutic-clinical-trials-cancer | https://hints.cancer.gov/docs/Briefs/HINTS_Brief_48.pdf

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19.

ScienceDaily. Global prevalence of chronic disease. ScienceDaily: GBD 2015 Study https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/06/150608081753.htm (2015)

2.3 billion individuals had more than five ailments (2013) Chronic conditions caused 74% of all deaths worldwide (2019), up from 67% (2010) Approximately 1 in 3 adults suffer from multiple chronic conditions (MCCs) Risk factor exposures: 2B exposed to biomass fuel, 1B to air pollution, 1B smokers Projected economic cost: $47 trillion by 2030 Note: 2.3B with 5+ ailments is more accurate than "2B with chronic disease." One-third of all adults globally have multiple chronic conditions Additional sources: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/06/150608081753.htm | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10830426/ | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6214883/

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20.

C&EN. Annual number of new drugs approved globally:  50. C&EN https://cen.acs.org/pharmaceuticals/50-new-drugs-received-FDA/103/i2 (2025)

50 new drugs approved annually Additional sources: https://cen.acs.org/pharmaceuticals/50-new-drugs-received-FDA/103/i2 | https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/novel-drug-approvals-fda

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21.

Williams, R. J., Tse, T., DiPiazza, K. & Zarin, D. A. Terminated trials in the ClinicalTrials.gov results database: Evaluation of availability of primary outcome data and reasons for termination. PLOS One 10, e0127242 (2015)

Approximately 12% of trials with results posted on the ClinicalTrials.gov results database (905/7,646) were terminated. Primary reasons: insufficient accrual (57% of non-data-driven terminations), business/strategic reasons, and efficacy/toxicity findings (21% data-driven terminations).

22.

IQVIA Report. Global trial capacity. IQVIA Report: Clinical Trial Subjects Number Drops Due to Decline in COVID-19 Enrollment https://gmdpacademy.org/news/iqvia-report-clinical-trial-subjects-number-drops-due-to-decline-in-covid-19-enrollment/

1.9M participants annually (2022, post-COVID normalization from 4M peak in 2021) Additional sources: https://gmdpacademy.org/news/iqvia-report-clinical-trial-subjects-number-drops-due-to-decline-in-covid-19-enrollment/

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23.

Research and Markets. Global clinical trials market 2024. Research and Markets https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2024/04/19/2866012/0/en/Global-Clinical-Trials-Market-Research-Report-2024-An-83-16-Billion-Market-by-2030-AI-Machine-Learning-and-Blockchain-will-Transform-the-Clinical-Trials-Landscape.html (2024)

Global clinical trials market valued at approximately $83 billion in 2024, with projections to reach $83-132 billion by 2030. Additional sources: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2024/04/19/2866012/0/en/Global-Clinical-Trials-Market-Research-Report-2024-An-83-16-Billion-Market-by-2030-AI-Machine-Learning-and-Blockchain-will-Transform-the-Clinical-Trials-Landscape.html | https://www.precedenceresearch.com/clinical-trials-market

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24.

OpenSecrets. Lobbying spend (defense). OpenSecrets https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying?ind=D (2024).

25.

Rummel, R. J. Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900. (Transaction Publishers, 1994).

Political scientist R.J. Rummel’s comprehensive accounting of democide (government murder of unarmed civilians) in the 20th century. His final revised estimate: 262 million people murdered by their own governments from 1900-1999, excluding battle deaths in wars. Range: 200-272+ million. Communist regimes account for the largest share (100-148+ million). Updated figures at hawaii.edu/powerkills.

26.

GiveWell. Cost per DALY for deworming programs. https://www.givewell.org/international/technical/programs/deworming/cost-effectiveness

Schistosomiasis treatment: $28.19-$70.48 per DALY (using arithmetic means with varying disability weights) Soil-transmitted helminths (STH) treatment: $82.54 per DALY (midpoint estimate) Note: GiveWell explicitly states this 2011 analysis is "out of date" and their current methodology focuses on long-term income effects rather than short-term health DALYs Additional sources: https://www.givewell.org/international/technical/programs/deworming/cost-effectiveness

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27.

Calculated from IHME Global Burden of Disease (2.55B DALYs) and global GDP per capita valuation. $109 trillion annual global disease burden.

The global economic burden of disease, including direct healthcare costs ($8.2 trillion) and lost productivity ($100.9 trillion from 2.55 billion DALYs × $39,570 per DALY), totals approximately $109.1 trillion annually.

28.

U.S. Department of Transportation. Departmental guidance on valuation of a statistical life in economic analysis. (2024).

29.

Think by Numbers. Pre-1962 drug development costs and timeline (think by numbers). Think by Numbers: How Many Lives Does FDA Save? https://thinkbynumbers.org/health/how-many-net-lives-does-the-fda-save/ (1962)

Historical estimates (1970-1985): USD $226M fully capitalized (2011 prices) 1980s drugs:  $65M after-tax R&D (1990 dollars),  $194M compounded to approval (1990 dollars) Modern comparison: $2-3B costs, 7-12 years (dramatic increase from pre-1962) Context: 1962 regulatory clampdown reduced new treatment production by 70%, dramatically increasing development timelines and costs Note: Secondary source; less reliable than Congressional testimony Additional sources: https://thinkbynumbers.org/health/how-many-net-lives-does-the-fda-save/ | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost_of_drug_development | https://www.statnews.com/2018/10/01/changing-1962-law-slash-drug-prices/

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30.

Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO). BIO clinical development success rates 2011-2020. Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) https://go.bio.org/rs/490-EHZ-999/images/ClinicalDevelopmentSuccessRates2011_2020.pdf (2021)

Phase I duration: 2.3 years average Total time to market (Phase I-III + approval): 10.5 years average Phase transition success rates: Phase I→II: 63.2%, Phase II→III: 30.7%, Phase III→Approval: 58.1% Overall probability of approval from Phase I: 12% Note: Largest publicly available study of clinical trial success rates. Efficacy lag = 10.5 - 2.3 = 8.2 years post-safety verification. Additional sources: https://go.bio.org/rs/490-EHZ-999/images/ClinicalDevelopmentSuccessRates2011_2020.pdf

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31.

Nature Medicine. Drug repurposing rate ( 30%). Nature Medicine https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-024-03233-x (2024)

Approximately 30% of drugs gain at least one new indication after initial approval. Additional sources: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-024-03233-x

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32.

EPI. Education investment economic multiplier (2.1). EPI: Public Investments Outside Core Infrastructure https://www.epi.org/publication/bp348-public-investments-outside-core-infrastructure/

Early childhood education: Benefits 12X outlays by 2050; $8.70 per dollar over lifetime Educational facilities: $1 spent → $1.50 economic returns Energy efficiency comparison: 2-to-1 benefit-to-cost ratio (McKinsey) Private return to schooling:  9% per additional year (World Bank meta-analysis) Note: 2.1 multiplier aligns with benefit-to-cost ratios for educational infrastructure/energy efficiency. Early childhood education shows much higher returns (12X by 2050) Additional sources: https://www.epi.org/publication/bp348-public-investments-outside-core-infrastructure/ | https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/442521523465644318/pdf/WPS8402.pdf | https://freopp.org/whitepapers/establishing-a-practical-return-on-investment-framework-for-education-and-skills-development-to-expand-economic-opportunity/

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33.

PMC. Healthcare investment economic multiplier (1.8). PMC: California Universal Health Care https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5954824/ (2022)

Healthcare fiscal multiplier: 4.3 (95% CI: 2.5-6.1) during pre-recession period (1995-2007) Overall government spending multiplier: 1.61 (95% CI: 1.37-1.86) Why healthcare has high multipliers: No effect on trade deficits (spending stays domestic); improves productivity & competitiveness; enhances long-run potential output Gender-sensitive fiscal spending (health & care economy) produces substantial positive growth impacts Note: "1.8" appears to be conservative estimate; research shows healthcare multipliers of 4.3 Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5954824/ | https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/government-investment-and-fiscal-stimulus | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3849102/ | https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Fiscal-multipliers-review.pdf

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34.

World Bank. Infrastructure investment economic multiplier (1.6). World Bank: Infrastructure Investment as Stimulus https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/ppps/effectiveness-infrastructure-investment-fiscal-stimulus-what-weve-learned (2022)

Infrastructure fiscal multiplier:  1.6 during contractionary phase of economic cycle Average across all economic states:  1.5 (meaning $1 of public investment → $1.50 of economic activity) Time horizon: 0.8 within 1 year,  1.5 within 2-5 years Range of estimates: 1.5-2.0 (following 2008 financial crisis & American Recovery Act) Italian public construction: 1.5-1.9 multiplier US ARRA: 0.4-2.2 range (differential impacts by program type) Economic Policy Institute: Uses 1.6 for infrastructure spending (middle range of estimates) Note: Public investment less likely to crowd out private activity during recessions; particularly effective when monetary policy loose with near-zero rates Additional sources: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/ppps/effectiveness-infrastructure-investment-fiscal-stimulus-what-weve-learned | https://www.gihub.org/infrastructure-monitor/insights/fiscal-multiplier-effect-of-infrastructure-investment/ | https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/government-investment-and-fiscal-stimulus | https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2022/eb_22-04

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35.

Mercatus. Military spending economic multiplier (0.6). Mercatus: Defense Spending and Economy https://www.mercatus.org/research/research-papers/defense-spending-and-economy

Ramey (2011):  0.6 short-run multiplier Barro (1981): 0.6 multiplier for WWII spending (war spending crowded out  40¢ private economic activity per federal dollar) Barro & Redlick (2011): 0.4 within current year, 0.6 over two years; increased govt spending reduces private-sector GDP portions General finding: $1 increase in deficit-financed federal military spending = less than $1 increase in GDP Variation by context: Central/Eastern European NATO: 0.6 on impact, 1.5-1.6 in years 2-3, gradual fall to zero Ramey & Zubairy (2018): Cumulative 1% GDP increase in military expenditure raises GDP by  0.7% Additional sources: https://www.mercatus.org/research/research-papers/defense-spending-and-economy | https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/world-war-ii-america-spending-deficits-multipliers-and-sacrifice | https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA739-2/RAND_RRA739-2.pdf

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36.

FDA. FDA-approved prescription drug products (20,000+). FDA https://www.fda.gov/media/143704/download

There are over 20,000 prescription drug products approved for marketing. Additional sources: https://www.fda.gov/media/143704/download

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37.

FDA. FDA GRAS list count ( 570-700). FDA https://www.fda.gov/food/generally-recognized-safe-gras/gras-notice-inventory

The FDA GRAS (Generally Recognized as Safe) list contains approximately 570–700 substances. Additional sources: https://www.fda.gov/food/generally-recognized-safe-gras/gras-notice-inventory

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38.

ACLED. Active combat deaths annually. ACLED: Global Conflict Surged 2024 https://acleddata.com/2024/12/12/data-shows-global-conflict-surged-in-2024-the-washington-post/ (2024)

2024: 233,597 deaths (30% increase from 179,099 in 2023) Deadliest conflicts: Ukraine (67,000), Palestine (35,000) Nearly 200,000 acts of violence (25% higher than 2023, double from 5 years ago) One in six people globally live in conflict-affected areas Additional sources: https://acleddata.com/2024/12/12/data-shows-global-conflict-surged-in-2024-the-washington-post/ | https://acleddata.com/media-citation/data-shows-global-conflict-surged-2024-washington-post | https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/index-january-2024/

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39.

UCDP. State violence deaths annually. UCDP: Uppsala Conflict Data Program https://ucdp.uu.se/

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): Tracks one-sided violence (organized actors attacking unarmed civilians) UCDP definition: Conflicts causing at least 25 battle-related deaths in calendar year 2023 total organized violence: 154,000 deaths; Non-state conflicts: 20,900 deaths UCDP collects data on state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence Specific "2,700 annually" figure for state violence not found in recent UCDP data; actual figures vary annually Additional sources: https://ucdp.uu.se/ | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uppsala_Conflict_Data_Program | https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-in-armed-conflicts-by-region

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40.

Our World in Data. Terror attack deaths (8,300 annually). Our World in Data: Terrorism https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism (2024)

2023: 8,352 deaths (22% increase from 2022, highest since 2017) 2023: 3,350 terrorist incidents (22% decrease), but 56% increase in avg deaths per attack Global Terrorism Database (GTD): 200,000+ terrorist attacks recorded (2021 version) Maintained by: National Consortium for Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism (START), U. of Maryland Geographic shift: Epicenter moved from Middle East to Central Sahel (sub-Saharan Africa) - now >50% of all deaths Additional sources: https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism | https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2024 | https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ | https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/fatalities-from-terrorism

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41.

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). IHME global burden of disease 2021 (2.88B DALYs, 1.13B YLD). Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-results/ (2024)

In 2021, global DALYs totaled approximately 2.88 billion, comprising 1.75 billion Years of Life Lost (YLL) and 1.13 billion Years Lived with Disability (YLD). This represents a 13% increase from 2019 (2.55B DALYs), largely attributable to COVID-19 deaths and aging populations. YLD accounts for approximately 39% of total DALYs, reflecting the substantial burden of non-fatal chronic conditions. Additional sources: https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-results/ | https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(24)00757-8/fulltext | https://www.healthdata.org/research-analysis/about-gbd

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42.

Costs of War Project, Brown University Watson Institute. Environmental cost of war ($100B annually). Brown Watson Costs of War: Environmental Cost https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/social/environment

War on Terror emissions: 1.2B metric tons GHG (equivalent to 257M cars/year) Military: 5.5% of global GHG emissions (2X aviation + shipping combined) US DoD: World’s single largest institutional oil consumer, 47th largest emitter if nation Cleanup costs: $500B+ for military contaminated sites Gaza war environmental damage: $56.4B; landmine clearance: $34.6B expected Climate finance gap: Rich nations spend 30X more on military than climate finance Note: Military activities cause massive environmental damage through GHG emissions, toxic contamination, and long-term cleanup costs far exceeding current climate finance commitments Additional sources: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/social/environment | https://earth.org/environmental-costs-of-wars/ | https://transformdefence.org/transformdefence/stats/

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43.

ScienceDaily. Medical research lives saved annually (4.2 million). ScienceDaily: Physical Activity Prevents 4M Deaths https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/06/200617194510.htm (2020)

Physical activity: 3.9M early deaths averted annually worldwide (15% lower premature deaths than without) COVID vaccines (2020-2024): 2.533M deaths averted, 14.8M life-years preserved; first year alone: 14.4M deaths prevented Cardiovascular prevention: 3 interventions could delay 94.3M deaths over 25 years (antihypertensives alone: 39.4M) Pandemic research response: Millions of deaths averted through rapid vaccine/drug development Additional sources: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/06/200617194510.htm | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9537923/ | https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.118.038160 | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9464102/

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44.

SIPRI. 36:1 disparity ratio of spending on weapons over cures. SIPRI: Military Spending https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2016/opportunity-cost-world-military-spending (2016)

Global military spending: $2.7 trillion (2024, SIPRI) Global government medical research:  $68 billion (2024) Actual ratio: 39.7:1 in favor of weapons over medical research Military R&D alone:  $85B (2004 data, 10% of global R&D) Military spending increases crowd out health: 1% ↑ military = 0.62% ↓ health spending Note: Ratio actually worse than 36:1. Each 1% increase in military spending reduces health spending by 0.62%, with effect more intense in poorer countries (0.962% reduction) Additional sources: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2016/opportunity-cost-world-military-spending | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9174441/ | https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45403

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45.

Think by Numbers. Lost human capital due to war ($270B annually). Think by Numbers https://thinkbynumbers.org/military/war/the-economic-case-for-peace-a-comprehensive-financial-analysis/ (2021)

Lost human capital from war: $300B annually (economic impact of losing skilled/productive individuals to conflict) Broader conflict/violence cost: $14T/year globally 1.4M violent deaths/year; conflict holds back economic development, causes instability, widens inequality, erodes human capital 2002: 48.4M DALYs lost from 1.6M violence deaths = $151B economic value (2000 USD) Economic toll includes: commodity prices, inflation, supply chain disruption, declining output, lost human capital Additional sources: https://thinkbynumbers.org/military/war/the-economic-case-for-peace-a-comprehensive-financial-analysis/ | https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/02/war-violence-costs-each-human-5-a-day/ | https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19115548/

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46.

PubMed. Psychological impact of war cost ($100B annually). PubMed: Economic Burden of PTSD https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35485933/

PTSD economic burden (2018 U.S.): $232.2B total ($189.5B civilian, $42.7B military) Civilian costs driven by: Direct healthcare ($66B), unemployment ($42.7B) Military costs driven by: Disability ($17.8B), direct healthcare ($10.1B) Exceeds costs of other mental health conditions (anxiety, depression) War-exposed populations: 2-3X higher rates of anxiety, depression, PTSD; women and children most vulnerable Note: Actual burden $232B, significantly higher than "$100B" claimed Additional sources: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35485933/ | https://news.va.gov/103611/study-national-economic-burden-of-ptsd-staggering/ | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9957523/

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47.

CGDev. UNHCR average refugee support cost. CGDev https://www.cgdev.org/blog/costs-hosting-refugees-oecd-countries-and-why-uk-outlier (2024)

The average cost of supporting a refugee is $1,384 per year. This represents total host country costs (housing, healthcare, education, security). OECD countries average $6,100 per refugee (mean 2022-2023), with developing countries spending $700-1,000. Global weighted average of  $1,384 is reasonable given that 75-85% of refugees are in low/middle-income countries. Additional sources: https://www.cgdev.org/blog/costs-hosting-refugees-oecd-countries-and-why-uk-outlier | https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2024-11/UNHCR-WB-global-cost-of-refugee-inclusion-in-host-country-health-systems.pdf

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48.

World Bank. World bank trade disruption cost from conflict. World Bank https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/trading-away-from-conflict

Estimated $616B annual cost from conflict-related trade disruption. World Bank research shows civil war costs an average developing country 30 years of GDP growth, with 20 years needed for trade to return to pre-war levels. Trade disputes analysis shows tariff escalation could reduce global exports by up to $674 billion. Additional sources: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/trading-away-from-conflict | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11565 | http://blogs.worldbank.org/en/trade/impacts-global-trade-and-income-current-trade-disputes

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49.

VA. Veteran healthcare cost projections. VA https://department.va.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/2026-Budget-in-Brief.pdf (2026)

VA budget: $441.3B requested for FY 2026 (10% increase). Disability compensation: $165.6B in FY 2024 for 6.7M veterans. PACT Act projected to increase spending by $300B between 2022-2031. Costs under Toxic Exposures Fund: $20B (2024), $30.4B (2025), $52.6B (2026). Additional sources: https://department.va.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/2026-Budget-in-Brief.pdf | https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45615 | https://www.legion.org/information-center/news/veterans-healthcare/2025/june/va-budget-tops-400-billion-for-2025-from-higher-spending-on-mandated-benefits-medical-care

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50.

IQVIA Institute for Human Data Science. The global use of medicines 2024: Outlook to 2028. IQVIA Institute Report https://www.iqvia.com/insights/the-iqvia-institute/reports-and-publications/reports/the-global-use-of-medicines-2024-outlook-to-2028 (2024)

Global days of therapy reached 1.8 trillion in 2019 (234 defined daily doses per person). Diabetes, respiratory, CVD, and cancer account for 71 percent of medicine use. Projected to reach 3.8 trillion DDDs by 2028.

51.

Sinn, M. P. Private industry clinical trial spending estimate. (2025)

Estimated private pharmaceutical and biotech clinical trial spending is approximately $75-90 billion annually, representing roughly 90% of global clinical trial spending.

52.

Cybersecurity Ventures. Cybercrime economy projected to reach $10.5 trillion. Cybersecurity Ventures: $10.5T Cybercrime https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/ (2016)

Global cybercrime costs: $3T (2015) → $6T (2021) → $10.5T (2025 projected) 15% annual growth rate If measured as country, would be 3rd largest economy after US and China Greatest transfer of economic wealth in history Note: More profitable than global trade of all major illegal drugs combined. Includes data theft, productivity loss, IP theft, fraud Additional sources: <https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/> | https://www.boisestate.edu/cybersecurity/2022/06/16/cybercrime-to-cost-the-world-10-5-trillion-annually-by-2025/

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53.

Sinn, M. P. The Political Dysfunction Tax. https://manual.warondisease.org/knowledge/appendix/political-dysfunction-tax.html (2025) doi:10.5281/zenodo.18603840

Quantifying the gap between current global governance and theoretical maximum welfare, estimating a 31-53% efficiency score and $97 trillion in annual opportunity costs.

54.

Bolt, J. & Zanden, J. L. van. Maddison project database 2020. (2020)

Historical GDP per capita estimates from year 1 to present. Global GDP per capita in 1900: approximately 1,260 in 1990 international dollars (roughly 3,150 in 2024 USD after PPP and inflation adjustment). Standard reference for long-run comparative economic history.

55.

Applied Clinical Trials. Global government spending on interventional clinical trials:  $3-6 billion/year. Applied Clinical Trials https://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/view/sizing-clinical-research-market

Estimated range based on NIH ( $0.8-5.6B), NIHR ($1.6B total budget), and EU funding ( $1.3B/year). Roughly 5-10% of global market. Additional sources: https://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/view/sizing-clinical-research-market | https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20)30357-0/fulltext

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56.

World Bank. Expense (% of GDP) - world. (2024).

57.

UBS. Credit suisse global wealth report 2023. Credit Suisse/UBS https://www.ubs.com/global/en/family-office-uhnw/reports/global-wealth-report-2023.html (2023)

Total global household wealth: USD 454.4 trillion (2022) Wealth declined by USD 11.3 trillion (-2.4%) in 2022, first decline since 2008 Wealth per adult: USD 84,718 Additional sources: https://www.ubs.com/global/en/family-office-uhnw/reports/global-wealth-report-2023.html

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58.

Component country budgets. Global government medical research spending ($67.5B, 2023–2024). See component country budgets: NIH Budget https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/budget.

59.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World population prospects 2024: Summary of results. (2024)

The 2024 Revision of the World Population Prospects provides population estimates and projections for 237 countries or areas. Global median age approximately 30.5 years in 2024, reflecting population-weighted average across all regions.

60.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Trends in world military expenditure, 2024. (2025).

61.

SIPRI. Global military spending ($2.72T, 2024). SIPRI https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2024 (2025).

62.

Estimated from major foundation budgets and activities. Nonprofit clinical trial funding estimate.

Nonprofit foundations spend an estimated $2-5 billion annually on clinical trials globally, representing approximately 2-5% of total clinical trial spending.

63.

ICAN. Global nuclear weapon maintenance cost: $100 billion/year. ICAN: Global Spending $100B 2024 https://www.icanw.org/global_spending_on_nuclear_weapons_topped_100_billion_in_2024 (2024)

2024: >$100 billion ($190,151/minute) - 11% increase ($9.9B) from 2023 Nine nuclear-armed states: China, France, India, Israel, N. Korea, Pakistan, Russia, UK, US US: $56.8B (more than all other 8 states combined); China: $12.5B; UK: $10B (+26% YoY, biggest increase) Historical trend: $72.9B (2019) → $82.4B (2021) → >$100B (2024) Private sector contracts: $463B ongoing; $42.5B earned from contracts in 2024 alone Note: $100B/year figure accurate for 2024. Rapid growth from $73B (2019). US spends more than rest of world combined on nuclear weapons Additional sources: https://www.icanw.org/global_spending_on_nuclear_weapons_topped_100_billion_in_2024 | https://www.icanw.org/the_cost_of_nuclear_weapons

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64.

Industry reports: IQVIA. Global pharmaceutical r&d spending.

Total global pharmaceutical R&D spending is approximately $300 billion annually. Clinical trials represent 15-20% of this total ($45-60B), with the remainder going to drug discovery, preclinical research, regulatory affairs, and manufacturing development.

65.

UN. Global population reaches 8 billion. UN: World Population 8 Billion Nov 15 2022 https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-population-reach-8-billion-15-november-2022 (2022)

Milestone: November 15, 2022 (UN World Population Prospects 2022) Day of Eight Billion" designated by UN Added 1 billion people in just 11 years (2011-2022) Growth rate: Slowest since 1950; fell under 1% in 2020 Future: 15 years to reach 9B (2037); projected peak 10.4B in 2080s Projections: 8.5B (2030), 9.7B (2050), 10.4B (2080-2100 plateau) Note: Milestone reached Nov 2022. Population growth slowing; will take longer to add next billion (15 years vs 11 years) Additional sources: https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-population-reach-8-billion-15-november-2022 | https://www.un.org/en/dayof8billion | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Day_of_Eight_Billion

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66.

Harvard Kennedy School. 3.5% participation tipping point. Harvard Kennedy School https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr/publications/35-rule-how-small-minority-can-change-world (2020)

The research found that nonviolent campaigns were twice as likely to succeed as violent ones, and once 3.5% of the population were involved, they were always successful. Chenoweth and Maria Stephan studied the success rates of civil resistance efforts from 1900 to 2006, finding that nonviolent movements attracted, on average, four times as many participants as violent movements and were more likely to succeed. Key finding: Every campaign that mobilized at least 3.5% of the population in sustained protest was successful (in their 1900-2006 dataset) Note: The 3.5% figure is a descriptive statistic from historical analysis, not a guaranteed threshold. One exception (Bahrain 2011-2014 with 6%+ participation) has been identified. The rule applies to regime change, not policy change in democracies. Additional sources: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr/publications/35-rule-how-small-minority-can-change-world | https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2024-05/Erica%20Chenoweth_2020-005.pdf | https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3.5%25_rule

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67.

International IDEA. International IDEA voter turnout database world export. (2026)

Best current register-based estimate of global registered voters. Sum of the latest available country-level Registration counts in International IDEA’s world export on 2026-04-22 = 4,128,142,495 registered voters across 199 countries and political entities. Methodology notes that Registration is the number of names on the voters’ register as reported by electoral management bodies, and comparability is imperfect because voter rolls and registration systems differ across countries. Additional sources: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout-database | https://www.idea.int/data-tools/export?type=region_only&themeId=293&world=all&loc=home

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68.

World Bank. Gross savings (% of GDP). (2024).

69.

Federation of American Scientists. World nuclear forces. Federation of American Scientists https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ (2024)

As of early 2025, we estimate that the world’s nine nuclear-armed states possess a combined total of approximately 12,241 nuclear warheads. Additional sources: https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/

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70.

NHGRI. Human genome project and CRISPR discovery. NHGRI https://www.genome.gov/11006929/2003-release-international-consortium-completes-hgp (2003)

Your DNA is 3 billion base pairs Read the entire code (Human Genome Project, completed 2003) Learned to edit it (CRISPR, discovered 2012) Additional sources: https://www.genome.gov/11006929/2003-release-international-consortium-completes-hgp | https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry/2020/press-release/

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71.

PMC. Only  12% of human interactome targeted. PMC https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10749231/ (2023)

Mapping 350,000+ clinical trials showed that only  12% of the human interactome has ever been targeted by drugs. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10749231/

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72.

WHO. ICD-10 code count ( 14,000). WHO https://icd.who.int/browse10/2019/en (2019)

The ICD-10 classification contains approximately 14,000 codes for diseases, signs and symptoms. Additional sources: https://icd.who.int/browse10/2019/en

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73.

Wikipedia. Longevity escape velocity (LEV) - maximum human life extension potential. Wikipedia: Longevity Escape Velocity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longevity_escape_velocity

Longevity escape velocity: Hypothetical point where medical advances extend life expectancy faster than time passes Term coined by Aubrey de Grey (biogerontologist) in 2004 paper; concept from David Gobel (Methuselah Foundation) Current progress: Science adds  3 months to lifespan per year; LEV requires adding >1 year per year Sinclair (Harvard): "There is no biological upper limit to age" - first person to live to 150 may already be born De Grey: 50% chance of reaching LEV by mid-to-late 2030s; SENS approach = damage repair rather than slowing damage Kurzweil (2024): LEV by 2029-2035, AI will simulate biological processes to accelerate solutions George Church: LEV "in a decade or two" via age-reversal clinical trials Natural lifespan cap:  120-150 years (Jeanne Calment record: 122); engineering approach could bypass via damage repair Key mechanisms: Epigenetic reprogramming, senolytic drugs, stem cell therapy, gene therapy, AI-driven drug discovery Current record: Jeanne Calment (122 years, 164 days) - record unbroken since 1997 Note: LEV is theoretical but increasingly plausible given demonstrated age reversal in mice (109% lifespan extension) and human cells (30-year epigenetic age reversal) Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longevity_escape_velocity | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC423155/ | https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/a36712084/can-science-cure-death-longevity/ | https://www.diamandis.com/blog/longevity-escape-velocity

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74.

OpenSecrets. Lobbyist statistics for washington d.c. OpenSecrets: Lobbying in US https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobbying_in_the_United_States

Registered lobbyists: Over 12,000 (some estimates); 12,281 registered (2013) Former government employees as lobbyists: 2,200+ former federal employees (1998-2004), including 273 former White House staffers,  250 former Congress members & agency heads Congressional revolving door: 43% (86 of 198) lawmakers who left 1998-2004 became lobbyists; currently 59% leaving to private sector work for lobbying/consulting firms/trade groups Executive branch: 8% were registered lobbyists at some point before/after government service Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobbying_in_the_United_States | https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving-door | https://www.citizen.org/article/revolving-congress/ | https://www.propublica.org/article/we-found-a-staggering-281-lobbyists-whove-worked-in-the-trump-administration

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75.

MDPI Vaccines. Measles vaccination ROI. MDPI Vaccines https://www.mdpi.com/2076-393X/12/11/1210 (2024)

Single measles vaccination: 167:1 benefit-cost ratio. MMR (measles-mumps-rubella) vaccination: 14:1 ROI. Historical US elimination efforts (1966-1974): benefit-cost ratio of 10.3:1 with net benefits exceeding USD 1.1 billion (1972 dollars, or USD 8.0 billion in 2023 dollars). 2-dose MMR programs show direct benefit/cost ratio of 14.2 with net savings of $5.3 billion, and 26.0 from societal perspectives with net savings of $11.6 billion. Additional sources: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-393X/12/11/1210 | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14760584.2024.2367451

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76.

Gosse, M. E. Assessing cost-effectiveness in healthcare: History of the $50,000 per QALY threshold. Sustainability Impact Metrics https://ecocostsvalue.com/EVR/img/references%20others/Gosse%202008%20QALY%20threshold%20financial.pdf (2008).

77.

National Institutes of Health BRAIN Initiative. BRAIN 2025: A scientific vision. (2014).

78.

Congressional Research Service. Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44824/R44824.7.pdf (2018).

79.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Electronic Health Records: First Year of CMS’s Incentive Programs Shows Opportunities to Improve Processes to Verify Providers Met Requirements. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-12-481 (2012).

80.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Operation Warp Speed Vaccine Candidate Awards Potential Value. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-207.pdf (2020).

81.

PCORnet. PCORnet quarterly progress report, Q4 2025. (2026).

82.

World Health Organization. Mental health global burden. World Health Organization https://www.who.int/news/item/28-09-2001-the-world-health-report-2001-mental-disorders-affect-one-in-four-people (2022)

One in four people in the world will be affected by mental or neurological disorders at some point in their lives, representing [approximately] 30% of the global burden of disease. Additional sources: https://www.who.int/news/item/28-09-2001-the-world-health-report-2001-mental-disorders-affect-one-in-four-people

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83.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Trends in world military expenditure, 2023. (2024).

84.

Calculated from Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases (2024). Diseases getting first effective treatment each year. Calculated from Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases (2024) https://ojrd.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13023-024-03398-1 (2024)

Under the current system, approximately 10-15 diseases per year receive their FIRST effective treatment. Calculation: 5% of 7,000 rare diseases ( 350) have FDA-approved treatment, accumulated over 40 years of the Orphan Drug Act =  9 rare diseases/year. Adding  5-10 non-rare diseases that get first treatments yields  10-20 total. FDA approves  50 drugs/year, but many are for diseases that already have treatments (me-too drugs, second-line therapies). Only  15 represent truly FIRST treatments for previously untreatable conditions.

85.

NIH. NIH budget (FY 2025). NIH https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/organization/budget (2024)

The budget total of $47.7 billion also includes $1.412 billion derived from PHS Evaluation financing... Additional sources: https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/organization/budget | https://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/

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86.

Bentley et al. NIH spending on clinical trials:  3.3%. Bentley et al. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10349341/ (2023)

NIH spent $8.1 billion on clinical trials for approved drugs (2010-2019), representing 3.3% of relevant NIH spending. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10349341/ | https://catalyst.harvard.edu/news/article/nih-spent-8-1b-for-phased-clinical-trials-of-drugs-approved-2010-19-10-of-reported-industry-spending/

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87.

PMC. Standard medical research ROI ($20k-$100k/QALY). PMC: Cost-effectiveness Thresholds Used by Study Authors https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10114019/ (1990)

Typical cost-effectiveness thresholds for medical interventions in rich countries range from $50,000 to $150,000 per QALY. The Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) uses a $100,000-$150,000/QALY threshold for value-based pricing. Between 1990-2021, authors increasingly cited $100,000 (47% by 2020-21) or $150,000 (24% by 2020-21) per QALY as benchmarks for cost-effectiveness. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10114019/ | https://icer.org/our-approach/methods-process/cost-effectiveness-the-qaly-and-the-evlyg/

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88.

Xia et al., Nature Food. Nuclear winter famine. Xia et al. https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-022-00573-0 (2022)

We estimate that a nuclear war between the United States and Russia would produce 150 Tg of soot and lead to  5 billion people dying at the end of year 2. Additional sources: https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-022-00573-0

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89.

Manhattan Institute. RECOVERY trial 82× cost reduction. Manhattan Institute: Slow Costly Trials https://manhattan.institute/article/slow-costly-clinical-trials-drag-down-biomedical-breakthroughs

RECOVERY trial:  $500 per patient ($20M for 48,000 patients = $417/patient) Typical clinical trial:  $41,000 median per-patient cost Cost reduction:  80-82× cheaper ($41,000 ÷ $500 ≈ 82×) Efficiency: $50 per patient per answer (10 therapeutics tested, 4 effective) Dexamethasone estimated to save >630,000 lives Additional sources: https://manhattan.institute/article/slow-costly-clinical-trials-drag-down-biomedical-breakthroughs | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9293394/

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90.

Trials. Patient willingness to participate in clinical trials. Trials: Patients’ Willingness Survey https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13063-015-1105-3

Recent surveys: 49-51% willingness (2020-2022) - dramatic drop from 85% (2019) during COVID-19 pandemic Cancer patients when approached: 88% consented to trials (Royal Marsden Hospital) Study type variation: 44.8% willing for drug trial, 76.2% for diagnostic study Top motivation: "Learning more about my health/medical condition" (67.4%) Top barrier: "Worry about experiencing side effects" (52.6%) Additional sources: https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13063-015-1105-3 | https://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/view/industry-forced-to-rethink-patient-participation-in-trials | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7183682/

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91.

The Commune. Pentagon audit failures ($2.46T unaccounted). The Commune https://thecommunemag.com/the-pentagon-misplaced-2-46-trillion-an-in-depth-look-at-the-financial-audit-failures (2024)

In the most recent audit, the Department of Defense (DoD) could not account for approximately 60% of its \(4.1 trillion in assets, amounting to\)2.46 trillion unaccounted for. Alternative title: Pentagon unsupported accounting adjustments (\(6.5T, single year, US Army) In 2015, the Department of Defense's Inspector General reported that the Army could not adequately support\)6.5 trillion in year-end adjustments, indicating severe accounting discrepancies. Additional sources: https://thecommunemag.com/the-pentagon-misplaced-2-46-trillion-an-in-depth-look-at-the-financial-audit-failures | https://accmag.com/audit-pentagon-cannot-account-for-6-5-trillion-dollars-is-taxpayer-money/

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92.

Tufts CSDD. Cost of drug development.

Various estimates suggest $1.0 - $2.5 billion to bring a new drug from discovery through FDA approval, spread across  10 years. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development often cited for $1.0 - $2.6 billion/drug. Industry reports (IQVIA, Deloitte) also highlight $2+ billion figures.

93.

Value in Health. Average lifetime revenue per successful drug. Value in Health: Sales Revenues for New Therapeutic Agents https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1098301524027542

Study of 361 FDA-approved drugs from 1995-2014 (median follow-up 13.2 years): Mean lifetime revenue: $15.2 billion per drug Median lifetime revenue: $6.7 billion per drug Revenue after 5 years: $3.2 billion (mean) Revenue after 10 years: $9.5 billion (mean) Revenue after 15 years: $19.2 billion (mean) Distribution highly skewed: top 25 drugs (7%) accounted for 38% of total revenue ($2.1T of $5.5T) Additional sources: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1098301524027542

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94.

Lichtenberg, F. R. How many life-years have new drugs saved? A three-way fixed-effects analysis of 66 diseases in 27 countries, 2000-2013. International Health 11, 403–416 (2019)

Using 3-way fixed-effects methodology (disease-country-year) across 66 diseases in 22 countries, this study estimates that drugs launched after 1981 saved 148.7 million life-years in 2013 alone. The regression coefficients for drug launches 0-11 years prior (beta=-0.031, SE=0.008) and 12+ years prior (beta=-0.057, SE=0.013) on years of life lost are highly significant (p<0.0001). Confidence interval for life-years saved: 79.4M-239.8M (95 percent CI) based on propagated standard errors from Table 2.

95.

Deloitte. Pharmaceutical r&d return on investment (ROI). Deloitte: Measuring Pharmaceutical Innovation 2025 https://www.deloitte.com/ch/en/Industries/life-sciences-health-care/research/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html (2025)

Deloitte’s annual study of top 20 pharma companies by R&D spend (2010-2024): 2024 ROI: 5.9% (second year of growth after decade of decline) 2023 ROI:  4.3% (estimated from trend) 2022 ROI: 1.2% (historic low since study began, 13-year low) 2021 ROI: 6.8% (record high, inflated by COVID-19 vaccines/treatments) Long-term trend: Declining for over a decade before 2023 recovery Average R&D cost per asset: $2.3B (2022), $2.23B (2024) These returns (1.2-5.9% range) fall far below typical corporate ROI targets (15-20%) Additional sources: https://www.deloitte.com/ch/en/Industries/life-sciences-health-care/research/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html | https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/deloittes-13th-annual-pharmaceutical-innovation-report-pharma-rd-return-on-investment-falls-in-post-pandemic-market-301738807.html | https://hitconsultant.net/2023/02/16/pharma-rd-roi-falls-to-lowest-level-in-13-years/

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96.

Nature Reviews Drug Discovery. Drug trial success rate from phase i to approval. Nature Reviews Drug Discovery: Clinical Success Rates https://www.nature.com/articles/nrd.2016.136 (2016)

Overall Phase I to approval: 10-12.8% (conventional wisdom  10%, studies show 12.8%) Recent decline: Average LOA now 6.7% for Phase I (2014-2023 data) Leading pharma companies: 14.3% average LOA (range 8-23%) Varies by therapeutic area: Oncology 3.4%, CNS/cardiovascular lowest at Phase III Phase-specific success: Phase I 47-54%, Phase II 28-34%, Phase III 55-70% Note: 12% figure accurate for historical average. Recent data shows decline to 6.7%, with Phase II as primary attrition point (28% success) Additional sources: https://www.nature.com/articles/nrd.2016.136 | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6409418/ | https://academic.oup.com/biostatistics/article/20/2/273/4817524

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97.

SofproMed. Phase 3 cost per trial range. SofproMed https://www.sofpromed.com/how-much-does-a-clinical-trial-cost

Phase 3 clinical trials cost between $20 million and $282 million per trial, with significant variation by therapeutic area and trial complexity. Additional sources: https://www.sofpromed.com/how-much-does-a-clinical-trial-cost | https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57126

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98.

Ramsberg, J. & Platt, R. Pragmatic trial cost per patient (median $97). Learning Health Systems https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6508852/ (2018)

Meta-analysis of 108 embedded pragmatic clinical trials (2006-2016). The median cost per patient was $97 (IQR $19–$478), based on 2015 dollars. 25% of trials cost <$19/patient; 10 trials exceeded $1,000/patient. U.S. studies median $187 vs non-U.S. median $27. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6508852/

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99.

WHO. Polio vaccination ROI. WHO https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/sustaining-polio-investments-offers-a-high-return (2019)

For every dollar spent, the return on investment is nearly US$ 39." Total investment cost of US$ 7.5 billion generates projected economic and social benefits of US$ 289.2 billion from sustaining polio assets and integrating them into expanded immunization, surveillance and emergency response programmes across 8 priority countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen). Additional sources: https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/sustaining-polio-investments-offers-a-high-return

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100.

ICRC. International campaign to ban landmines (ICBL) - ottawa treaty (1997). ICRC https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jpjn.htm (1997)

ICBL: Founded 1992 by 6 NGOs (Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation) Started with ONE staff member: Jody Williams as founding coordinator Grew to 1,000+ organizations in 60 countries by 1997 Ottawa Process: 14 months (October 1996 - December 1997) Convention signed by 122 states on December 3, 1997; entered into force March 1, 1999 Achievement: Nobel Peace Prize 1997 (shared by ICBL and Jody Williams) Government funding context: Canada established $100M CAD Canadian Landmine Fund over 10 years (1997); International donors provided $169M in 1997 for mine action (up from $100M in 1996) Additional sources: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jpjn.htm | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Campaign_to_Ban_Landmines | https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1997/summary/ | https://un.org/press/en/1999/19990520.MINES.BRF.html | https://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2003/landmine-monitor-2003/mine-action-funding.aspx

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101.

OpenSecrets. Revolving door: Former members of congress. (2024)

388 former members of Congress are registered as lobbyists. Nearly 5,400 former congressional staffers have left Capitol Hill to become federal lobbyists in the past 10 years. Additional sources: https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving-door

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102.

Kinch, M. S. & Griesenauer, R. H. Lost medicines: A longer view of the pharmaceutical industry with the potential to reinvigorate discovery. Drug Discovery Today 24, 875–880 (2019)

Research identified 1,600+ medicines available in 1962. The 1950s represented industry high-water mark with >30 new products in five of ten years; this rate would not be replicated until late 1990s. More than half (880) of these medicines were lost following implementation of Kefauver-Harris Amendment. The peak of 1962 would not be seen again until early 21st century. By 2016 number of organizations actively involved in R&D at level not seen since 1914.

103.

Baily, M. N. Pre-1962 drug development costs (baily 1972). Baily (1972) https://samizdathealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/hlthaff.1.2.6.pdf (1972)

Pre-1962: Average cost per new chemical entity (NCE) was $6.5 million (1980 dollars) Inflation-adjusted to 2024 dollars: $6.5M (1980) ≈ $22.5M (2024), using CPI multiplier of 3.46× Real cost increase (inflation-adjusted): $22.5M (pre-1962) → $2,600M (2024) = 116× increase Note: This represents the most comprehensive academic estimate of pre-1962 drug development costs based on empirical industry data Additional sources: https://samizdathealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/hlthaff.1.2.6.pdf

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104.

Think by Numbers. Pre-1962 physician-led clinical trials. Think by Numbers: How Many Lives Does FDA Save? https://thinkbynumbers.org/health/how-many-net-lives-does-the-fda-save/ (1966)

Pre-1962: Physicians could report real-world evidence directly 1962 Drug Amendments replaced "premarket notification" with "premarket approval", requiring extensive efficacy testing Impact: New regulatory clampdown reduced new treatment production by 70%; lifespan growth declined from  4 years/decade to  2 years/decade Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI): NAS/NRC evaluated 3,400+ drugs approved 1938-1962 for safety only; reviewed >3,000 products, >16,000 therapeutic claims FDA has had authority to accept real-world evidence since 1962, clarified by 21st Century Cures Act (2016) Note: Specific "144,000 physicians" figure not verified in sources Additional sources: https://thinkbynumbers.org/health/how-many-net-lives-does-the-fda-save/ | https://www.fda.gov/drugs/enforcement-activities-fda/drug-efficacy-study-implementation-desi | http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/history/archives/collections/des-1966-1969-1.html

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105.

GAO. 95% of diseases have 0 FDA-approved treatments. GAO https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106774 (2025)

95% of diseases have no treatment Additional sources: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106774 | https://globalgenes.org/rare-disease-facts/

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106.

Oren Cass, Manhattan Institute. RECOVERY trial cost per patient. Oren Cass https://manhattan.institute/article/slow-costly-clinical-trials-drag-down-biomedical-breakthroughs (2023)

The RECOVERY trial, for example, cost only about $500 per patient... By contrast, the median per-patient cost of a pivotal trial for a new therapeutic is around $41,000. Additional sources: https://manhattan.institute/article/slow-costly-clinical-trials-drag-down-biomedical-breakthroughs

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107.

NHS England; Águas et al. RECOVERY trial global lives saved ( 1 million). NHS England: 1 Million Lives Saved https://www.england.nhs.uk/2021/03/covid-treatment-developed-in-the-nhs-saves-a-million-lives/ (2021)

Dexamethasone saved  1 million lives worldwide (NHS England estimate, March 2021, 9 months after discovery). UK alone: 22,000 lives saved. Methodology: Águas et al. Nature Communications 2021 estimated 650,000 lives (range: 240,000-1,400,000) for July-December 2020 alone, based on RECOVERY trial mortality reductions (36% for ventilated, 18% for oxygen-only patients) applied to global COVID hospitalizations. June 2020 announcement: Dexamethasone reduced deaths by up to 1/3 (ventilated patients), 1/5 (oxygen patients). Impact immediate: Adopted into standard care globally within hours of announcement. Additional sources: https://www.england.nhs.uk/2021/03/covid-treatment-developed-in-the-nhs-saves-a-million-lives/ | https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-021-21134-2 | https://pharmaceutical-journal.com/article/news/steroid-has-saved-the-lives-of-one-million-covid-19-patients-worldwide-figures-show | https://www.recoverytrial.net/news/recovery-trial-celebrates-two-year-anniversary-of-life-saving-dexamethasone-result

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108.

National September 11 Memorial & Museum. September 11 attack facts. (2024)

2,977 people were killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks: 2,753 at the World Trade Center, 184 at the Pentagon, and 40 passengers and crew on United Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

109.

World Bank. World bank singapore economic data. World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/country/singapore (2024)

Singapore GDP per capita (2023): $82,000 - among highest in the world Government spending: 15% of GDP (vs US 38%) Life expectancy: 84.1 years (vs US 77.5 years) Singapore demonstrates that low government spending can coexist with excellent outcomes Additional sources: https://data.worldbank.org/country/singapore

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110.

International Monetary Fund. IMF singapore government spending data. (2024)

Singapore government spending is approximately 15% of GDP This is 23 percentage points lower than the United States (38%) Despite lower spending, Singapore achieves excellent outcomes: - Life expectancy: 84.1 years (vs US 77.5) - Low crime, world-class infrastructure, AAA credit rating Additional sources: https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SGP

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111.

World Health Organization. WHO life expectancy data by country. (2024)

Life expectancy at birth varies significantly among developed nations: Switzerland: 84.0 years (2023) Singapore: 84.1 years (2023) Japan: 84.3 years (2023) United States: 77.5 years (2023) - 6.5 years below Switzerland, Singapore Global average:  73 years Note: US spends more per capita on healthcare than any other nation, yet achieves lower life expectancy Additional sources: https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/mortality-and-global-health-estimates/ghe-life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy

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112.

CSIS. Smallpox eradication ROI. CSIS https://www.csis.org/analysis/smallpox-eradication-model-global-cooperation.

113.

PMC. Contribution of smoking reduction to life expectancy gains. PMC: Benefits Smoking Cessation Longevity https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1447499/ (2012)

Population-level: Up to 14% (9% men, 14% women) of total life expectancy gain since 1960 due to tobacco control efforts Individual cessation benefits: Quitting at age 35 adds 6.9-8.5 years (men), 6.1-7.7 years (women) vs continuing smokers By cessation age: Age 25-34 = 10 years gained; age 35-44 = 9 years; age 45-54 = 6 years; age 65 = 2.0 years (men), 3.7 years (women) Cessation before age 40: Reduces death risk by  90% Long-term cessation: 10+ years yields survival comparable to never smokers, averts  10 years of life lost Recent cessation: <3 years averts  5 years of life lost Additional sources: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1447499/ | https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2012/11_0295.htm | https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(24)00217-4/fulltext | https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1211128

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114.

ICER. Value per QALY (standard economic value). ICER https://icer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Reference-Case-4.3.25.pdf (2024)

Standard economic value per QALY: $100,000–$150,000. This is the US and global standard willingness-to-pay threshold for interventions that add costs. Dominant interventions (those that save money while improving health) are favorable regardless of this threshold. Additional sources: https://icer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Reference-Case-4.3.25.pdf

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115.

GAO. Annual cost of u.s. Sugar subsidies. GAO: Sugar Program https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106144

Consumer costs: $2.5-3.5 billion per year (GAO estimate) Net economic cost:  $1 billion per year 2022: US consumers paid 2X world price for sugar Program costs $3-4 billion/year but no federal budget impact (costs passed directly to consumers via higher prices) Employment impact: 10,000-20,000 manufacturing jobs lost annually in sugar-reliant industries (confectionery, etc.) Multiple studies confirm: Sweetener Users Association ($2.9-3.5B), AEI ($2.4B consumer cost), Beghin & Elobeid ($2.9-3.5B consumer surplus) Additional sources: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106144 | https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/report/the-us-sugar-program-bad-consumers-bad-agriculture-and-bad-america | https://www.aei.org/articles/the-u-s-spends-4-billion-a-year-subsidizing-stalinist-style-domestic-sugar-production/

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116.

World Bank. Swiss military budget as percentage of GDP. World Bank: Military Expenditure https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=CH

2023: 0.70272% of GDP (World Bank) 2024: CHF 5.95 billion official military spending When including militia system costs:  1% GDP (CHF 8.75B) Comparison: Near bottom in Europe; only Ireland, Malta, Moldova spend less (excluding microstates with no armies) Additional sources: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=CH | https://www.avenir-suisse.ch/en/blog-defence-spending-switzerland-is-in-better-shape-than-it-seems/ | https://tradingeconomics.com/switzerland/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html

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117.

World Bank. Switzerland vs. US GDP per capita comparison. World Bank: Switzerland GDP Per Capita https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CH

2024 GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted): Switzerland $93,819 vs United States $75,492 Switzerland’s GDP per capita 24% higher than US when adjusted for purchasing power parity Nominal 2024: Switzerland $103,670 vs US $85,810 Additional sources: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CH | https://tradingeconomics.com/switzerland/gdp-per-capita-ppp | https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/USA/gdp_per_capita_ppp/

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118.

OECD. OECD government spending as percentage of GDP. (2024)

OECD government spending data shows significant variation among developed nations: United States: 38.0% of GDP (2023) Switzerland: 35.0% of GDP - 3 percentage points lower than US Singapore: 15.0% of GDP - 23 percentage points lower than US (per IMF data) OECD average: approximately 40% of GDP Additional sources: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm

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119.

OECD. OECD median household income comparison. (2024)

Median household disposable income varies significantly across OECD nations: United States: $77,500 (2023) Switzerland: $55,000 PPP-adjusted (lower nominal but comparable purchasing power) Singapore: $75,000 PPP-adjusted Additional sources: https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-disposable-income.htm

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120.

Wikipedia. Thalidomide scandal: Worldwide cases and mortality. Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalidomide_scandal

The total number of embryos affected by the use of thalidomide during pregnancy is estimated at 10,000, of whom about 40% died around the time of birth. More than 10,000 children in 46 countries were born with deformities such as phocomelia. Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalidomide_scandal

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121.

PLOS One. Health and quality of life of thalidomide survivors as they age. PLOS One https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0210222 (2019)

Study of thalidomide survivors documenting ongoing disability impacts, quality of life, and long-term health outcomes. Survivors (now in their 60s) continue to experience significant disability from limb deformities, organ damage, and other effects. Additional sources: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0210222

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122.

US Census Bureau. Historical world population estimates. US Census Bureau https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/international-programs/historical-est-worldpop.html

US Census Bureau historical estimates of world population by country and region (1950-2050). US population in 1960:  180 million of  3 billion worldwide (6%). Additional sources: https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/international-programs/historical-est-worldpop.html

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123.

FDA Study via NCBI. Trial costs, FDA study. FDA Study via NCBI https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6248200/

Overall, the 138 clinical trials had an estimated median (IQR) cost of $19.0 million ($12.2 million-$33.1 million)... The clinical trials cost a median (IQR) of $41,117 ($31,802-$82,362) per patient. Additional sources: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6248200/

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124.

GBD 2019 Diseases and Injuries Collaborators. Global burden of disease study 2019: Disability weights. The Lancet 396, 1204–1222 (2020)

Disability weights for 235 health states used in Global Burden of Disease calculations. Weights range from 0 (perfect health) to 1 (death equivalent). Chronic conditions like diabetes (0.05-0.35), COPD (0.04-0.41), depression (0.15-0.66), and cardiovascular disease (0.04-0.57) show substantial variation by severity. Treatment typically reduces disability weights by 50-80 percent for manageable chronic conditions.

125.

WHO. Annual global economic burden of alzheimer’s and other dementias. WHO: Dementia Fact Sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dementia (2019)

Global cost: $1.3 trillion (2019 WHO-commissioned study) 50% from informal caregivers (family/friends,  5 hrs/day) 74% of costs in high-income countries despite 61% of patients in LMICs $818B (2010) → $1T (2018) → $1.3T (2019) - rapid growth Note: Costs increased 35% from 2010-2015 alone. Informal care represents massive hidden economic burden Additional sources: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dementia | https://alz-journals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/alz.12901

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126.

JAMA Oncology. Annual global economic burden of cancer. JAMA Oncology: Global Cost 2020-2050 https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaoncology/fullarticle/2801798 (2020)

2020-2050 projection: $25.2 trillion total ($840B/year average) 2010 annual cost: $1.16 trillion (direct costs only) Recent estimate:  $3 trillion/year (all costs included) Top 5 cancers: lung (15.4%), colon/rectum (10.9%), breast (7.7%), liver (6.5%), leukemia (6.3%) Note: China/US account for 45% of global burden; 75% of deaths in LMICs but only 50.0% of economic cost Additional sources: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaoncology/fullarticle/2801798 | https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00634-9

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127.

CDC. U.s. Chronic disease healthcare spending. CDC https://www.cdc.gov/chronic-disease/data-research/facts-stats/index.html

Chronic diseases account for  90% of U.S. healthcare spending ( $3.7T/year). Additional sources: https://www.cdc.gov/chronic-disease/data-research/facts-stats/index.html

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128.

Diabetes Care. Annual global economic burden of diabetes. Diabetes Care: Global Economic Burden https://diabetesjournals.org/care/article/41/5/963/36522/Global-Economic-Burden-of-Diabetes-in-Adults

2015: $1.3 trillion (1.8% of global GDP) 2030 projections: $2.1T-2.5T depending on scenario IDF health expenditure: $760B (2019) → $845B (2045 projected) 2/3 direct medical costs ($857B), 1/3 indirect costs (lost productivity) Note: Costs growing rapidly; expected to exceed $2T by 2030 Additional sources: https://diabetesjournals.org/care/article/41/5/963/36522/Global-Economic-Burden-of-Diabetes-in-Adults | https://doi.org/10.1016/S2213-8587(17)30097-9

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129.

CBO. The 2024 Long-Term Budget Outlook. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60039 (2024).

130.

World Bank, Bureau of Economic Analysis. US GDP 2024 ($28.78 trillion). World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US (2024)

US GDP reached $28.78 trillion in 2024, representing approximately 26% of global GDP. Additional sources: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US | https://www.bea.gov/news/2024/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2024-advance-estimate

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131.

Environmental Working Group. US farm subsidy database and analysis. Environmental Working Group https://farm.ewg.org/ (2024)

US agricultural subsidies total approximately $30 billion annually, but create much larger economic distortions. Top 10% of farms receive 78% of subsidies, benefits concentrated in commodity crops (corn, soy, wheat, cotton), environmental damage from monoculture incentivized, and overall deadweight loss estimated at $50-120 billion annually. Additional sources: https://farm.ewg.org/ | https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-income-finances/government-payments-the-safety-net/

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132.

Drug Policy Alliance. The drug war by the numbers. (2021)

Since 1971, the war on drugs has cost the United States an estimated $1 trillion in enforcement. The federal drug control budget was $41 billion in 2022. Mass incarceration costs the U.S. at least $182 billion every year, with over $450 billion spent to incarcerate individuals on drug charges in federal prisons.

133.

International Monetary Fund. IMF fossil fuel subsidies data: 2023 update. (2023)

Globally, fossil fuel subsidies were $7 trillion in 2022 or 7.1 percent of GDP. The United States subsidies totaled $649 billion. Underpricing for local air pollution costs and climate damages are the largest contributor, accounting for about 30 percent each.

134.

Papanicolas, Irene et al. Health care spending in the united states and other high-income countries. Papanicolas et al. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2674671 (2018)

The US spent approximately twice as much as other high-income countries on medical care (mean per capita: $9,892 vs $5,289), with similar utilization but much higher prices. Administrative costs accounted for 8% of US spending vs 1-3% in other countries. US spending on pharmaceuticals was $1,443 per capita vs $749 elsewhere. Despite spending more, US health outcomes are not better. Additional sources: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2674671

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135.

Hsieh, C.-T. & Moretti, E. Housing constraints and spatial misallocation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20170388 (2019)

We quantify the amount of spatial misallocation of labor across US cities and its aggregate costs. Tight land-use restrictions in high-productivity cities like New York, San Francisco, and Boston lowered aggregate US growth by 36% from 1964 to 2009. Local constraints on housing supply have had enormous effects on the national economy. Additional sources: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20170388

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136.

Yale Budget Lab. The fiscal, economic, and distributional effects of all u.s. tariffs. (2025)

Accounting for all the 2025 US tariffs and retaliation implemented to date, the level of real GDP is persistently -0.6% smaller in the long run, the equivalent of $160 billion 2024$ annually.

137.

Tax Foundation. Tax compliance costs the US economy $546 billion annually. https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/federal/irs-tax-compliance-costs/ (2024)

Americans will spend over 7.9 billion hours complying with IRS tax filing and reporting requirements in 2024. This costs the economy roughly $413 billion in lost productivity. In addition, the IRS estimates that Americans spend roughly $133 billion annually in out-of-pocket costs, bringing the total compliance costs to $546 billion, or nearly 2 percent of GDP.

138.

Cook, C., Cole, G., Asaria, P., Jabbour, R. & Francis, D. P. Annual global economic burden of heart disease. International Journal of Cardiology https://www.internationaljournalofcardiology.com/article/S0167-5273(13)02238-9/abstract (2014)

Heart failure alone: $108 billion/year (2012 global analysis, 197 countries) US CVD: $555B (2016) → projected $1.8T by 2050 LMICs total CVD loss: $3.7T cumulative (2011-2015, 5-year period) CVD is costliest disease category in most developed nations Note: No single $2.1T global figure found; estimates vary widely by scope and year Additional sources: https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/10.1161/CIR.0000000000001258

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139.

Source: US Life Expectancy FDA Budget 1543-2019 CSV. US life expectancy growth 1880-1960: 3.82 years per decade. (2019)

Pre-1962: 3.82 years/decade Post-1962: 1.54 years/decade Reduction: 60% decline in life expectancy growth rate Additional sources: https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy | https://www.mortality.org/ | https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality_tables.htm

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140.

Source: US Life Expectancy FDA Budget 1543-2019 CSV. Post-1962 slowdown in life expectancy gains. (2019)

Pre-1962 (1880-1960): 3.82 years/decade Post-1962 (1962-2019): 1.54 years/decade Reduction: 60% decline Temporal correlation: Slowdown occurred immediately after 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment Additional sources: https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy | https://www.mortality.org/ | https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality_tables.htm

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141.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. US life expectancy 2023. (2024)

US life expectancy at birth was 77.5 years in 2023 Male life expectancy: 74.8 years Female life expectancy: 80.2 years This is 6-7 years lower than peer developed nations despite higher healthcare spending Additional sources: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/life-expectancy.htm

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142.

US Census Bureau. US median household income 2023. (2024)

US median household income was $77,500 in 2023 Real median household income declined 0.8% from 2022 Gini index: 0.467 (income inequality measure) Additional sources: https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2024/demo/p60-282.html

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143.

Manuel, D. U.s. Defense spending history: 100 years of military budgets. DaveManuel.com https://www.davemanuel.com/us-defense-spending-history-military-budget-data.php (2025)

US military spending in constant 2024 dollars: 1939 $29B (pre-WW2 baseline), 1940 $37B, 1944 $1,383B, 1945 $1,420B (peak), 1946 $674B, 1947 $176B, 1948 $117B, 2024 $886B. The post-WW2 demobilization cut spending 88% in two years (1945-1947). Current peacetime spending ($886B) is 30x the pre-WW2 baseline and 62% of peak WW2 spending, in inflation-adjusted dollars.

144.

Statista. US military budget as percentage of GDP. Statista https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/ (2024)

U.S. military spending amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 2024. In 2024, the U.S. spent nearly $1 trillion on its military budget, equal to 3.4% of GDP. Additional sources: https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/ | https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf

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145.

US Census Bureau. Number of registered or eligible voters in the u.s. US Census Bureau https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/2024-presidential-election-voting-registration-tables.html (2024)

73.6% (or 174 million people) of the citizen voting-age population was registered to vote in 2024 (Census Bureau). More than 211 million citizens were active registered voters (86.6% of citizen voting age population) according to the Election Assistance Commission. Additional sources: https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/2024-presidential-election-voting-registration-tables.html | https://www.eac.gov/news/2025/06/30/us-election-assistance-commission-releases-2024-election-administration-and-voting

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146.

U.S. Senate. Treaties. U.S. Senate https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/treaties.htm

The Constitution provides that the president ’shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur’ (Article II, section 2). Treaties are formal agreements with foreign nations that require two-thirds Senate approval. 67 senators (two-thirds of 100) must vote to ratify a treaty for it to take effect. Additional sources: https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/treaties.htm

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147.

Federal Election Commission. Statistical summary of 24-month campaign activity of the 2023-2024 election cycle. (2023)

Presidential candidates raised $2 billion; House and Senate candidates raised $3.8 billion and spent $3.7 billion; PACs raised $15.7 billion and spent $15.5 billion. Total federal campaign spending approximately $20 billion. Additional sources: https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-of-24-month-campaign-activity-of-the-2023-2024-election-cycle/

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148.

OpenSecrets. Federal lobbying hit record $4.4 billion in 2024. (2024)

Total federal lobbying reached record $4.4 billion in 2024. The $150 million increase in lobbying continues an upward trend that began in 2016. Additional sources: https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2025/02/federal-lobbying-set-new-record-in-2024/

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149.

Columbia/NBER. Odds of a single vote being decisive in a u.s. Presidential election. Columbia/NBER: What Is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference? https://sites.stat.columbia.edu/gelman/research/published/probdecisive2.pdf (2012)

National average: 1 in 60 million chance (2008 election analysis by Gelman, Silver, Edlin) Swing states (NM, VA, NH, CO):  1 in 10 million chance Non-competitive states: 34 states >1 in 100 million odds; 20 states >1 in 1 billion Washington DC: 1 in 490 billion odds Methodology: Probability state is necessary for electoral college win × probability state vote is tied Additional sources: https://sites.stat.columbia.edu/gelman/research/published/probdecisive2.pdf | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00272.x

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150.

Hutchinson and Kirk. Valley of death in drug development. (2011)

The overall failure rate of drugs that passed into Phase 1 trials to final approval is 90%. This lack of translation from promising preclinical findings to success in human trials is known as the "valley of death." Estimated 30-50% of promising compounds never proceed to Phase 2/3 trials primarily due to funding barriers rather than scientific failure. The late-stage attrition rate for oncology drugs is as high as 70% in Phase II and 59% in Phase III trials.

151.

DOT. DOT value of statistical life ($13.6M). DOT: VSL Guidance 2024 https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis (2024)

Current VSL (2024): $13.7 million (updated from $13.6M) Used in cost-benefit analyses for transportation regulations and infrastructure Methodology updated in 2013 guidance, adjusted annually for inflation and real income VSL represents aggregate willingness to pay for safety improvements that reduce fatalities by one Note: DOT has published VSL guidance periodically since 1993. Current $13.7M reflects 2024 inflation/income adjustments Additional sources: https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis | https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/economic-values-used-in-analysis

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152.

PLOS ONE. Cost per DALY for vitamin a supplementation. PLOS ONE: Cost-effectiveness of "Golden Mustard" for Treating Vitamin A Deficiency in India (2010) https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0012046 (2010)

India: $23-$50 per DALY averted (least costly intervention, $1,000-$6,100 per death averted) Sub-Saharan Africa (2022): $220-$860 per DALY (Burkina Faso: $220, Kenya: $550, Nigeria: $860) WHO estimates for Africa: $40 per DALY for fortification, $255 for supplementation Uganda fortification: $18-$82 per DALY (oil: $18, sugar: $82) Note: Wide variation reflects differences in baseline VAD prevalence, coverage levels, and whether intervention is supplementation or fortification Additional sources: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0012046 | https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0266495

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153.

Correlates of War Project. National material capabilities (NMC) dataset. (2017).

154.

UN News. Clean water & sanitation (LMICs) ROI. UN News https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/11/484032 (2014).

155.

PMC. Cost-effectiveness threshold ($50,000/QALY). PMC https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5193154/

The $50,000/QALY threshold is widely used in US health economics literature, originating from dialysis cost benchmarks in the 1980s. In US cost-utility analyses, 77.5% of authors use either $50,000 or $100,000 per QALY as reference points. Most successful health programs cost $3,000-10,000 per QALY. WHO-CHOICE uses GDP per capita multiples (1× GDP/capita = "very cost-effective", 3× GDP/capita = "cost-effective"), which for the US ( $70,000 GDP/capita) translates to $70,000-$210,000/QALY thresholds. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5193154/ | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9278384/

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156.

Integrated Benefits Institute. Chronic illness workforce productivity loss. Integrated Benefits Institute 2024 https://www.ibiweb.org/resources/chronic-conditions-in-the-us-workforce-prevalence-trends-and-productivity-impacts (2024)

78.4% of U.S. employees have at least one chronic condition (7% increase since 2021) 58% of employees report physical chronic health conditions 28% of all employees experience productivity loss due to chronic conditions Average productivity loss: $4,798 per employee per year Employees with 3+ chronic conditions miss 7.8 days annually vs 2.2 days for those without Note: 28% productivity loss translates to roughly 11 hours per week (28% of 40-hour workweek) Additional sources: https://www.ibiweb.org/resources/chronic-conditions-in-the-us-workforce-prevalence-trends-and-productivity-impacts | https://www.onemedical.com/mediacenter/study-finds-more-than-half-of-employees-are-living-with-chronic-conditions-including-1-in-3-gen-z-and-millennial-employees/ | https://debeaumont.org/news/2025/poll-the-toll-of-chronic-health-conditions-on-employees-and-workplaces/

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157.

Sinn, M. P. Choose Your Own Earth: A World Without the Political Dysfunction Tax, or Terminal Parasitic Load in 15 Years. https://manual.warondisease.org/knowledge/economics/gdp-trajectories.html (2025) doi:10.5281/zenodo.19076850

Your destructive economy (military spending plus cybercrime) is already 11.5% of GDP and growing faster than your productive economy. At current rates, it reaches the Soviet collapse threshold in 8 years and exceeds productive output in 15. This paper models two GDP trajectories: the optimized path under military-to-medical reallocation, and the default path to civilizational collapse.