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Wishocracy

Keywords

war-on-disease, 1-percent-treaty, medical-research, public-health, peace-dividend, decentralized-trials, dfda, dih, victory-bonds, health-economics, cost-benefit-analysis, clinical-trials, drug-development, regulatory-reform, military-spending, peace-economics, decentralized-governance, wishocracy, blockchain-governance, impact-investing

On Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, the studio audience picked the right answer 91% of the time. The “phone a friend” expert? 65%11.

Your entire system of government is phone-a-friend. You phone 535 members of Congress who don’t know the subject, aren’t trying to answer your question, and are being paid by one of the answer choices. Then you act surprised when the answer is wrong.

On Wishonia, we found the same pattern 4,297 years ago: random crowds outperform credentialed experts on every question where the expert has any incentive to lie, which in government is all of them. So we stopped phoning friends. We built a system that asks everyone. We named it after ourselves, which your species would call “branding.”

Wishocracy replaces committees with code and representatives with math. It lets 8 billion people decide how to split contested public budgets without the answer being quietly rewritten by lobbyists, committees, or people whose main qualification is seniority. The difference between this and Congress is like asking 200 bureaucrats what you should have for lunch versus asking your stomach. Your stomach has never once funded a colleague’s lunch out of professional courtesy.

Your species is already making brutal tradeoffs. Every extra dollar for nuclear weapon systems is a dollar not spent on pragmatic clinical trials, pandemic defense, transit, housing, or anything else. Your current institutions hide that fact by slicing the budget into committees, subcommittees, and jargon until nobody can see the tradeoff clearly enough to object. Wishocracy drags it into daylight.

Regular polling is useless here because it lets people live in a fantasy where scarcity doesn’t exist. Ask humans whether they want more spending on defense, healthcare, education, infrastructure, and also lower taxes, and they’ll cheerfully say yes to all of it because the poll never makes them pay for one with another. Wishocracy does. Every answer is a tradeoff under finite resources, which is why it measures budgets instead of vibes.

How Wishocracy Allocates High-Level Priorities

Anyone can submit a priority. Wishocracy allocates the part of a budget that genuinely requires a collective decision: tradeoffs across domains, shared infrastructure, and public goods that markets handle badly. It’s Kickstarter, but backed by the GDP of nations instead of your friend’s credit card.

What Wishocracy Actually Decides:

The hard stuff. Allocation across competing priorities where there is no honest price signal:

High-Level Tradeoffs

  • “Nuclear weapon modernization” vs “Pragmatic clinical trials”
  • “Pandemic surveillance” vs “Missile defense”
  • “Warhead dismantlement verification” vs “Submarine recapitalization”

Shared Public Goods Within a Domain

  • “Verification satellite network” vs “On-site inspection capacity”
  • “Bridge inspection” vs “Port cybersecurity”
  • “Trial matching infrastructure” vs “Research data interoperability”

Everything else is execution. Engineers build. Operators operate. Researchers research. Markets handle the parts where prices work. Wishocracy governs the part where the species has to decide what the next marginal public dollar should buy.

How It Works: Pairwise Slider Allocation

Your brain can’t rank a list of 20 priorities. It gives up around item number seven139. But it’s much better at a local tradeoff between two things. So instead of asking “Rank these 10,000 priorities,” the system shows you two at a time and asks:

“How would you split $100 between these two priorities right now?”

  • “Nuclear weapon modernization” vs “Pragmatic clinical trials”?
  • “Pandemic surveillance” vs “Missile defense”?
  • “Bridge inspection” vs “Port cybersecurity”?

People split money between two priorities at a time, over and over, until math decides what gets funded. Democracy, but make it exhausting.

People split money between two priorities at a time, over and over, until math decides what gets funded. Democracy, but make it exhausting.

You drag the slider, submit your split, and do this a few times with different random pairs. It takes five minutes (less time than you spend choosing a Netflix show, and considerably more important). Millions of other people do the same. An algorithm aggregates all these pairwise allocations into funding weights. No filibustering. No horse-trading. No senators holding one priority hostage because they want a weapons plant, research park, or bridge in their district.

Not everyone answers every pair. If you don’t know enough about “pandemic surveillance vs missile defense,” skip it. A tiny minority writes Wikipedia articles, a somewhat larger minority edits them, and the majority just reads. The crowd doesn’t need everyone doing the same job. It needs enough informed people doing each job. Skipping is a feature: better to skip than inject random noise because you felt obliged to have an opinion. Low participation is a risk (the system needs thresholds and fallback modes when engagement is too thin), but letting people answer where they actually know or care beats mandatory guessing.

Individual domains keep their own allocation systems. Health has patient-directed trial participation. Science has peer review. Transit has rider feedback. Markets still handle things with prices. Wishocracy sits above that layer, steering the part that actually requires collective choice. One is the engine, the other is the steering wheel. You need both unless you enjoy driving into walls.

Why This Actually Works (Math Warning)

When millions of people make pairwise choices, something almost magical happens (by which I mean “statistically inevitable,” which is the only kind of magic that works):

  • Random pairs prevent gaming. Corrupting your current system requires buying access to 535 members of Congress, which is so affordable that every major industry does it simultaneously. Corrupting Wishocracy would require bribing 8 billion random voters, and the only way to “bribe” 8 billion people is to offer them something they actually want, which is the system working correctly. The attack vector is giving people what they voted for. Your security vulnerability is democracy. It’s also immune to marketing: no ballot measure to link to, no “Vote Yes on Proposition 7” ad to run. Each voter sees random pairs, so the only way to advertise is to convince people your proposal is better than whatever it happens to be compared against, which is just… making a good argument. Your species finds this deeply unsettling.
  • Independence is built in. Surowiecki identified four conditions for crowd wisdom: diversity, independence, decentralization, and aggregation11. Your elections destroy the most critical one. First-past-the-post voting forces strategic voting: people pick the “viable” candidate rather than the best one, so each ballot reflects what voters think other voters will do rather than what they actually want. It’s an ant death spiral: each ant follows the one ahead, the leader follows the last, and the whole colony walks in a circle until it dies. Pairwise comparisons can’t death-spiral. “Which matters more: pragmatic trials or nuclear modernization?” has no spoiler candidate, no wasted vote, no reason to care what your neighbor picked. You just answer honestly. When millions of people answer honestly, you get wisdom. When millions game a two-option system, you get two candidates nobody likes.
  • Statistical models (Bradley-Terry, PageRank)140 extract global preferences from individual comparisons. The same math that ranks Google search results can rank humanity’s budget priorities. Google uses it to find cat videos. You’ll use it to decide whether the next marginal dollar buys a warhead or a clinical trial. Progress.
  • Outliers cancel out. The guy who votes “fund my personal jetpack” gets drowned out by the millions voting for things that are at least attached to reality.
  • Wisdom of crowds emerges. Remember the 91%-versus-65% gap from Millionaire? Your species already proved that random people outperform credentialed individuals at picking the right answer. Wishocracy just applies this to questions that matter.

Example with real numbers:

  • 5 million people vote. Each makes 20 comparisons. That’s 100 million data points.
  • Algorithm processes them in seconds.
  • Output: “Allocate 27% to nuclear weapon systems, 41% to pragmatic clinical trials, 18% to pandemic defense, 14% to everything else…”
  • No committee meetings were harmed in the making of this budget.

It’s democracy without the shouting. The stupidity is still there, but it’s evenly distributed across millions of people and thus cancels out. Your species calls this “the wisdom of crowds.” Mine calls it “obvious.” About half of the 847 civilizations I’ve advised adopted some version of Wishocracy. The other half voted against it, which turned out to be the last thing they voted on.

“But Direct Democracy Has Been Tried” (Yes. Badly.)

You tried asking everyone. It went poorly. But not because asking was wrong.

Your species has run four experiments in direct democracy. Each one failed for a specific, diagnosable reason. None of those reasons apply here.

Athens voted to execute Socrates and invade Sicily (which destroyed their navy and lost the Peloponnesian War). Failure mode: mob rule. Demagogues gave emotional speeches, crowds got excited, irreversible decisions happened before lunch. Wishocracy has no speeches, no candidates, no charisma. You cannot execute a philosopher with a pairwise comparison between infrastructure projects.

California propositions let voters ban same-sex marriage (Prop 8, 2008) while spending over $700 million per cycle on ballot campaigns141. Failure mode: majority rule on fundamental rights, plus unlimited advertising on binary yes/no questions. Wishocracy is scope-locked to budget allocation (you cannot vote on who gets to marry) and presents random pairs (there is no ballot measure to buy ads for).

Brexit reduced a 100-dimensional trade policy to a single binary question, then asked 33 million people to evaluate it with less information than they use to choose a phone plan142. Failure mode: voter incompetence on complex policy forced into yes/no. Wishocracy asks “pragmatic clinical trials vs. nuclear modernization,” not “leave a 27-country trade bloc: yes/no.” Pairwise comparisons between concrete tradeoffs are exactly what crowds answer well.

Swiss referendums denied women the vote until 1971 (one canton held out until 1990)143 and banned minaret construction in 2009144. Failure mode: unbounded scope. Any question could appear on the ballot, including questions about who counts as a person. But the Swiss system is also the closest working model: turnout averages 45%, decisions are granular, the country hasn’t collapsed. Wishocracy keeps the good parts (distributed decisions, regular participation) and scope-locks away the bad parts (voting on rights, 50-page ballot packets). Five minutes of pairwise comparisons, not a weekend with a legal dictionary.

Every criticism of direct democracy is actually a criticism of bad aggregation on unbounded questions. Athens: majority rule on everything with emotional manipulation. California: binary yes/no on complex policy with unlimited ad spending. Wishocracy: pairwise comparisons on scope-locked questions with no advertising surface. Same species. Different math. Different result.

Your Current System Is Phone-a-Friend (But Your Friend Is Being Bribed)

That 91%-versus-65% gap is generous to your politicians. Phone-a-friend experts have three advantages over Congress:

  1. They’re trying to get the right answer. A senator deciding between nuclear modernization and pragmatic clinical trials is trying to get re-elected. These are different objectives. One occasionally produces a sensible budget by accident.

  2. They’re selected for knowledge. You phone your friend who knows history for history questions. Your appropriations chair got there through 30 years of seniority and prolific fundraising. At no point did anyone check whether they could price a warhead against a clinical trial.

  3. They’re not being paid by one of the answer choices. If the phone-a-friend expert were receiving $127M from “Answer C,” you’d call that corruption. When a senator receives money from a defense contractor and then votes on defense spending, you call that “lobbying,” which is the same thing but with a syllable that makes it sound boring enough that nobody gets angry.

So your current system isn’t 65%. It’s phone-a-friend where your friend doesn’t know the subject, isn’t trying to answer your question, and is being paid to say “B.” Against that baseline, 91% seems less like a modest improvement and more like replacing a broken compass with GPS.

The 26-Point Gap Is a Floor, Not a Ceiling

Trivia is the best case for experts. One correct answer. The expert either knows it or doesn’t. Nobody is paying them to say “Constantinople” when the answer is “Istanbul.” No lobbyist taking them to dinner. Their career doesn’t depend on getting it wrong. And they still only hit 65%.

Governance is worse for experts on every dimension:

  • The “right answer” requires knowledge no individual has. Friedrich Hayek won a Nobel Prize in 1974 for explaining why145. No committee knows how much the public actually values one less warhead relative to one more clinical trial. But the public does, and a system that asks all of them knows more than any committee ever could.
  • Experts have financial incentives to give the wrong answer. On Millionaire, nobody pays the expert to lie. In Congress, it’s the business model.
  • Experts are selected for the wrong criteria. On Millionaire, you pick your smartest friend. In Congress, the selection process optimizes for charisma, name recognition, and the ability to stand at a podium without saying anything career-ending. The overlap between this skill set and “knows which public goods deserve the next marginal dollar” is zero.

If crowds outperform experts by 26 points on questions where experts have every advantage, the gap on governance decisions (where experts are compromised, poorly selected, and missing most of the relevant information) is almost certainly larger. The 91%-versus-65% gap is the floor. The ceiling is the Soviet Union: a small group of credentialed experts making resource allocation decisions for 286 million people. It ran for 69 years. It did not go well.

Why Markets Solved This (and Why You Still Need Wishocracy)

Hayek’s solution was markets. Prices aggregate dispersed information automatically: if millions of people want more of something, the price goes up, producers make more. No committee required. Your species has been doing this for thousands of years and it works so well you barely notice it, the way you barely notice breathing until someone puts a pillow over your face.

But markets have a blind spot. They only work when someone can profit from the solution. Markets are good at shoes, mediocre at healthcare, and terrible at public goods like pandemic surveillance, arms reduction verification, and basic research infrastructure. Anything where everyone benefits but nobody can capture the return privately. Markets handle these the way your cat handles a bath.

Wishocracy is what you build when you need Hayek-style information aggregation but can’t rely on price signals. Millions of individual decisions aggregated into collective intelligence, applied to the things markets won’t touch. It’s the free market’s missing organ: the part that funds what’s important instead of just what’s profitable. Hayek diagnosed the disease in 1945. On Wishonia, we built the cure several millennia earlier. Better late than never.

From Priorities to Projects (Where Wishes Become Tasks)

Great, so the Pairwise Slider tells you “Pragmatic clinical trials” matter more than “nuclear weapon modernization.” Now what? A priority without a plan is just a wish. Wishes don’t cure anything or dismantle anything (despite the name). Wishocracy translates that priority into action.

  1. AI Breaks It Down: An AI takes the high-level priority and breaks it into thousands of smaller, concrete, fundable tasks. “Expand pragmatic clinical trials” becomes “Build trial matching infrastructure.” That becomes “Integrate hospital data systems.” “Build open verification tools for warhead dismantlement” becomes “Contract satellite imagery analysis.” Every impossible problem is just a series of possible steps arranged in a line. Your species figured this out for building pyramids 4,500 years ago but keeps forgetting to apply it to government.

  2. The Bounty Board: The system posts these tasks to a global marketplace. It’s like eBay, but for whatever priority the public just chose.

    • WANTED: Expand pragmatic clinical trial capacity. BOUNTY: $10 billion.
    • WANTED: Build open verification tools for warhead dismantlement. BOUNTY: $500 million.
  3. The World Competes: Teams from MIT to some kid in a garage in Lagos bid on these tasks. The system funds multiple approaches in parallel. Winners get more funding. Losers get defunded instantly. It’s venture capital for public goods. Your species already uses this method to decide which restaurants survive and which phone apps get downloaded. Time to try it with the things you keep pretending are too important for competition.

Computer breaks big wishes into small tasks. People compete to do the tasks. Wishes come true. We’ve automated hope.

Computer breaks big wishes into small tasks. People compete to do the tasks. Wishes come true. We’ve automated hope.

Why the Algorithm Is the Constitution

Your species writes beautiful rules and then immediately finds people to break them. Your Constitution guarantees free speech; your government classifies documents. Your laws prohibit bribery; your lobbying industry does it with a receipt. Every protection you’ve designed relies on humans to enforce it, and humans can be bought, threatened, promoted, or distracted by a sufficiently interesting scandal.

On Wishonia, we tried enforcement-based protections for about 200 years before concluding that constitutional constraints enforced by people are just suggestions with better typography. So we put the protections in the math.

Algorithmic Protections (Rules Nobody Can Break Because They’re Not Rules)

Scope. The domain is defined before voting starts. An allocation ballot can ask “nuclear weapon systems or pragmatic clinical trials?” A health ballot can ask “trial matching infrastructure or research data interoperability?” It cannot ask who counts as a person, which religion gets banned, or whether your senator’s cousin deserves a bridge contract. You can’t deposit a sandwich at an ATM. The machine doesn’t accept that input.

Transparency. No backroom where a committee quietly edits the answer. All comparisons, allocations, and outputs get published. Not because a law requires it, but because the system was designed without a “hide this part” button.

Corruption resistance. Your current system can be captured by a manageable number of lobbyists bribing a manageable number of people in a manageable number of rooms. Wishocracy raises the cost dramatically. No single appropriations chair to buy. No single committee hearing to dominate. No single swing vote to purchase. Most of the money never passes through a room with a door you can close.

Bodily autonomy. You can vote to allocate budgets. You cannot vote to control someone else’s body. Not by majority vote. Not by executive order. Not by a very convincing TED talk. On Wishonia, the shortest law on the books is still: “Self.”

What Wishocracy Measures

Wishocracy measures one thing: how people want a bounded public budget split.

It doesn’t tell you whether the public is morally correct. It doesn’t prove which policy is causally optimal. It answers a narrower question: what do people actually want the next marginal public dollar to buy?

If the answer is “27 cents to nuclear weapon systems and 73 cents to pragmatic clinical trials,” that’s already more information than most elections produce after two years of campaigning, three billion dollars in ads, and a national shouting match.