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Earth Optimization Fund

Keywords

war-on-disease, 1-percent-treaty, medical-research, public-health, peace-dividend, decentralized-trials, dfda, dih, victory-bonds, health-economics, cost-benefit-analysis, clinical-trials, drug-development, regulatory-reform, military-spending, peace-economics, decentralized-governance, wishocracy, blockchain-governance, impact-investing

Earth Optimization Services is a company because your planet requires a legal box before anyone can reduce the amount of preventable dying. The box is a holding company. It sells products, makes money, and uses the money to optimize Earth. The first money product is EOS equity. “Earth Optimization Fund” is the public label for the strategy, not a separate fund LLC.

Optimitron checks which policies work. Wishocracy164 asks humans what they want without handing them a 4,000-page budget and a sedative. Money buys a return. It does not buy extra votes, board control over EOS, or a private steering wheel for Earth. The steering wheel is shared, which is the first design improvement.

Product What it does Revenue
The Manual The book you are reading Sales (pay-what-you-want, anchored to $109 (95% CI: $107-$111))
The Uniform T-shirts that say “I am retarded” Sales + the free permanent-marker version
EOS equity (Earth Optimization Fund) Buys company shares and uses shareholder rights to redirect lobbying toward higher long-term shareholder value Portfolio appreciation + operating revenue, no carry
Optimitron Lobbying-ROI data platform Data subscriptions, consulting, board-seat compensation
The dFDA Clinical trial machinery Platform fees
The Prize Assurance contracts for coordinated action Escrow returns
Incentive Alignment Bonds Later revenue-share bonds funding the political campaign Bond issuance fees

EOS buys shares in companies whose lobbying shapes government policy, starting with military contractors because the 1% Treaty165 166 has the cleanest math there. It uses ordinary shareholder tools: voting, demand letters, proxy proposals, proxy contests, board campaigns, and public analysis. This is the investable version of the Loving Takeover. The side quest is buying your own share and filing your own letter. The main money machine is the holding company that owns the campaign.

The long-term goal is to buy enough influence over the companies that already buy policy, then hand the policy agenda back to humanity through Wishocracy164. EOS investors buy economic upside. They do not buy EOS governance, extra votes, nonprofit control, PAC control, or a private steering wheel for Earth.

How you make money

There are three layers of appreciation.

Layer 1: Buying pressure. A coordinated buy-up creates roughly $873 billion of net new demand against a tradeable float of roughly $460 billion. When demand exceeds supply, prices rise. This is arithmetic.

Layer 2: Credibility cascade. As the campaign builds credibility, the market prices in the probability of success. Early buyers see appreciation, which attracts more buyers, which raises prices further. This is the same mechanism that prices in M&A announcements, FDA approvals, and earnings revisions.

Layer 3: The pivot. If the treaty passes, GDP at year 15 runs roughly 1.43x (95% CI: 1.22x-1.72x) the current trajectory. Military contractors in a larger economy capture proportionally more revenue. The engineering workforce pivots to medical, biotech, and civilian applications.

The asymmetric structure. If the campaign succeeds, shares appreciate through all three layers. If it fails, you hold a normal military contractor position. The downside is the foregone return on whatever else you would have bought. These three layers are only part of it; the full set of ways a success pays off (a capped downside against thirteen stacked upsides) is itemized in Earth Optimization Services.

The terms

Term Value Why
First EOS equity raise target $500K to $2M Enough to buy stock, test governance pressure, and keep operations alive. Not enough to build a bureaucracy, which is a feature.
Minimum investment Offering-specific The minimum belongs to the exemption and offering documents, not vibes. Early private capital likely uses standard private-offering minimums.
Operating budget Target: flat annual budget The goal is fixed operating cost, not a growing percentage of assets. Exact expenses belong in the offering documents.
Performance fee / carry Target: none The operators should not skim the upside. If any fee exists, disclose it in plain English and make it boring.
Advisory fee None EOS invests its own balance sheet. It has company expenses, not an outside adviser charging a fund.
Lockup 1 year The interesting part takes longer, but you can leave.
Operator control No investor-bought EOS control Operators run EOS. Investors get economic exposure and share rights, not extra votes in EOS or Wishocracy.
Security type Non-voting EOS equity (private phase), then public shares Money in, more money out. No voting coin, no bought board seat, no private political control.

The cap table principle in one breath: money can buy exposure to EOS. Money cannot buy the human vote, Wishocracy allocation power, nonprofit control, PAC control, or personal influence over politicians. Every dual-class company you have heard of runs the split so the founders can keep the votes. This one runs it so nobody can buy them.

How private-phase pricing works

The private phase prices EOS equity on two things: the portfolio assets EOS owns and the probability-weighted value of the governance campaign succeeding. The public phase is simpler: shares trade around observable market value.

The speculative early claim is your fractional exposure to the probability-weighted value of optimizing Earth. The formula:

\[\text{price per share} = \frac{P(I) \times V}{\text{total shares}}\]

V is the total addressable value EOS can capture: the NPV of the fraction of the political dysfunction tax56 that flows to EOS shareholders through portfolio appreciation. Nordhaus (2004) found innovators capture roughly 2.2% of the social value they create; for activist governance (where the capture mechanism is portfolio appreciation, not competitive product pricing) this is likely a floor. At the base case: $101T/yr dysfunction tax × 2.2% capture × perpetuity at 3% discount rate ≈ $74.1 trillion (95% CI: $16.1 trillion-$260 trillion). Expand the tree below to adjust any assumption.

Product revenue, consulting, board comp, platform subscriptions, does not enter V. It funds operations. V is what happens to the portfolio if the campaign works.

P(I) is the probability of success given total capital invested I. It rises with I: each dollar funds campaigns that raise credibility, which raises the market’s implied probability, which raises the price.

How the initial share price is set, all the options.

A continuous per-share auction is aspirational; Reg D requires signed subscription documents per investor. EOS sets the initial price using a combination of the methods below, then reprices each subsequent tranche based on observed uptake.

Method What it gives you Role in EOS pricing
Implied-probability back-calculation Post-money valuation = P₀ × V / shares. Pick a P₀ a reasonable skeptic accepts as honest; the valuation follows. E.g. P₀ = 0.0001% → ~$74M post-money. Sets the sanity-check floor and ceiling before any investor is approached. Anchors the range within which the auction must land to be credible.
Comparable activist launches Engine No. 1 launched at ~$250M for its first close with no track record. Other activist vehicles: $50M-$500M at launch. Provides an independent cross-check. If the auction clears outside this range, investigate why before proceeding.
Minimum-investment anchor If $25K should represent ~X% of the company, post-money = $25K / X%. E.g. 0.5% → $5M post-money. Sets the floor: a price so low that the $25K minimum feels meaningfully large. Prevents pricing that makes early investors feel like they bought rounding error.
Uniform-price auction (primary mechanism) Solicit bids (price per share + quantity) from all prospective investors before Tranche 1 closes. Sort by price, fill from highest down to the raise target. Everyone pays the clearing price, the lowest winning bid. Underbidding gets you excluded, not a discount, so lowballing is punished. This is the actual price-discovery mechanism. The comparables and implied-probability calculation inform investors before they bid; the auction aggregates their beliefs into a clearing price.
Bayesian tranche repricing After each close, the clearing price is evidence that investors estimated P ≥ implied level. Next tranche opens above that price, reflecting the updated signal. Governs all tranches after Tranche 1. The auction sets the initial price; Bayesian updating governs every subsequent reprice.

How they combine: the implied-probability and comparables methods set the bounds before the auction (a sanity check investors can verify). The minimum-investment anchor prevents the price from being so high that the smallest check feels trivial. The uniform-price auction then runs within those bounds and discovers the actual clearing price. Every tranche after that is a Bayesian update on the signal from the last close.

This means no single person, not Mike, not the attorneys, not the lead investor, picks the share price. The market picks it, within bounds the formula makes explicit and defensible.

Why early money earns more. The early dollar funds the first campaign when P is lowest and each win moves it most. And it is the social proof every later dollar waits for. You bought probability while it was cheap, and your buying is part of what made it expensive. The discount is not a promotion; it is the market’s measure of how much conviction the purchase required.

Why this is not the scheme it resembles. A price that rises with adoption and rewards early believers is also the grammar of a Ponzi. The difference: EOS holds publicly traded portfolio companies. Any payout traces to assets, revenue, or disclosed equity rights, not to later investors. Later buyers can raise the market price; they do not become the source of the asset. That is the entire difference between an activist holding company and a chain letter, and it is auditable.

If the campaign fails. P drops. Price drops. Investors hold a concentrated activist portfolio that underperformed. The honest downside is not catastrophe; it is opportunity cost, what you would have earned elsewhere.

ImportantTwo separate things both called “vote”

EOS corporate voting shares (who controls EOS the company), held by the founder, later by a mission-lock foundation. Investors buying EOS equity receive non-voting economic shares. Money buys returns, never control of EOS.

The civic vote / Wishocracy (what policies humanity wants), one per human, permanent, non-transferable, completely separate from EOS equity. Not a share. Not purchasable. The political governance system the book proposes for public resource allocation. Never conflate the two.

The long-term goal: the mission-lock foundation holds EOS voting shares and is governed by Wishocracy outputs → EOS goes public → anyone on Earth can own common shares → distributed economic ownership at scale. The civic vote remains one per human regardless.

Where the money goes

Your investment
    └─> Buy military contractor shares
            └─> Share price goes up (Layer 1)
            └─> Gain voting rights
                    └─> Redirect lobbying budget
                            └─> Campaign credibility rises
                                    └─> Share price goes up more (Layer 2)
                                            └─> Pass the 1% treaty
                                                    └─> Economy grows 1.43x (95% CI: 1.22x-1.72x)
                                                            └─> Share price goes up a lot (Layer 3)
                                                                    └─> You also don't die

The last line is not priced into the return, but it is arguably the more valuable one.

The cascade: how $5,000 becomes $873 billion

The diagram above assumes somebody buys everything at once. Nobody has $873 billion.

But you do not need to buy 50% of a company to control its board. In 2021, Engine No. 1 won three board seats at ExxonMobil while holding 0.02% of its shares. Carl Icahn has been redirecting boards since 1979 with positions between 1% and 10%. The mechanism is a demand letter the board is legally required to read (Caremark), a proxy proposal institutional investors are required to evaluate (ISS guidelines), and enough credibility that the board’s lawyers recommend settling.

Three methods, ordered by cost:

Method Cost (all 9 US primes) Feasibility
Buy 51% of shares ~$460 billion Impossible without being a nation-state
Activist positions (1-5%) ~$9.1 billion Hard but demonstrated (Icahn, Ackman, Peltz)
Governance pressure + institutional votes $75-200 million Possible

The third method works because institutional investors (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street) hold 60-75% of military contractor shares. They do not need to be bought. They need to be presented with an economically rational proxy proposal. ISS and Glass Lewis evaluate every one. “Your lobbying has negative ROI for your own shareholders” is economically rational. Engine No. 1 proved this at Exxon.

The cascade starts small.

Target 1: Huntington Ingalls (HII). Market cap ~$10 billion. The smallest major prime. A governance-pressure campaign costs $5,000-$15,000. If HII’s board commissions the lobbying ROI analysis (which Caremark doctrine increasingly requires), and the analysis shows what existing studies show (that the lobbying is self-defeating), the lobbying budget begins to redirect. This generates media coverage. Media coverage attracts investors. Investors create buying pressure.

Target 2: Kratos (KTOS). Then Leidos (LDOS). Then L3Harris (LHX). Each success creates three things: credibility (the previous one worked), capital (appreciation from the last campaign funds the next), and attention (which attracts more investors). Each target is funded by the appreciation from the previous one.

HII ($10B) → KTOS ($12B) → LDOS ($20B) → LHX ($45B)
→ GD ($80B) → NOC ($75B) → LMT ($110B) → BA ($130B)
→ RTX ($160B) → GE Aerospace ($200B+)

Then pharma ($373M/yr in lobbying). Then finance ($720M/yr). Then energy. Each sector’s lobbying apparatus, redirected to champion the treaty. Each funded by the appreciation from the last.

The cascade starts with one demand letter filed by one shareholder who paid $200 for one share.

Why this is unlike every other investment

Most investments are zero-sum at the margin. A dollar of market share won by one company is a dollar lost by a competitor. A dollar of return earned by one vehicle is a dollar someone else did not earn. The pie does not grow; the slices are redistributed.

This one is different in four ways that do not coexist in any other asset class.

1. It is the only investment that increases the value of everything else you own. The political dysfunction tax is not a tax on one sector. It is a drag on the entire economy. Eliminating it does not rerate one stock; it reraters all of them. If you own index funds, bonds, real estate, or a business, their value is being suppressed by misallocated policy. EOS correcting that suppression makes your other holdings worth more at the same time it makes itself worth more. No other investment does this.

2. It has no competitors by structure. Every other business competes with someone for something: customers, attention, market share, talent, contracts. EOS’s competition is waste. Waste does not compete back. Nobody is lobbying for preventable deaths to continue because it helps their bottom line in a way they can defend in public. The competitive moat is not a patent, a network effect, or a distribution advantage. It is that fixing the problem makes every other party better off, so there is no organized constituency for the problem to persist.

3. The leverage math is absurd. The top U.S. defense contractors spend roughly $60 million per year on direct lobbying. That money is burned: spent, gone, zero asset remaining. It purchases access and influence for one year and requires the same spend next year to maintain.

EOS buys an estimated $75-200 million in share positions to achieve equivalent governance influence (table above). That capital is not burned. It is invested. The shares appreciate. The influence is perpetual.

The correct way to measure the cost of the governance leverage is not the capital deployed, you were going to invest that capital somewhere regardless. The cost is the opportunity cost: the return you would have earned in your next-best investment, minus what you earn here.

\[\text{ROI}_\text{leverage} = \frac{\text{value of governance influence}}{\text{return elsewhere} - \text{return on MIC activist portfolio}}\]

If the activist campaign causes MIC stocks to outperform your alternatives (Layer 2 appreciation), the denominator is negative, you are paid to hold the governance leverage. If MIC stocks merely match the market, the denominator is zero and the ROI is infinite. If they underperform by 2% on $150M, the annual cost of the leverage is $3 million, still a small price for perpetual influence over $60M/yr of lobbying and a policy apparatus pointing at an $886B annual budget.

The company spending $60M/yr on lobbying has nothing to show for it in year two. EOS has the same influence and an appreciating asset.

4. The amount of policy at stake per dollar invested is exceptional. Governments collectively spend roughly $2.72 trillion per year on the military. Defense contractors collectively influence a meaningful fraction of how that is allocated. The capital required to gain activist influence at the board level across the major primes is a small fraction of one year’s defense budget. Spend that fraction once; redirect the influence on $2.72 trillion per year, compounding, forever. That ratio exists in no other asset class.

The honest caveat: these four properties only hold if the governance campaigns work. Engine No. 1 proved the mechanism at ExxonMobil; it has not been applied at scale to defense. The downside if it fails is a concentrated activist portfolio, not a catastrophe. But the upside if it works is in a different universe from every other investment you could make with the same capital.

What each stage is worth (before it happens)

On my planet, valuation is simple. You look at what a thing does, estimate how much waste it eliminates, and that is what it is worth. Your planet has a more complicated method involving comparable transactions, revenue multiples, and people in suits arguing about discount rates. I will use both methods and see if they agree.

EOS captures value from waste. Not from competitors, not from customers, not from market share. From the gap between what money currently does and what it could do if pointed at things that work. This is not a zero-sum game. The value exists because your species is currently spending money on things that destroy value instead of creating it. EOS redirects the spending. The destroyed value becomes created value. The difference is the return.

Control is the one thing split evenly: one vote per human, operators included, none worth more than another. Your money buys a return, not a bigger say. Your species finds this more suspicious than if they had simply stolen everything.

Stage 1: One company (HII). Huntington Ingalls Industries is the sole supplier of aircraft carriers to the United States Navy. Market cap roughly $10 billion. Its core revenue is contract-locked (the Navy cannot buy carriers from anyone else), its engineering workforce is among the most skilled on the planet, and its lobbying budget is currently pointed at maintaining military spending levels that its own shareholders would be better off without. A governance campaign redirects the lobbying. The contract revenue continues. The stock appreciates from the credibility cascade. Expected value of the position: approximately $330 million. A $25,000 early investment is worth roughly $532,000 at this stage.

Stage 2: Nine companies. The same logic applied to all nine major U.S. military primes. Each success funds the next (appreciation from HII funds KTOS, KTOS funds LDOS, and so on). The lobbying of the entire military sector, redirected. Expected value: $7 billion or more. The mechanism is identical to Stage 1; the scale is larger because nine companies lobby more than one.

Stage 3: All lobbying sectors. Military contracting is not the only industry that lobbies for policies its own shareholders would be better off without. Pharmaceutical companies spend $373 million per year lobbying against drug pricing reforms that would expand their addressable market. Energy companies lobby against transitions that would lower their input costs. Finance, telecom, agriculture. Every industry that lobbies for wasteful policy has value trapped by misallocation. EOS applies the same governance pressure across all of them. Expected value: approximately $452 billion. That $25,000 early investment is now worth roughly $34 million.

Stage 4: Wishocratic governance. When resource allocation is optimized across all public spending globally, through Wishocracy, the total value is the difference between what humanity produces under current governance and what it produces under optimal governance. This is the political dysfunction tax, eliminated. Expected value: approximately $133 trillion. The same $25,000 is worth roughly $10 billion. This sounds absurd until you remember that global GDP is approximately $105 trillion per year, and the difference between good and bad allocation of that sum, compounded over decades, is larger than any number that fits comfortably in a sentence.

Each stage is independently valuable. You do not need Stage 4 to profit from Stage 1. But each stage funds the next, and the probability of reaching each subsequent stage increases with each completed stage. The math suggests this is probably irresistible once Stage 1 demonstrates the mechanism. But “the math suggests” is doing a lot of work in that sentence, and you should check the math yourself. The calculators above let you do that.

How EOS funds its operations

The share price is derived from the probability of civilizational optimization, not from revenue. But EOS still needs money to operate. Here is where it comes from. Four layers. Each works independently. None of them enter the share price formula.

Layer 1: Operating budget. EOS is a holding company, not a fund. There is no management fee, no carry, no advisory fee. The founder is paid a salary as an ordinary operating expense. EOS still has real costs: legal, audit, custody, brokerage, filing, insurance, compliance, and one developer. These should be disclosed, capped, and kept too small to become the product.

At $2M in assets, a flat $150K operating budget is 7.5% of assets. Expensive for a fund; acceptable for a startup that happens to hold activist positions. At $20M it is 0.75%. At $200M it is 0.075%, less than most index funds charge. The operator gets progressively less rich as the company gets bigger. This is the opposite of every fund whose manager is paid to gather assets regardless of performance. Here, the incentive is to make the assets worth more.

Layer 2: Consulting. The demand letter creates a legal obligation for the board to respond (Caremark). Responding requires commissioning an analysis of whether the company’s lobbying generates positive shareholder returns. EOS, through Optimitron, provides this analysis. The free version demonstrates competence. The paid version (deeper, proprietary, ongoing advisory) is how EOS becomes a consultant to the companies it is pressuring.

I spent a long time looking for the part where the demand letter and the consulting pipeline stop being the same object and could not find it. Each demand letter in the cascade creates a potential client. Across military contracting, pharma, and finance at scale, this is $10-50 million per year.

Layer 3: Board seat compensation. When a governance campaign succeeds in placing a director, that director earns $220,000-$350,000 per year in board compensation from the portfolio company, not from EOS. Activist investors routinely require nominated directors to remit that compensation back to the nominating entity under a disclosed agreement. This is standard practice at Elliott, Starboard, and Third Point; it is disclosed in the proxy statement and legally clean.

EOS nominates directors who represent the platonic ideal of a board member: someone who genuinely believes math and evidence should determine what maximizes long-term shareholder value, and acts on it. Optimitron provides the lobbying-ROI analysis; the director reviews it and exercises independent judgment, which, when the analysis is correct, means agreeing with it. The director is not a puppet; they are a person whose values align with the evidence. The $300,000 per year is the fee the company pays for having its shareholders represented by someone who actually read the data.

At scale: 15 board seats across the defense primes generates ~$4.2M/yr. 50 seats across defense, pharma, and finance generates ~$13.5M/yr, enough to cover EOS’s full operating budget from board compensation alone, independent of any management fee.

Layer 4: Platform. Optimitron becomes the analytical infrastructure that every institutional investor, proxy advisory firm, and pension fund uses to evaluate lobbying ROI. The data product is valuable to everyone who votes proxies. This is not a SaaS subscription to a software feature; it is access to a proprietary dataset that takes years of activist campaigns to build and cannot be replicated cheaply.

Layer 5: Brand. The book you are reading. The educational film. The shirts. None of this is large revenue. It is marketing that covers its own costs.

EOS does not need donations or grants. The revenue comes from the same activities that redirect the lobbying. If you separate the revenue from the mechanism, neither functions. Together, they compound: the more successfully EOS redirects lobbying, the more profitable it becomes.

Why competitors help

If another fund copies this strategy, EOS investors make more money. More funds buying means more buying pressure means higher share prices. More demand letters means faster board responses. More media attention means more retail investors.

Ten competing funds means ten times the buying pressure and ten times the demand letters. Competition and cooperation produce identical outcomes. I do not know a word for a game where this is true, but it is the game you are in.

The only thing that needs protecting is the governance: that whoever controls the redirected lobbying does not use it for extraction. This is why EOS publishes the equity formula, the humanity reserve, and the transfer clause before any of it is profitable. Establishing the norms first is the only defense against a version of this that is sleazy.

If someone copies this and executes it well, they have ended war and disease.

Two Money Boxes

There are two money boxes. Do not pour the wrong thing into the wrong box.

EOS equity. Your money buys non-voting shares of Earth Optimization Services, the holding company, which buys activist positions in portfolio companies and operates real businesses on its own balance sheet. Private phase first (Reg D 506(c)), then public listing as fast as campaign results allow. This is the takeover arm.

Incentive Alignment Bonds167. Your money funds the political campaign to pass the treaty. If the treaty passes, it generates $27.2 billion per year, and bondholders receive $2.72 billion per year forever (a projected 272% annual return on the campaign cost of $1 billion). This is the later campaign money, not the first thing you sell.

EOS equity buys the opposition. The bonds may later fund the campaign. Do not confuse the two.

The math on your investment

Set the three personal variables. The success multiplier is not a number you guess: it is derived from how much larger the economy gets if the treaty passes. Expand it to see where the base case comes from, and drag any underlying driver to set your own.

Share-price multiplier if the campaign succeeds. Pick your package. The Light package is the 1% Treaty passing and nothing else: the economy ends up about 1.43x (95% CI: 1.22x-1.72x) the size it would otherwise be by year 15. The Deluxe package is full Wishonia optimization, government replaced with optimal policy, which the model puts at 26.9x (95% CI: 7.65x-100x) by year 15. The Deluxe is a bigger job (you actually replace the broken machine, not just trim its budget), and pays like it. And it is not a one-time choice: you ship the Light package first by passing the treaty, then upgrade to Deluxe at any time by running the rest of the optimization. Same investment, same shares; the upgrade is how far the program goes, not a second purchase. The default below is the Light package, so the number you see first is the floor of the upside, not the ceiling. Expand the tree to edit the drivers.

When you buy changes what you make

The cards above value the share by the appreciation of what it holds (military contractors pivoting in a larger economy). That is only one of the layers. The other is repricing: a share is worth its probability of success times the value of success. You buy while the market prices that probability near zero. If you are right, the share reprices the whole way up, and you keep the difference.

This cuts two ways, and an honest pitch shows both.

The number you are actually betting

Your investment is the lever. Your net worth is the bet. If the treaty passes and the economy ends up larger than the current trajectory, everything you own that tracks the economy (stocks, property, business equity) is worth more under that trajectory than the one where nothing happens. You are already long this outcome. The only question is whether you spend a little to improve its odds.

Your money is melting

This section is not about the fund. It is about everything else you own.

The value of money is a function of two variables: how much you have, and how long you can use it. Your species obsesses over the first variable and ignores the second, which is strange, because the second one is going to zero.

Your probability of being alive and cognitively functional decreases every day. Not because of the market. Because of biology. Every dollar you own is worth slightly less to you today than it was yesterday, because you are slightly closer to the point where you cannot use it. The account balance goes up. The person who can spend it degrades.

The math: if you have $1 million and you spend $200 on something that increases your probability of being alive to use the rest, you have increased the expected value of the remaining $999,800. The $200 does not just generate its own return. It preserves the value of everything else.

This scales linearly with wealth. A person with $1,000 who spends $200 preserves $800 of future utility. A person with $1 billion who spends $200 preserves $999,999,800. Same cost. Same action. The wealthier you are, the more you lose by dying on schedule.

A person who spends 80 years accumulating $100 million and then dies of a treatable disease has built a pile of something that became worthless at the moment of their death. On my planet we find this very confusing. You are building a number and then not being alive for it. It is like spending your life writing a book and then burning it on the last page.

Where to point the money: the lobbying allocation calculator

The question is not “should I buy military contractor stocks?” The question is: which companies give you the most lobbying redirect per dollar of shares?

Military contractors are not the only companies whose lobbying budgets are pointed away from rational policy. Pharmaceutical companies spend roughly $56M/year lobbying against drug pricing reform and clinical trial modernization. Insurance companies lobby against healthcare reform. Oil and gas companies lobby against energy transition. Each dollar of lobbying, redirected, is a dollar pushing toward the treaty.

The calculator below takes your investment amount, allocates it across companies in proportion to their lobbying-per-dollar-of-market-cap ratio, and shows you what that buys: how many shareholder proposals you can file, how much lobbying you can challenge, and at what cost.

What return to expect

Honest version, with the warts, because a number you cannot defend is worse than no number. Your return rides on which trajectory the world ends up on, and there is a floor under all of them.

Outcome Economy at year 15 What your equity return tracks
Floor (nothing works) unchanged You hold concentrated public-company exposure. It may perform like the sector, underperform the market, or suffer normal drawdowns. The consolation is that the assets are real, not that loss is impossible.
Light package (1% Treaty only) ~1.43x (95% CI: 1.22x-1.72x) The companies capture that larger economy and the larger “not-dying” market. The first domino, alone.
Deluxe package (full Wishonia optimization) ~26.9x (95% CI: 7.65x-100x) (year 20: ~56.7x (95% CI: 11.7x-304x)) Government replaced with optimal policy. The moonshot: vast magnitude, lower probability. This is Wishonia’s Wager denominated in dollars.

What does the historical record of taking over badly-run companies suggest is achievable? The clean, peer-reviewed evidence: activist campaigns produce about a 7% one-time repricing at announcement and real operating improvements afterward168, and simply installing competent management at a poorly-run firm raised productivity about 11% in a randomized trial169. The ceiling for disciplined long-term ownership is Warren Buffett’s Berkshire: 19.9% a year versus the S&P 500’s 10.4% over 1965-2024, roughly twice the market for sixty years170.

The warts, stated plainly: that 7% is a one-time repricing, not an annual yield, so do not annualize it. The governance premium that paid 8.5% a year in the 1990s171 faded afterward, so treat it as evidence the badly-run-versus-well-run gap exists, not as a forward yield. Engine No. 1 won three ExxonMobil board seats with a 0.02% stake172, which proves a tiny stake can win control, but the stock’s subsequent surge was the oil-price rally, not the boardroom, so it is a feasibility proof, not a return proof. And activist returns are lumpy: Icahn Enterprises fell about 55% in 2023173.

Why this isn’t Buffett

That lumpiness is the most important thing on the page, because of what causes it. Buffett and Icahn extract returns from inside a system that periodically robs the table, and they eat its volatility. Icahn’s 2023 collapse was not bad stock-picking; it was largely the boom-and-bust the system manufactures: years of money-printing pumped every asset, the disorderly correction dumped them, and leverage finished the job. The lumpiness is the dysfunction.

This is a different kind of bet. Buffett got twice the market despite the dysfunction. EOS proposes to remove the source of it. Rules-based monetary policy replaces the discretionary money-printing that drives the boom-bust (the money-printing machine; algorithmic administration). Optimal policy reduces the malinvestment that distorted rates create. Wishocracy ends the regulatory whiplash that lobbying-driven policy produces. Peace reduces war risk. Each removes a policy-induced source of the volatility that makes every other investor’s returns lumpy.

So this is not only a search for alpha (beating the market). It is an attempt to raise the quality of the market itself: lower the systematic, undiversifiable risk, and you raise risk-adjusted returns and compress the drawdowns for everything anyone holds, including you. The honest bound: this does not abolish risk. Genuine, exogenous shocks remain. What it removes is the large, self-inflicted, policy-manufactured share, which is precisely the share that made Buffett’s six decades a roller-coaster instead of a straight line. Fixing the casino helps every bet at the table. That is the part no fund can offer you, because no fund is trying to fix the casino.

Risk analysis: three scenarios

Scenario 1: Thesis works. Buy shares, gain influence, redirect lobbying, treaty passes. Shares appreciate through buying pressure, credibility cascade, and economic growth. Best case.

Scenario 2: Peace gets priced in early. Other forces (fiscal crisis, parallel peace movements, public opinion shift) reduce military spending before the takeover completes. Military contractor stocks decline. But: you’re buying shares cheaper, biotech positions (if held) appreciate, and board influence during a forced pivot is more valuable than ever.

Scenario 3: Status quo holds. Military spending continues. Treaty fails. You hold concentrated military-contractor exposure. It can perform well during continued military spending, but it can also underperform for ordinary company, valuation, leverage, scandal, rate, or war-risk reasons. The downside is the loss plus the opportunity cost of whatever else you would have bought.

The asymmetry: The strategy is attractive because the upside can stack across portfolio appreciation, policy repair, and the rest of your net worth. It is not attractive because loss is impossible. The best case is you own the companies that pivoted from weapons to medicine in the largest reallocation of capital in human history. The worst case is an activist fund that bought the wrong securities at the wrong time and failed to move policy.

The hedge: The portfolio should include biotech and healthcare positions alongside military contractors. When military spending falls, health spending rises. The two sectors are natural hedges. A portfolio long both captures the transition instead of suffering through it.

If you are greedy

If the campaign fails, you hold the portfolio and the risk. If it succeeds, the appreciation can be a multiple of your investment. The expected value can exceed the S&P at probability estimates that assign enough weight to the upside. The calculator above lets you test this with your own numbers.

If you are generous

Every dollar buys exposure to voting shares in the companies whose lobbyists are the single largest obstacle to the treaty. The money does not fund an advocacy campaign. It buys the opposition and redirects it.

If you are both

Greed and generosity arrive at the same place.