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The Funniest Loving Takeover in the Universe

Author
Affiliation

Mike P. Sinn

International Campaign to End War and Disease

Abstract

The Western military-industrial complex has a combined market capitalization of approximately $670 billion across the major US primes, plus another $50 billion across allied European primes. A majority shareholding requires roughly $385 billion nominal (and far more after price inflation during a coordinated buy-up, which is the point: the upside accrues to the early buyers). Distributed across the global population, the per-person ante is approximately $48-$90. Once humanity holds the majority, the single highest-leverage action is to redirect the ~$127 million per year of defense lobbying from blocking the 1% treaty to championing it. Expected return per global human: ~3,500x-11,000x at base case; ~35x-110x even after a 99% pessimistic haircut. The takeover is structurally loving: existing shareholders are made richer by the demand that buys their shares, defense-contractor employees keep their jobs (and gain new ones in the medical pivot), and the directors and officers who settle gain personal life expectancy alongside everyone else.

Keywords

loving takeover, friendly takeover, shareholder coalition, military industrial complex, defense contractors, 1% treaty, coordinated share purchase, lobbying redirection

STATUS: DRAFT. Requires securities, antitrust, and CFIUS counsel review before any organized buy-up begins. Market-cap numbers are approximate and should be re-verified against current 10-K filings before publication.

COST TO BUY CONTROL OF THE WESTERN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: approximately $700 billion realistic, or ~$90 per global human.

ANNUAL LOBBYING BUDGET YOU GET TO REDIRECT: $127 million (95% CI: $100 million-$160 million), currently spent blocking the 1% treaty157 158. After the takeover, spent passing it.

EXPECTED VALUE PER GLOBAL HUMAN PARTICIPANT: ~$310,000-$1,000,000 in base case, or ~$3,500-$11,000 in ROI multiple. Even after a 99% pessimism haircut, ~$3,000-$10,000 in expected return per $90 contributed.

This is the lawsuit escalated. The lawsuit campaign is the cheap version: own one share, file a demand letter, force the math into the boardroom. The takeover is the maximalist version: own enough shares to vote out the board, redirect the lobbying budget, and convert the most effective political-influence operation on Earth from blocking the treaty to championing it. Same mechanism, larger surface area.

Why “Loving,” Not “Hostile”

A normal hostile takeover is hostile to the people being acquired. The acquirer pays as little as possible. The existing shareholders get cashed out at a small premium. The directors and officers usually lose their jobs. The acquired company is restructured against the prior management’s wishes.

This takeover does the opposite of all four.

  1. Existing shareholders make money on the way in. A coordinated humanity-wide buy-up is roughly $300-700B of net new demand against a tradeable float of ~$460B. The mathematical consequence is that share prices rise. Anyone who held defense contractor stock before the campaign started is wealthier because of the campaign. The takeover is the largest voluntary wealth transfer to existing defense-contractor shareholders in history.
  2. Defense-contractor employees keep their jobs. The companies are not liquidated. The engineering workforce is redirected toward medical, biotech, and dual-use civilian applications that compound at higher rates in the post-treaty economy. Headcount goes up, not down.
  3. Directors and officers gain personal life expectancy. The settlement adds approximately 12 years (95% CI: 8 years-18 years) to the average beneficiary’s healthy life, including the directors and officers themselves and their families. The same directors who currently face the same age-stratified disease risk as everyone else gain measurable additional years of life from the company they direct settling rather than fighting.
  4. The acquirers are everyone. The campaign has no central acquirer extracting value at the expense of others. The “control premium” is paid by humanity to humanity. The early buyers (who fund the campaign by accepting the early risk) capture some upside. The later buyers (who join once the campaign has scale) capture the policy benefits. Existing holders capture the price appreciation. Defense contractors capture an addressable market roughly 4.1x (95% CI: 2.02x-8.62x) larger than the current trajectory. There is no party that loses.

The only thing the takeover is hostile to is a budget line item: the $127 million (95% CI: $100 million-$160 million)/year of lobbying that currently funds the political opposition to the 1% treaty. The humans associated with that line item are not adversaries. The line item is.

Why Buying Shares Is Selfishly Rational

The campaign does not require altruism. It requires self-interest correctly calculated.

A defense contractor’s share price today reflects its current business model: sell weapons, lobby for more weapons spending, repeat. If the campaign succeeds, two things happen mechanically:

  1. The addressable market grows. Under the treaty trajectory, GDP at year 15 is roughly 4.1x (95% CI: 2.02x-8.62x) larger than the current trajectory. Even if military spending stays at the same fraction of GDP, the absolute defense budget grows in proportion. A defense contractor operating in a 4x economy captures roughly 4x the absolute revenue, with no change in its market share.
  2. The pivot opportunity opens. Defense engineering talent applied to medical, biotech, AI-augmented drug discovery, decentralized FDA159,160 infrastructure, sensors, imaging, materials, and dual-use civilian applications compounds at substantially higher rates than current cost-plus defense work. The same workforce produces more value per engineer-year in the medical pivot than in the weapons-system status quo.

The asymmetric upside. If the campaign succeeds, defense contractor shares appreciate substantially through both channels above. If the campaign fails, the shares stay roughly where they are (a normal defense contractor position). Heads you make money; tails you hold a normal defense position. The downside is the foregone return on whatever the share purchase displaced (typically index funds at ~7-10% annualized).

The self-financing cascade. As the campaign builds credibility, the upside above starts to price in. Early buyers see appreciation, which attracts more buyers, which drives prices higher, which makes early buyers wealthier, which validates the strategy, which attracts the next wave. The lawsuit (and the demand-letter pipeline it sits inside) is the catalyst that activates this cycle: every demand letter filed, every board response received, every press article covering the math is a credibility-step that shifts probability mass toward “campaign succeeds” and pulls the future upside into the present share price.

This is not speculation. It is the same mechanism that prices any value-event into a stock: M&A announcements, FDA approvals, regulatory rulings, earnings revisions. The campaign supplies the value-event (a structural shift in the defense contractor’s long-term addressable market and pivot optionality) and the market prices it in as the probability of success rises.

Selfish and altruistic converge. A reader who does not care about disease eradication and wants only to make money has the same correct action as a reader who cares about disease eradication and would buy the shares purely to redirect the lobbying. Both buy the shares. The campaign requires no shared motivation, only shared action.

What Happens to the Share Price When Demand Exceeds Float

The share-price upside above assumes the value-event is the campaign succeeding. There is a second, more mechanical reason prices rise: if the participation rate is high, demand for defense contractor shares exceeds available float, and prices spike for the same reason any constrained-supply asset spikes when buyers pile in.

The math:

Float dynamics

The major Western defense primes have a combined market capitalization of approximately $765 billion. Institutional ownership (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street, other index funds, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds) holds roughly 60-75% of outstanding shares across this universe. Those institutional positions are not actively for sale at any reasonable price; index funds hold market-cap-weighted positions because their mandates require it, not because they want to sell at a particular price.

The freely tradeable float (shares that change hands at market prices on a normal trading day) is roughly 25-40% of total market cap, or approximately $200-300 billion across all major Western defense primes combined.

Daily trading volume in this universe is roughly $5-8 billion. Total annual turnover is roughly 1-2x the float. The market is not built to absorb a multi-hundred-billion-dollar coordinated buy without significant price impact.

Participation scenarios

Scenario Buyers Shares per buyer Total demand Effect
A. Modest 10 million global participants 1 share of one prime ~$3-5B distributed across primes 5-15% price rise per prime over weeks
B. Strong 100 million global participants 1 share of one prime ~$30-50B distributed across primes 30-80% price rise per prime; some halts
C. Coordinated 100 million global participants 1 share of each of ~10 primes ~$300-500B (exceeds entire tradeable float) 3-8x price spike across all primes; trading halts; SEC scrutiny
D. Viral 1 billion global participants 1 share of each of ~10 primes ~$3 trillion (~10x available float) 10-50x price spike at peak; circuit breakers triggered; market mechanisms strained

Reference point: GameStop, January 2021

The GameStop short squeeze offers an empirical anchor. GameStop had approximately 50 million shares outstanding and a tradeable float comparable to a single mid-sized defense prime. Coordinated retail buying (millions of participants, no institutional coordination) drove the price from approximately $20 to approximately $483 over several weeks: a ~24x increase. The squeeze was amplified by ~140% short interest (a dynamic that does not apply meaningfully to defense primes), but the basic mechanism (float-constrained demand from coordinated retail) is identical to what scenarios C and D model.

Defense primes have lower short interest, which removes the squeeze-amplification, but they also have larger market caps and smaller proportional float, which increases the price sensitivity to large demand shocks. Net: a coordinated global buy-up plausibly produces price moves in the same order of magnitude as GameStop did, distributed across a basket of contractors rather than concentrated in one.

What this means for early buyers

In scenarios C and D, early buyers see price appreciation before the campaign has finished its first acquisition wave. A participant who buys 1 share of Lockheed Martin at $530 today and 100 million other participants follow over the next 6-18 months sees the share price rise into the $1,500-$3,000 range mechanically, before any policy outcome materializes.

This is the structural reason the campaign is selfish-rational: the price spike happens whether or not the treaty passes, because it is caused by the demand for the shares, not by the eventual policy outcome.

The combination of (1) asymmetric upside from the policy outcome and (2) mechanical price appreciation from float-constrained demand is, per dollar deployed, plausibly the highest expected-return investment available to a retail buyer in the current market.

Caveats

Three honest caveats apply:

  1. Circuit breakers and trading halts will trigger in scenarios C and D. Buyers will not be able to fill orders at every desired price point. Some demand will displace into options markets, ETFs, and adjacent securities.
  2. Some institutional holders will sell at high prices to capture the spike, providing partial supply relief. This dampens the peak but does not eliminate the rise; rebalancing flows are bounded by mandate constraints.
  3. Regulatory intervention is possible. The SEC may scrutinize a coordinated buy-up. Posture matters: “long-term shareholders aligning lobbying with shareholder interests” is defensible; “coordinated market manipulation” is not. The substance is the same; the framing determines how regulators respond.

None of these caveats undo the basic dynamic. They shape the trajectory and the volatility, not the direction.

Why This Works

The military-industrial complex is not a sovereign power. It is a collection of publicly traded corporations whose shares are for sale to anyone with a brokerage account. The lobby that has driven defense budget expansion for eighty years is a line item in those corporations’ SG&A. The line item is controllable by whoever holds the board. The board is electable by whoever holds 50%+1 of the shares. The shares are for sale.

Stated as a chain: the diseases that will kill you and your family stay in the trial queue because the trials are not funded. The trials are not funded because the federal budget pays for missiles instead of cures. The federal budget pays for missiles instead of cures because the defense lobby tells Congress to. The defense lobby tells Congress to because the defense contractors authorize and pay for it. The defense contractors authorize and pay for it because their boards vote to. The boards vote to because their shareholders elect them. The shareholders elect them because nobody has yet pointed out that they could elect a different board for the price of a coffee per global human.

This page points it out.

The Math

Major Western defense primes (approximate market caps)

Contractor Ticker Approx market cap 50%+1 control cost
RTX (Raytheon) RTX ~$160B ~$80B
Boeing BA ~$130B ~$65B
Lockheed Martin LMT ~$110B ~$55B
General Dynamics GD ~$80B ~$40B
Northrop Grumman NOC ~$75B ~$38B
L3Harris LHX ~$45B ~$23B
Leidos LDOS ~$20B ~$10B
Booz Allen Hamilton BAH ~$20B ~$10B
CACI International CACI ~$11B ~$6B
Huntington Ingalls HII ~$10B ~$5B
SAIC SAIC ~$8B ~$4B
US primes subtotal ~$670B ~$336B
BAE Systems (UK) BA.L ~$60B ~$30B
Thales (France) HO.PA ~$35B ~$18B
Allied primes ~$95B ~$48B
Total Western primes ~$765B ~$384B

Numbers are approximate and require verification against current filings before any campaign acts on them.

Realistic cost after price inflation

A coordinated purchase of half the float of every major defense prime simultaneously would push prices up sharply. Realistic effective cost after a 1.5x-3x acquisition premium:

  • Nominal: ~$385 billion
  • Realistic with acquisition premium: ~$600 billion to $1 trillion

The premium is the upside captured by the early buyers. It is the campaign’s self-financing mechanism, not a cost overrun.

Per-person cost

Cost distributed across Per-person cost (realistic)
Global humans (8 billion) ~$90
Global adults (~5.5 billion) ~$130
Global middle class+ (~3.5 billion) ~$200
US adults (260 million) ~$2,700
US households (130 million) ~$5,400
US households earning >$100k (~50 million) ~$14,000

The entire Western military-industrial lobbying apparatus can be brought under common shareholder control for less than the price of a coffee per week per global human for a single year.

This number is calculable. It is not a fantasy.

What Humanity Does Once It Owns the Companies

Ranked by leverage. The first action is the entire game; the rest are bonus.

Tier 1: Redirect the lobbying budget (highest leverage, zero cost)

Defense contractors currently spend $127 million (95% CI: $100 million-$160 million) per year lobbying Congress to expand defense appropriations. This is the most effective political-influence operation on Earth. It has driven US military spending from its 1939 baseline to current levels and prevented every serious proposal for reallocation.

After the takeover, the same budget is reallocated to lobby for the 1% treaty. The same lobbyists, the same congressional relationships, the same legislative drafting expertise, the same media operations, all pointed in the opposite direction.

Cost: $0 (it is the same line item, just relabeled).

Time to effect: Immediate. The first quarter’s lobbying disclosures will show the new direction.

Why this is the entire game: US military and foreign policy follows defense-industry lobbying with high fidelity. Flip the lobby, and the senators who depend on defense PAC money to keep their seats follow within one election cycle. China and Russia become the only remaining holdouts, and they are easier holdouts to address with the US lobby championing the treaty than with the US lobby blocking it.

Tier 2: Public corporate endorsement

Every major defense contractor publicly endorses the 1% treaty. The most common political argument against the treaty (“industry opposes it”) evaporates overnight. Senators lose cover. Editorial boards reverse positions. The Overton window shifts by a decade in a week.

Cost: $0.

Time to effect: One press release per contractor.

Tier 3: Stop opposing donations

Defense PACs currently donate to candidates who oppose the treaty. After the takeover, those donations stop. They can also reverse direction: donate to candidates who support the treaty. Per cycle this redirects roughly $30-50 million across all defense PACs.

Cost: $0 (reallocates existing political spending).

Time to effect: Next election cycle.

Tier 4: Shareholder resolutions requiring ROI analysis of all lobbying

Every shareholder meeting requires the board to publish an ROI analysis of all lobbying spending against the long-term shareholder value of the company. The new analyses will reach the conclusion the demand letters have been forcing all along: lobbying for military expansion produces negative ROI for shareholders because it suppresses the GDP growth that funds the company’s addressable market. The analysis becomes auditable documentation that locks in the new lobbying direction against backsliding.

Cost: Negligible (corporate audit work).

Time to effect: Next AGM, typically 3-9 months.

Tier 5: Pivot R&D toward medical and biotech applications

Defense contractors already produce technologies with direct medical applications: imaging, sensors, materials, AI, robotics, encryption. R&D budgets can be partially redirected toward decentralized FDA159,160 infrastructure, AI-augmented drug discovery, and clinical trial logistics. The existing engineering workforce is well suited to this pivot; many of these companies already have biotech-adjacent product lines.

Cost: Capital reallocation, no new spending required.

Time to effect: 1-3 years for substantial product impact.

Tier 6: Cancel weapons systems with no defensive justification

Some defense programs have negative externalities exceeding their revenue (autonomous weapons, cluster munitions, certain export-only programs). The board can wind these down without compromising the company’s defensive product lines.

Cost: Negative (eliminates loss-making or marginal programs).

Time to effect: 1-3 years.

Tier 7: Open-source defense IP for medical use

Patents on technologies with dual-use applications (imaging, sensors, AI models, materials, manufacturing processes) can be licensed for free for medical applications. This accelerates DFDA infrastructure and drug discovery without requiring active R&D pivot.

Cost: Foregone licensing revenue, typically small relative to the medical impact.

Time to effect: 6-12 months.

Tier 8: Partial manufacturing conversion to medical devices and vaccines

Defense factories have precision manufacturing, supply chain, and quality systems that translate well to medical device and vaccine production. Reverse-WW2 industrial mobilization: instead of converting consumer factories to military, convert military to consumer and medical.

Cost: Capex investment, typically pays back within 5-7 years.

Time to effect: 3-5 years.

Tier 9: Distribute dividends directly to the 8 billion shareholders

Defense contractor profits historically flow to a narrow set of institutional and high-net-worth shareholders. After the takeover, profits flow to the 8 billion humans who own the shares. Per-capita this is small (~$10-50 per global human per year) but it is the first direct income transfer from the military industrial complex to humanity in history.

Cost: Negative (just redistributes existing profits).

Time to effect: Next dividend declaration.

Expected Value Per Person

Investment per person (realistic, including acquisition premium)

Population Cost
Per global human ~$90
Per US adult ~$2,700
Per US household ~$5,400

Expected return per person (base case, treaty passes and multipliers hold)

For a global human contributing ~$90:

Benefit Approx value per person
Personal share of global GDP growth from reduced disease burden ~$10,000-$50,000
Disease eradication value: ~10-20 extra healthy life-years × global VSL (~$30-50K/year) ~$300,000-$1,000,000
Lower lifetime apocalypse risk ~$1,000-$10,000
Defense-contractor dividends now flowing to humanity ~$10-50/year ongoing
Direct share-price appreciation from float-constrained demand ~$200-$2,000 on the initial purchase
Total EV per global human (base case) ~$310,000-$1,000,000

Base case ROI multiple per global human: ~3,500x to 11,000x.

For a US adult contributing ~$2,700:

Benefit Approx value per person
Personal share of GDP-doubling at year 15 (US median net worth ~$190K → ~$380-570K) ~$190,000-$380,000
Disease eradication: ~10-20 extra healthy life-years × US QALY threshold ($100,000/year) ~$1,000,000-$2,000,000
Lower lifetime apocalypse risk ~$10,000-$100,000
Direct defense-industry dividends ~$500-$2,000/year ongoing
Direct share-price appreciation from float-constrained demand ~$5,000-$50,000 on the initial purchase
Total EV per US adult (base case) ~$1,200,000-$2,500,000

Base case ROI multiple per US adult: ~450x to 900x.

Pessimism-adjusted expected value

Apply a 99% pessimism haircut to every line item above (treaty fails to pass, multipliers are wrong, takeover is partially blocked, implementation is incomplete, etc.):

Population Discounted EV Discounted ROI
Global human (~$90 in) ~$3,000-$10,000 ~35x-110x
US adult (~$2,700 in) ~$12,000-$25,000 ~4.5x-9x

Even with a brutally pessimistic discount, the per-person expected return on this single one-time purchase exceeds the lifetime return of any standard investment vehicle available to a retail buyer.

This is per-unit-money the highest-EV investment a human can make.

Real Frictions

These are real, and they shape how the campaign is structured. They do not eliminate it.

Price inflation during a coordinated buy-up

Defense stock floats are not infinitely liquid. A coordinated purchase of half the float of every prime would push prices up sharply. Estimates range from 1.5x to 3x premium during acquisition, and potentially much higher in the scenarios modeled above.

Mitigation: Phased buying across multiple quarters, distributed across many small purchasers rather than concentrated, public communication of intent to acquire long positions rather than to flip them. Index fund or trust vehicle that aggregates small purchases without telegraphing the buy to the market. The price inflation is also the upside captured by the early buyers, so the “mitigation” framing is partial: the campaign benefits from the inflation it causes.

CFIUS and national security review

Any large or unusual ownership change in a US defense prime triggers Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States review. A coalition of US citizens buying shares is domestic and falls outside CFIUS, but the Department of Defense has informal mechanisms to slow or block ownership changes it considers adversarial to national security. This is a real obstacle, not a fatal one.

Mitigation: The public framing matters. “Long-term shareholders organized to align defense industry lobbying with shareholder interests” is a defensible CFIUS posture. The “loving takeover” framing is more defensible than “hostile” but still requires careful presentation. The substance is the same; the framing is what CFIUS reviews.

Staggered boards and poison pills

Most defense primes have anti-takeover provisions that delay control even with majority ownership. Staggered boards can be replaced only one-third per year. Poison pills can dilute acquirers the board deems hostile.

Mitigation: Practical control takes 2-3 years post-acquisition rather than immediate. Shareholder resolutions and demand letters operate in parallel during the transition period and produce most of the lobbying-redirection benefit before formal board control is achieved. The “loving” framing also matters here: poison pills are designed to deter acquirers who plan to extract value at the expense of existing shareholders. They are harder to justify against an acquirer mathematically demonstrating that existing shareholders are richer under the takeover than under the status quo.

Coordination capacity

Buying half the float of every Western defense prime requires coordinating millions of purchasers. This is a real operational challenge, though not the corporate-campaign kind. It is closer to the chain-letter or viral-meme kind: distributed, opt-in, low-friction per participant.

Mitigation: A standardized acquisition vehicle (e.g., an index fund or trust dedicated to the takeover) that anyone can buy into for the price of one share. Open-source coordination of which contractors are being targeted in which quarter. The same recruitment funnel as the shirts campaign and the lawsuit campaign.

Relationship to the Lawsuit Campaign

The two campaigns are complementary, not alternative.

Lawsuit Loving takeover
Cost per participant ~$200 (one share) ~$90 (proportional share of control)
Number of participants required Hundreds to thousands Millions to billions
Mechanism Force the math into boardrooms via demand letters Buy the board, change the lobbying direction
Time to effect 1-3 years 2-5 years
What it produces Public board responses, media coverage, Overton window shift Direct policy change via redirected lobbying
Failure mode Court dismisses, board ignores Buy-up incomplete, board partial control
Compounding effect on the other Demand letters become takeover groundwork Shareholder control becomes the venue for the demand letters’ asks

The lawsuit campaign generates the public attention and shareholder organization that makes the takeover financially feasible. The takeover, in turn, locks in the lawsuit’s asks against backsliding by ensuring the board itself supports the treaty. Run them together.

Next Steps

This page is a draft. Before any campaign acts on the math:

  1. Verify market cap and float numbers against current 10-K filings.
  2. Engage securities and antitrust counsel on the structure of an aggregating acquisition vehicle.
  3. Engage CFIUS counsel on framing and review posture.
  4. Build the acquisition vehicle (index fund, trust, or DAO-style coordination) that allows distributed participation at $90 per share.
  5. Coordinate with the lawsuit campaign so demand letters and share accumulation reinforce each other.
  6. Coordinate with the handout and shirts campaign so recruitment of participants happens through the same funnel.

For the underlying argument for why this is necessary, see Where Am I Wrong? and the 1% treaty paper. For the liability framework that quantifies the harm the takeover is correcting, see Humanity v. Government.

The Funniness of This Loving Takeover, Mathematically

The financial ROI is obvious: ~$90 in, ~$310,000-$1,000,000 out. The financial ROI is also not the point. The point is that this is the funniest loving takeover in the universe, and the funniness is also calculable.

A normal hostile takeover produces one laugh: the laugh of the acquirer counting their gains. This one produces approximately 3.51 quadrillion laughs (95% CI: 1.61 quadrillion laughs-5.59 quadrillion laughs).

The chain:

  • Average human laughter rate: 17 laughs per day, or 6,205 per healthy life-year.
  • The takeover redirects the $127 million (95% CI: $100 million-$160 million) per year of defense lobbying from blocking the 1% treaty to championing it.
  • The treaty compresses the disease eradication queue from 443 years to 36 years, recovering approximately 565 billion healthy life-years across humanity.
  • 565 billion recovered healthy life-years × 6,205 laughs per year = 3.51 quadrillion laughs.

The full calculation:

\[ \begin{gathered} L_{shirt} \\ = DALYs_{max} \times L_{year} \\ = 565B \times 6{,}200 \\ = 3510T \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} DALYs_{max} \\ = DALYs_{global,ann} \times Pct_{avoid,DALY} \times T_{accel,max} \\ = 2.88B \times 92.6\% \times 212 \\ = 565B \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ T_{accel,max} = T_{accel} + T_{lag} = 204 + 8.2 = 212 \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} T_{accel} \\ = T_{first,SQ} \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{k_{capacity}}\right) \\ = 222 \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{12.3}\right) \\ = 204 \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} T_{first,SQ} \\ = T_{queue,SQ} \times 0.5 \\ = 443 \times 0.5 \\ = 222 \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} T_{queue,SQ} \\ = \frac{N_{untreated}}{Treatments_{new,ann}} \\ = \frac{6{,}650}{15} \\ = 443 \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} N_{untreated} \\ = N_{rare} \times 0.95 \\ = 7{,}000 \times 0.95 \\ = 6{,}650 \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} k_{capacity} \\ = \frac{N_{fundable,ref}}{Slots_{curr}} \\ = \frac{23.4M}{1.9M} \\ = 12.3 \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} N_{fundable,ref} \\ = \frac{Subsidies_{trial,ref}}{Cost_{pragmatic,pt}} \\ = \frac{\$21.8B}{\$929} \\ = 23.4M \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} Subsidies_{trial,ref} \\ = Funding_{trial,ref} - OPEX_{trial} \\ = \$21.8B - \$40M \\ = \$21.8B \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ \begin{gathered} OPEX_{trial} \\ = Cost_{platform} + Cost_{staff} + Cost_{infra} \\ + Cost_{regulatory} + Cost_{community} \\ = \$15M + \$10M + \$8M + \$5M + \$2M \\ = \$40M \end{gathered} \]
where:
\[ L_{year} = L_{day} \times 365 = 17 \times 365 = 6{,}200 \]

The ratio of laughs produced to laughs generated by a typical joke is approximately 3.51 quadrillion to 1. The ratio of laughs produced to the ~$90 per-human cost is approximately 39 trillion laughs per dollar. The cost-per-laugh is approximately $0.00000000003.

Carl Linnaeus, Charles Darwin, and the entire history of biology never had a sample size large enough to measure a joke this funny. This page contains the first known calculation of a joke at quadrillion-laugh scale. The other contenders (the ozone treaty, the eradication of smallpox, the Marshall Plan) all produced fewer than 10^12 laughs each. This one produces more than 10^15.

If you have any remaining objections, please weigh them against 3.51 quadrillion laughs and proceed accordingly.