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Here’s some fun math to ruin your day:
Chance your vote decides an election: 1 in 60 million138 Value if your candidate wins: $10,000 (in policies you prefer) Expected value of voting: $0.00017 Cost of voting (time, gas, finding parking): $50 Net value: -$49.99983
Voting is literally irrational. You have better odds of dying in a car crash on the way to vote than your vote mattering.
Yet people get really mad when you point this out.
Democracy
The Founding Fathers were smart. They created checks and balances, separation of powers, etc.
They just forgot one thing: Voters don’t know very much.
Not you, of course. You’re reading a book. But the average voter? 64% can’t name or describe what the three branches of government do139.
The Rational Ignorance Problem
Here’s why democracy can’t fix our problems:
Cost of being informed: 100+ hours researching candidates and issues Benefit of being informed: Your one vote (worth $0.00017) Rational decision: Stay ignorant, watch Netflix
This isn’t stupidity. It’s math.
Why spend 100 hours researching healthcare policy when your vote won’t change anything? Better to spend that time literally doing anything else.
What Democracy Should Look Like vs Reality
Princeton University did a study. They analyzed 1,779 policy decisions over 20 years. The correlation between what you want and what happens? Zero. Percent.140
But when economic elites want something? They get it 78% of the time140.
You have the same political influence as your houseplant. Actually less, at least politicians pretend to care about the environment.
The chart above shows what actually happens: whether 0% or 100% of voters support a bill, it has the same ~30% chance of passing.
Here’s what democracy SHOULD look like versus the reality:
The Mathematics of Political Failure
Concentrated Benefits vs. Diffuse Costs
Sugar subsidies cost Americans $3.5 billion per year106. That’s $10 per person.
Will you spend weeks fighting to save $10? No. Will sugar companies spend millions to keep their $3.5 billion? Yes.
Guess who wins?
This pattern repeats everywhere:
- Military contractors: $999 billion concentrated benefit141 (37% of $2.72T global spending)
- Taxpayers: $3,000 each in diffuse costs ($999B ÷ 333M Americans)
- Winner: Guess
- Pharma companies: $500 billion in concentrated profits142
- Patients: $1,500 each in diffuse suffering
- Winner: Not you
- Banks in 2008: $700 billion bailout (concentrated)143
- You: $2,100 in taxes (diffuse)
- Winner: The ones with yachts
How Money Buys Power
Research shows144 campaign contributions don’t directly buy how politicians vote on legislation, only 1 in 4 studies support that notion.
But they do something far more effective: They buy which politicians get elected in the first place.
The numbers are stark:
- 95% of House races since 2004144: Won by the highest spender
- Average winning House campaign: $2.79 million144
- Average winning Senate campaign: $26.53 million144
If you fund the campaigns of politicians who already agree with you, you don’t need to buy their votes later. You’ve already bought the election.
And for the ones already in office, contributions buy something more subtle than votes:
- Access: Your call gets returned, theirs goes to voicemail
- Agenda control: Your issue gets a hearing, theirs gets buried
- Legislative language: The exact wording that creates loopholes
- Committee positions: $450,000 to party committees144 buys a seat where bills live or die
You don’t buy the vote. You buy the voter, the agenda, and the conditions that make the vote irrelevant.
The Lobbying ROI: 1,810:1 Returns
The most profitable investment in America isn’t stocks or real estate. It’s bribing politicians:
- Disease advocacy groups spend: $100 million on lobbying145
- They get: $1.8 billion in increased funding145
- ROI: 1,810:1
Meanwhile:
- Breast cancer: Great lobbyists = massive funding
- Heart disease: Kills more people, worse lobbyists = less funding
- Rare pediatric diseases: No lobbyists = no funding
Democracy doesn’t allocate resources by need. It allocates by who can afford the best K Street firm.
Why Nothing Ever Changes: A Mathematical Proof
- Number of Americans who want lower drug prices: 330 million
- Money they contribute to this cause: $0
- Number of pharma executives who want high drug prices: 1,000
- Money they contribute: $4.88 billion
1,000 > 330,000,000 (when you multiply by money)
That’s not corruption. That’s math.
Why Politicians Don’t Care About You (With Math!)
A politician needs three things:
- Votes (from idiots)
- Money (from corporations)
- Media coverage (from other corporations)
You provide 1/150,000,000th of item #1. Corporations provide 100% of items #2 and #3.
Who do you think they listen to?
The Iron Law of Oligarchy
Every democratic organization eventually becomes an oligarchy. It’s not a conspiracy. It’s math.
Here’s how:
- Organization needs leaders
- Leaders gain expertise and connections
- Leaders become irreplaceable
- Leaders do whatever they want
- Democracy becomes decoration
This happened to:
- Every political party
- Every union
- Every non-profit
- Your homeowners association
- The PTA
- Everything
Democracy doesn’t prevent oligarchy. It legitimizes it.
Your Congressman: A Prostitute with a Pension
Average time congressmen spend on:
- Fundraising: 4 hours/day146
- Reading bills: 0 hours/day
- Actual governing: Whatever’s left
They don’t even read what they vote on. The PATRIOT Act: 342 pages, voted on 45 minutes after release147. The Affordable Care Act: 2,700 pages, “we have to pass it to see what’s in it.”148
These people control nuclear weapons.
Sleep tight.
Congressional Committees: Available for Purchase
Committees are where real power lives. They control which bills live or die, what gets funded, and who gets regulated. No committee seat = no power.
So naturally, both parties sell them149:
| House Speaker |
$31 million |
$20 million |
Controls entire agenda |
| Ways & Means Chair |
$1.8 million |
$1.2 million |
All tax laws start here |
| Appropriations Chair |
$1.8 million |
$1.2 million |
Controls $1.7 trillion budget |
| Energy & Commerce |
$1.8 million |
$1.2 million |
Healthcare + Wall Street |
| Regular Committee |
$500K-1M |
$875,000 |
Still beats irrelevance |
| Basic Member |
$150,000+ |
Varies |
Entry fee to play |
The price correlates with power. Ways and Means writes tax code affecting trillions. Appropriations decides who gets government money. Energy and Commerce oversees healthcare (17% of GDP) and Wall Street.
Don’t pay? Your bills die. Your amendments get ignored. There’s even a “giant wall of shame” displaying who hasn’t paid their dues149.
This is why congressmen spend 4 hours a day fundraising. They’re not campaigning, they’re paying rent on their committee seats. The people writing your healthcare laws literally bought their positions from the same industries.
The 4-Year Attention Span: Democracy Has ADHD
- Politician promises to “cure cancer”
- Gets elected
- Creates blue-ribbon commission
- Commission recommends more committees
- Next election happens
- New politician promises to “cure cancer”
- Repeat until heat death of universe
Democracy has the attention span of a goldfish on cocaine.
Real problems take decades to solve. Elections happen every 2-4 years. Politicians optimize for the next election, not the next generation.
Why No One Can Fix This
Every four years, someone promises to “fix Washington.”
Every four years, nothing changes.
Why? Because the problem isn’t the people. It’s the incentives.
You could elect 535 clones of Gandhi and within two years they’d be taking pharma money and approving bombing campaigns. The system corrupts everyone. It’s designed to.
The Voting Paradox
Democracy assumes voters want what’s best for society.
Reality:
- Farmers vote for farm subsidies (bad for everyone else)
- Old people vote for Social Security (paid by young people)
- Rich people vote for tax cuts (paid by poor people)
- Poor people vote for welfare (paid by middle class)
- Everyone votes to steal from everyone else
It’s not a democracy. It’s a circular robbery.
Special Interest Groups: Democracy’s Real Winners
Number of voters: 240 million128 Number who care about sugar subsidies: 0 Number of sugar companies: 10 Number who care about sugar subsidies: 10 Winner: Big Sugar
This repeats for every industry:
- Corn: 4,000 farmers beat 330 million consumers
- Defense: 5 contractors beat 330 million taxpayers
- Pharma: 50 companies beat 330 million patients
In democracy, the minority always beats the majority. The concentrated always beat the diffuse. The organized always beat the disorganized.
That’s not a bug. It’s the operating system.
Why Your Political Tribe Is Also Worthless
Republicans say they want small government. Republican presidents increase spending.
Democrats say they want to help poor people. Democrat cities have the most homeless.
Libertarians say they want freedom. Libertarians can’t even agree what a road is.
They’re all selling the same product: Hope that voting matters.
It doesn’t.
The Solution Democracy Can’t Provide
Democracy can’t solve coordination problems. It creates them.
Example: Climate change
- Cost to fix: $1 trillion
- Benefit: Survival of species
- Problem: Benefits are in 50 years, costs are today
- Democratic solution: Argue about it until Miami is underwater
Example: Medical research
- Cost: $100 billion
- Benefit: Cure all disease
- Problem: Benefits are diffuse, costs are concentrated
- Democratic solution: Spend it on bombs instead
Democracy optimizes for short-term concentrated benefits. Every time.
Public Choice Theory: The Nobel Prize for Cynicism
In 1986, James Buchanan won the Nobel Prize in Economics150 for proving what everyone already knew:
People don’t suddenly become angels when they work for the government.
This is Public Choice Theory: bureaucrats, politicians, and regulators are just as selfish as everyone else. They just have better PR.
What They Actually Maximize
| NIH |
Cures |
Grants awarded |
No cures |
| FDA |
Lives saved |
Avoiding lawsuits |
Deadly delays |
| Congress |
Voter welfare |
Campaign donations |
Corporate welfare |
| Pharma |
Health outcomes |
Recurring revenue |
Chronic disease preferred |
| Defense Contractor |
National security |
Government contracts |
Endless wars |
Nobody in the system is incentivized to cure disease. Or end war.
The Libertarian Paradox
Libertarians say: Government fails because it’s run by self-interested people
Socialists say: Government fails because it’s underfunded
Public Choice Theory says: Government fails because self-interested people are in positions where their interests conflict with good outcomes
The solution: Design systems where self-interest produces good outcomes
Why This Is Actually Good News
Democracy can’t fix these problems. But markets can.
Markets don’t care if voters are stupid. Markets don’t care if politicians are corrupt. Markets care about one thing: profit.
So make the right thing profitable.
That’s what a 1% treaty does. It doesn’t try to fix democracy. It bypasses it entirely.
Instead of convincing 240 million voters to be smart (impossible), you convince 1,000 investors to be greedy (automatic).
Why This Is Liberating
You don’t need to:
- Find virtuous leaders
- Hope politicians care
- Wait for bureaucrats to change
- Convince anyone to be less selfish
You just need to align their selfishness with your goals.
Solution
Democracy fails because:
- Voters are rationally ignorant
- Politicians follow incentives
- Special interests concentrate benefits
- Costs are diffused to everyone
A 1% treaty solution:
- Don’t need informed voters (investors do the math)
- Create better incentives (make health profitable)
- Concentrate benefits for reform (VICTORY Incentive Alignment Bonds)
- Diffuse costs to military budget (they won’t notice 1%)
You’re using democracy’s bugs as features.
Your Choice
Option A: Keep voting and hope it matters this time (it won’t)
Option B: Accept that democracy is broken and use market incentives instead
The Founding Fathers were geniuses, but they didn’t anticipate:
- Television
- The internet
- Nuclear weapons
- Global pandemics
- Voters who think vaccines cause autism
Democracy made sense in 1789. Today, it’s a cargo cult.
But markets? Markets turned feudal peasants into TikTok influencers. Markets put computers in our pockets more powerful than what sent men to the moon. Markets work.
You’re not making people better. You’re making better systems for selfish people.
And since everyone’s selfish, those systems will actually work.
Let’s use what works.
A Brief History of Human Decision-Making (Spoiler: It’s Bad)
Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others151.
Churchill said that. He was drunk at the time, but still right.
Here’s how humanity currently makes decisions:
Ancient Times: Biggest guy with club decides everything. Sometimes eaten by tiger. New biggest guy takes over.
Classical Era: Guys in togas vote. Women, slaves, and anyone interesting excluded. Socrates forced to drink poison for asking questions.
Medieval Period: God allegedly tells one inbred family what to do. Family mostly interested in cousin-marriage and cathedral construction.
Modern Democracy: Millions vote for representatives who ignore them. Representatives vote based on bribes. Lobbyists write the actual laws. Everyone pretends this makes sense.
Current System: All of the above, plus Twitter.
Why Your Brain Can’t Handle Democracy
The human brain evolved to:
- Remember where the good berries are
- Run from tigers
- Decide who to mate with
- Hold grudges against that guy who stole your mammoth meat
The human brain did NOT evolve to:
- Understand compound interest
- Evaluate 10,000 budget proposals
- Comprehend exponential growth
- Care about people 10,000 miles away
- Think about consequences beyond next Tuesday
Your working memory can hold about 7 things152. That’s it. Seven. The phone number length isn’t a coincidence.
Yet we ask people to:
- Choose between thousands of political candidates
- Understand the federal budget ($6 trillion of complexity)
- Have opinions on every global crisis simultaneously
- Rank the importance of infinite problems
- Do all this while checking Instagram
No wonder democracy produces results like:
- The platypus (God’s committee design)
- The U.S. tax code (27,000 pages of pure evil153)
- Pineapple pizza (crimes against Italy)
We’re asking chimp brains to do quantum physics. Then we’re surprised when the chimps elect other chimps who throw feces at each other on C-SPAN.
How Government Actually Allocates Money (A Horror Story)
The Current Budget Process: Democracy Theater
Here’s how your government decides to spend trillions:
Step 1: Lobbyists Write Checks
- Defense contractors donate $50 million
- Pharmaceutical companies donate $40M
- Teachers unions donate their lunch money
- Poor people donate nothing (mistake)
Step 2: Politicians Pretend to Think
- Hold hearings nobody watches
- Read reports nobody wrote
- Make speeches nobody believes
- Vote based on who paid them
Step 3: The Budget Emerges
Like a demon from a committee meeting:
- Military: $999 billion141 (for killing)
- Healthcare: $1.5 trillion154 (for not dying, but slowly)
- Education: $80 billion155 (explaining why we can’t afford education)
- Arts: $200 million156 (Congress’s cocaine budget is higher)
Step 4: Everyone Gets Mad
- Conservatives: “Too much welfare!”
- Liberals: “Too much warfare!”
- Economists: “None of this makes sense!”
- Lobbyists: “Perfect, same time next year?”
This system has produced:
- $30 trillion in national debt157
- Bridges collapsing while we build new bombers
- Schools using textbooks from 1987
- The F-35 fighter jet (doesn’t fight, barely jets)
P.S. - If you still believe in democracy, ask yourself: Would you let 150 million random Americans perform your heart surgery by voting on each incision? No? Then why let them vote on healthcare policy? At least with surgery, you’d die quickly.
Regulatory Capture: How Industries Write Their Own Rules
The best investment in America isn’t stocks or real estate. It’s buying politicians. As detailed earlier, the return on investment for lobbying is astronomical, with studies showing returns as high as 1,810:1.
How to Buy a Democracy: A Practical Guide
- Hire an Ex-Congressman: There are 13,700 registered lobbyists in Washington69, and half of them used to work in the government69 they’re now bribing. The revolving door spins so fast it powers half of DC.
Speak the Universal Language (Money): In 2023, corporations spent $4.1 billion on lobbying158. That’s $7.7 million per congressman, who makes only $174,000 a year159.
Write the Laws Yourself: Pharmaceutical companies and defense contractors literally write their own regulations and budgets. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, written by pharma lobbyists160, banned the government from negotiating drug prices160, leading to Americans paying $1,200 for insulin that costs $6 to make161.
The Money Machine: How Regulatory Capture Works
Campaign Contributions: Perfectly legal bribes. Citizens United162 made corporations people, and people can donate unlimited money through Super PACs.
Revolving Door: Work in government, learn the system, sell that knowledge to the highest bidder. It’s LinkedIn for corruption.
Lobbying: Hire people to whisper sweet nothings (and campaign donation promises) in politicians’ ears.
Jobs Blackmail: Spread operations across districts. Threaten to leave if politicians don’t cooperate. “Nice employment rate you got there. Shame if something happened to it.”
Regulatory Capture: Get your people appointed to agencies that regulate you. The fox doesn’t guard the henhouse - the fox owns the henhouse and charges the chickens rent.
The Military-Industrial Complex: Murder Inc.
Lockheed Martin’s business model is a masterclass in political leverage. By distributing operations across 42 states163, they ensure that any attempt to cut funding for a program like the $1.7 trillion F-35 fighter jet164 is met with furious opposition from senators protecting local “jobs.”
The Defense Budget: A Comedy in Three Acts
Act 1: The Pentagon requests nearly a trillion dollars for “readiness,” a figure detailed in the Cost of War chapter.
Act 2: Congress adds $25 billion the Pentagon didn’t ask for165.
Act 3: Money goes to contractors in key congressional districts.
Curtain falls. Audience (taxpayers) weeps.
The Pentagon has never passed an audit166. They literally don’t know where trillions of dollars166 went. But somehow they know they need more.
Big Pharma: Your Dealer Has a Lobbyist
The pharmaceutical industry employs 3 lobbyists for every member of Congress167, ensuring that policies favor profit over patients. The result is a system where a drug patent sold for $1 in 1922161 now costs Americans $300 per vial161, and where the FDA gets 75% of its drug review budget from the companies it regulates168.
The Incentive Structure From Hell
The entire system is perfectly incentivized to maintain the status quo:
- Pharmaceutical Companies: Cures are a one-time payment; treatments are a recurring revenue stream.
- FDA Regulators: Approving a bad drug ends a career; delaying a good one has no consequences.
- Politicians: Funding pragmatic clinical trials is boring; creating new agencies provides photo ops.
Everyone who matters wins. Everyone who’s dying loses.
The Solution They Don’t Want
Here’s the secret: Their whole system depends on diffuse costs and concentrated benefits.
Each American loses $100 to corruption. Not worth fighting over. Each corporation gains $100 million. Very worth fighting for.
But what if you concentrated the benefits of reform? What if curing disease was more profitable than treating it? What if peace paid better than war?
That’s what a 1% treaty does. It doesn’t fight the system. It hijacks it.
You’re going to out-bribe the bribers.
The same lobbying system that created this mess is the feature you will exploit. Lockheed Martin and Pfizer don’t love war and disease; they love money. By making health and peace the most profitable investments in history, you can hijack the system and buy your democracy back.
Your Democracy: An Auction House
Every law is for sale. Every regulation negotiable. Every politician has a price.
That’s not cynicism. That’s Wednesday in Washington.
The military-industrial complex figured this out in 1961. Big Pharma perfected it in the 1990s. Wall Street turned it into an art form in 2008.
Now it’s your turn.
You’re not going to fix democracy. That’s impossible. You’re going to buy it back.
One perfectly legal bribe at a time.
P.S. - If this chapter depressed you, remember: The same system that lets corporations buy politicians also lets you buy them back. The corruption is the feature you’re going to exploit. It’s like using the Death Star’s exhaust port, but with spreadsheets instead of proton torpedoes.
1.
Fund, N. C. NIH pragmatic trials: Minimal funding despite 30x cost advantage.
NIH Common Fund: HCS Research Collaboratory https://commonfund.nih.gov/hcscollaboratory (2025)
The NIH Pragmatic Trials Collaboratory funds trials at **$500K for planning phase, $1M/year for implementation**—a tiny fraction of NIH’s budget. The ADAPTABLE trial cost **$14 million** for **15,076 patients** (= **$929/patient**) versus **$420 million** for a similar traditional RCT (30x cheaper), yet pragmatic trials remain severely underfunded. PCORnet infrastructure enables real-world trials embedded in healthcare systems, but receives minimal support compared to basic research funding. Additional sources: https://commonfund.nih.gov/hcscollaboratory | https://pcornet.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ADAPTABLE_Lay_Summary_21JUL2025.pdf | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5604499/
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2.
NIH. Antidepressant clinical trial exclusion rates.
Zimmerman et al. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26276679/ (2015)
Mean exclusion rate: 86.1% across 158 antidepressant efficacy trials (range: 44.4% to 99.8%) More than 82% of real-world depression patients would be ineligible for antidepressant registration trials Exclusion rates increased over time: 91.4% (2010-2014) vs. 83.8% (1995-2009) Most common exclusions: comorbid psychiatric disorders, age restrictions, insufficient depression severity, medical conditions Emergency psychiatry patients: only 3.3% eligible (96.7% excluded) when applying 9 common exclusion criteria Only a minority of depressed patients seen in clinical practice are likely to be eligible for most AETs Note: Generalizability of antidepressant trials has decreased over time, with increasingly stringent exclusion criteria eliminating patients who would actually use the drugs in clinical practice Additional sources: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26276679/ | https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26164052/ | https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/news/antidepressant-trials-exclude-most-real-world-patients-with-depression
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3.
CNBC. Warren buffett’s career average investment return.
CNBC https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/05/warren-buffetts-return-tally-after-60-years-5502284percent.html (2025)
Berkshire’s compounded annual return from 1965 through 2024 was 19.9%, nearly double the 10.4% recorded by the S&P 500. Berkshire shares skyrocketed 5,502,284% compared to the S&P 500’s 39,054% rise during that period. Additional sources: https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/05/warren-buffetts-return-tally-after-60-years-5502284percent.html | https://www.slickcharts.com/berkshire-hathaway/returns
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4.
Group, E. W. US farm subsidy database and analysis.
Environmental Working Group https://farm.ewg.org/ (2024)
US agricultural subsidies total approximately $30 billion annually, but create much larger economic distortions. Top 10% of farms receive 78% of subsidies, benefits concentrated in commodity crops (corn, soy, wheat, cotton), environmental damage from monoculture incentivized, and overall deadweight loss estimated at $50-120 billion annually. Additional sources: https://farm.ewg.org/ | https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-income-finances/government-payments-the-safety-net/
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5.
Posen, B. R.
Restraint: A New Foundation for u.s. Grand Strategy. (Posen, 2014).
The United States could maintain adequate deterrence and defense with a much smaller military budget. Current spending levels reflect force projection capabilities far beyond what homeland security and deterrence require. A strategy of restraint could reduce defense spending by 40-50% while maintaining security through nuclear deterrence and geographic advantages. Additional sources: https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801452581/restraint/
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6.
Alliance, D. P.
The drug war by the numbers. (2021)
Since 1971, the war on drugs has cost the United States an estimated $1 trillion in enforcement. The federal drug control budget was $41 billion in 2022. Mass incarceration costs the U.S. at least $182 billion every year, with over $450 billion spent to incarcerate individuals on drug charges in federal prisons.
8.
Fund, I. M.
IMF fossil fuel subsidies data: 2023 update. (2023)
Globally, fossil fuel subsidies were $7 trillion in 2022 or 7.1 percent of GDP. The United States subsidies totaled $649 billion. Underpricing for local air pollution costs and climate damages are the largest contributor, accounting for about 30 percent each.
9.
Papanicolas, I. et al. Health care spending in the united states and other high-income countries.
Papanicolas et al. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2674671 (2018)
The US spent approximately twice as much as other high-income countries on medical care (mean per capita: $9,892 vs $5,289), with similar utilization but much higher prices. Administrative costs accounted for 8% of US spending vs 1-3% in other countries. US spending on pharmaceuticals was $1,443 per capita vs $749 elsewhere. Despite spending more, US health outcomes are not better. Additional sources: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2674671
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10.
Hsieh, C.-T. & Moretti, E. Housing constraints and spatial misallocation.
Hsieh & Moretti https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20170388 (2019)
We quantify the amount of spatial misallocation of labor across US cities and its aggregate costs. Tight land-use restrictions in high-productivity cities like New York, San Francisco, and Boston lowered aggregate US growth by 36% from 1964 to 2009. Local constraints on housing supply have had enormous effects on the national economy. Additional sources: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20170388
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11.
Justice, V. I. of. The economic burden of incarceration in the united states.
Vera Institute https://www.vera.org/publications/the-economic-burden-of-incarceration-in-the-u-s (2024)
US incarceration costs approximately $80 billion annually in direct correctional expenditures alone. Including social costs (lost earnings, family impacts, health effects, reduced child outcomes), total burden exceeds $300 billion annually. The US incarcerates at 5x the rate of other OECD countries with no corresponding reduction in crime. Evidence shows community-based alternatives cost less and reduce recidivism more effectively. Additional sources: https://www.vera.org/publications/the-economic-burden-of-incarceration-in-the-u-s | https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2024.html | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA108-3.html
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12.
Marron Institute, N. Transit costs project - why US infrastructure costs so much.
NYU Transit Costs Project https://transitcosts.com/ (2024)
The United States builds transit infrastructure at dramatically higher costs than peer countries. New York’s Second Avenue Subway cost $2.5 billion per kilometer vs. $200-500 million in European cities. US highway construction similarly costs 2-5x more than comparable projects abroad. Causes include: excessive environmental review, litigation risk, lack of in-house expertise, fragmented project management, and inflated soft costs. Additional sources: https://transitcosts.com/ | https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-does-infrastructure-cost-so-much/
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13.
Clemens, M. A.
Economics and emigration: Trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk? Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, 83–106 (2011)
Free global labor mobility would increase gross world product by somewhere in the range of 67-147%... The gains to eliminating migration barriers amount to large fractions of world GDP—one or two orders of magnitude larger than the gains from dropping all remaining restrictions on international flows of goods and capital.
16.
Foundation, T. Tax compliance costs the US economy $546 billion annually.
https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/federal/irs-tax-compliance-costs/ (2024)
Americans will spend over 7.9 billion hours complying with IRS tax filing and reporting requirements in 2024. This costs the economy roughly $413 billion in lost productivity. In addition, the IRS estimates that Americans spend roughly $133 billion annually in out-of-pocket costs, bringing the total compliance costs to $546 billion, or nearly 2 percent of GDP.
17.
Organization, W. H. WHO global health estimates 2024.
World Health Organization https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/mortality-and-global-health-estimates (2024)
Comprehensive mortality and morbidity data by cause, age, sex, country, and year Global mortality: 55-60 million deaths annually Lives saved by modern medicine (vaccines, cardiovascular drugs, oncology): 12M annually (conservative aggregate) Leading causes of death: Cardiovascular disease (17.9M), Cancer (10.3M), Respiratory disease (4.0M) Note: Baseline data for regulatory mortality analysis. Conservative estimate of pharmaceutical impact based on WHO immunization data (4.5M/year from vaccines) + cardiovascular interventions (3.3M/year) + oncology (1.5M/year) + other therapies. Additional sources: https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/mortality-and-global-health-estimates
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18.
GiveWell. GiveWell cost per life saved for top charities (2024).
GiveWell: Top Charities https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities General range: $3,000-$5,500 per life saved (GiveWell top charities) Helen Keller International (Vitamin A): $3,500 average (2022-2024); varies $1,000-$8,500 by country Against Malaria Foundation: $5,500 per life saved New Incentives (vaccination incentives): $4,500 per life saved Malaria Consortium (seasonal malaria chemoprevention): $3,500 per life saved VAS program details: $2 to provide vitamin A supplements to child for one year Note: Figures accurate for 2024. Helen Keller VAS program has wide country variation ($1K-$8.5K) but $3,500 is accurate average. Among most cost-effective interventions globally Additional sources: https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities | https://www.givewell.org/charities/helen-keller-international | https://ourworldindata.org/cost-effectiveness
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19.
AARP. Unpaid caregiver hours and economic value.
AARP 2023 https://www.aarp.org/caregiving/financial-legal/info-2023/unpaid-caregivers-provide-billions-in-care.html (2023)
Average family caregiver: 25-26 hours per week (100-104 hours per month) 38 million caregivers providing 36 billion hours of care annually Economic value: $16.59 per hour = $600 billion total annual value (2021) 28% of people provided eldercare on a given day, averaging 3.9 hours when providing care Caregivers living with care recipient: 37.4 hours per week Caregivers not living with recipient: 23.7 hours per week Note: Disease-related caregiving is subset of total; includes elderly care, disability care, and child care Additional sources: https://www.aarp.org/caregiving/financial-legal/info-2023/unpaid-caregivers-provide-billions-in-care.html | https://www.bls.gov/news.release/elcare.nr0.htm | https://www.caregiver.org/resource/caregiver-statistics-demographics/
.
20.
MMWR, C. Childhood vaccination economic benefits.
CDC MMWR https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/73/wr/mm7331a2.htm (1994)
US programs (1994-2023): $540B direct savings, $2.7T societal savings ( $18B/year direct, $90B/year societal) Global (2001-2020): $820B value for 10 diseases in 73 countries ( $41B/year) ROI: $11 return per $1 invested Measles vaccination alone saved 93.7M lives (61% of 154M total) over 50 years (1974-2024) Additional sources: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/73/wr/mm7331a2.htm | https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(24
.
22.
Labor Statistics, U. S. B. of.
CPI inflation calculator. (2024)
CPI-U (1980): 82.4 CPI-U (2024): 313.5 Inflation multiplier (1980-2024): 3.80× Cumulative inflation: 280.48% Average annual inflation rate: 3.08% Note: Official U.S. government inflation data using Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). Additional sources: https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
.
23.
Del Rosal, I. The empirical measurement of rent-seeking costs.
Journal of Economic Surveys https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00621.x (2011)
A comprehensive survey of empirical estimates finds rent-seeking costs range from 0.2% to 23.7% of GDP across different methodologies and countries. Laband & Sophocleus (1988) estimated up to 45% for the US.
24.
via, D. analysis. ClinicalTrials.gov cumulative enrollment data (2025).
Direct analysis via ClinicalTrials.gov API v2 https://clinicaltrials.gov/data-api/api Analysis of 100,000 active/recruiting/completed trials on ClinicalTrials.gov (November 2025) shows cumulative enrollment of 12.2 million participants: Phase 1 (722k), Phase 2 (2.2M), Phase 3 (6.5M), Phase 4 (2.7M). Median participants per trial: Phase 1 (33), Phase 2 (60), Phase 3 (237), Phase 4 (90). Additional sources: https://clinicaltrials.gov/data-api/api
.
25.
CAN, A. Clinical trial patient participation rate.
ACS CAN: Barriers to Clinical Trial Enrollment https://www.fightcancer.org/policy-resources/barriers-patient-enrollment-therapeutic-clinical-trials-cancer Only 3-5% of adult cancer patients in US receive treatment within clinical trials About 5% of American adults have ever participated in any clinical trial Oncology: 2-3% of all oncology patients participate Contrast: 50-60% enrollment for pediatric cancer trials (<15 years old) Note: 20% of cancer trials fail due to insufficient enrollment; 11% of research sites enroll zero patients Additional sources: https://www.fightcancer.org/policy-resources/barriers-patient-enrollment-therapeutic-clinical-trials-cancer | https://hints.cancer.gov/docs/Briefs/HINTS_Brief_48.pdf
.
26.
ScienceDaily. Global prevalence of chronic disease.
ScienceDaily: GBD 2015 Study https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/06/150608081753.htm (2015)
2.3 billion individuals had more than five ailments (2013) Chronic conditions caused 74% of all deaths worldwide (2019), up from 67% (2010) Approximately 1 in 3 adults suffer from multiple chronic conditions (MCCs) Risk factor exposures: 2B exposed to biomass fuel, 1B to air pollution, 1B smokers Projected economic cost: $47 trillion by 2030 Note: 2.3B with 5+ ailments is more accurate than "2B with chronic disease." One-third of all adults globally have multiple chronic conditions Additional sources: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/06/150608081753.htm | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10830426/ | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6214883/
.
27.
C&EN. Annual number of new drugs approved globally: 50.
C&EN https://cen.acs.org/pharmaceuticals/50-new-drugs-received-FDA/103/i2 (2025)
50 new drugs approved annually Additional sources: https://cen.acs.org/pharmaceuticals/50-new-drugs-received-FDA/103/i2 | https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/novel-drug-approvals-fda
.
28.
estimates, I. Clinical trial abandonment.
Average: 10% abandoned before completion
.
32.
GiveWell. Cost per DALY for deworming programs.
https://www.givewell.org/international/technical/programs/deworming/cost-effectiveness Schistosomiasis treatment: $28.19-$70.48 per DALY (using arithmetic means with varying disability weights) Soil-transmitted helminths (STH) treatment: $82.54 per DALY (midpoint estimate) Note: GiveWell explicitly states this 2011 analysis is "out of date" and their current methodology focuses on long-term income effects rather than short-term health DALYs Additional sources: https://www.givewell.org/international/technical/programs/deworming/cost-effectiveness
.
33.
Numbers, T. by. Pre-1962 drug development costs and timeline (think by numbers).
Think by Numbers: How Many Lives Does FDA Save? https://thinkbynumbers.org/health/how-many-net-lives-does-the-fda-save/ (1962)
Historical estimates (1970-1985): USD $226M fully capitalized (2011 prices) 1980s drugs: $65M after-tax R&D (1990 dollars), $194M compounded to approval (1990 dollars) Modern comparison: $2-3B costs, 7-12 years (dramatic increase from pre-1962) Context: 1962 regulatory clampdown reduced new treatment production by 70%, dramatically increasing development timelines and costs Note: Secondary source; less reliable than Congressional testimony Additional sources: https://thinkbynumbers.org/health/how-many-net-lives-does-the-fda-save/ | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost_of_drug_development | https://www.statnews.com/2018/10/01/changing-1962-law-slash-drug-prices/
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34.
(BIO), B. I. O. BIO clinical development success rates 2011-2020.
Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) https://go.bio.org/rs/490-EHZ-999/images/ClinicalDevelopmentSuccessRates2011_2020.pdf (2021)
Phase I duration: 2.3 years average Total time to market (Phase I-III + approval): 10.5 years average Phase transition success rates: Phase I→II: 63.2%, Phase II→III: 30.7%, Phase III→Approval: 58.1% Overall probability of approval from Phase I: 12% Note: Largest publicly available study of clinical trial success rates. Efficacy lag = 10.5 - 2.3 = 8.2 years post-safety verification. Additional sources: https://go.bio.org/rs/490-EHZ-999/images/ClinicalDevelopmentSuccessRates2011_2020.pdf
.
35.
Medicine, N. Drug repurposing rate ( 30%).
Nature Medicine https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-024-03233-x (2024)
Approximately 30% of drugs gain at least one new indication after initial approval. Additional sources: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-024-03233-x
.
36.
EPI. Education investment economic multiplier (2.1).
EPI: Public Investments Outside Core Infrastructure https://www.epi.org/publication/bp348-public-investments-outside-core-infrastructure/ Early childhood education: Benefits 12X outlays by 2050; $8.70 per dollar over lifetime Educational facilities: $1 spent → $1.50 economic returns Energy efficiency comparison: 2-to-1 benefit-to-cost ratio (McKinsey) Private return to schooling: 9% per additional year (World Bank meta-analysis) Note: 2.1 multiplier aligns with benefit-to-cost ratios for educational infrastructure/energy efficiency. Early childhood education shows much higher returns (12X by 2050) Additional sources: https://www.epi.org/publication/bp348-public-investments-outside-core-infrastructure/ | https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/442521523465644318/pdf/WPS8402.pdf | https://freopp.org/whitepapers/establishing-a-practical-return-on-investment-framework-for-education-and-skills-development-to-expand-economic-opportunity/
.
37.
PMC. Healthcare investment economic multiplier (1.8).
PMC: California Universal Health Care https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5954824/ (2022)
Healthcare fiscal multiplier: 4.3 (95% CI: 2.5-6.1) during pre-recession period (1995-2007) Overall government spending multiplier: 1.61 (95% CI: 1.37-1.86) Why healthcare has high multipliers: No effect on trade deficits (spending stays domestic); improves productivity & competitiveness; enhances long-run potential output Gender-sensitive fiscal spending (health & care economy) produces substantial positive growth impacts Note: "1.8" appears to be conservative estimate; research shows healthcare multipliers of 4.3 Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5954824/ | https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/government-investment-and-fiscal-stimulus | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3849102/ | https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Fiscal-multipliers-review.pdf
.
38.
Bank, W. Infrastructure investment economic multiplier (1.6).
World Bank: Infrastructure Investment as Stimulus https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/ppps/effectiveness-infrastructure-investment-fiscal-stimulus-what-weve-learned (2022)
Infrastructure fiscal multiplier: 1.6 during contractionary phase of economic cycle Average across all economic states: 1.5 (meaning $1 of public investment → $1.50 of economic activity) Time horizon: 0.8 within 1 year, 1.5 within 2-5 years Range of estimates: 1.5-2.0 (following 2008 financial crisis & American Recovery Act) Italian public construction: 1.5-1.9 multiplier US ARRA: 0.4-2.2 range (differential impacts by program type) Economic Policy Institute: Uses 1.6 for infrastructure spending (middle range of estimates) Note: Public investment less likely to crowd out private activity during recessions; particularly effective when monetary policy loose with near-zero rates Additional sources: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/ppps/effectiveness-infrastructure-investment-fiscal-stimulus-what-weve-learned | https://www.gihub.org/infrastructure-monitor/insights/fiscal-multiplier-effect-of-infrastructure-investment/ | https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/government-investment-and-fiscal-stimulus | https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2022/eb_22-04
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39.
Mercatus. Military spending economic multiplier (0.6).
Mercatus: Defense Spending and Economy https://www.mercatus.org/research/research-papers/defense-spending-and-economy Ramey (2011): 0.6 short-run multiplier Barro (1981): 0.6 multiplier for WWII spending (war spending crowded out 40¢ private economic activity per federal dollar) Barro & Redlick (2011): 0.4 within current year, 0.6 over two years; increased govt spending reduces private-sector GDP portions General finding: $1 increase in deficit-financed federal military spending = less than $1 increase in GDP Variation by context: Central/Eastern European NATO: 0.6 on impact, 1.5-1.6 in years 2-3, gradual fall to zero Ramey & Zubairy (2018): Cumulative 1% GDP increase in military expenditure raises GDP by 0.7% Additional sources: https://www.mercatus.org/research/research-papers/defense-spending-and-economy | https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/world-war-ii-america-spending-deficits-multipliers-and-sacrifice | https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA739-2/RAND_RRA739-2.pdf
.
40.
FDA. FDA-approved prescription drug products (20,000+).
FDA https://www.fda.gov/media/143704/download There are over 20,000 prescription drug products approved for marketing. Additional sources: https://www.fda.gov/media/143704/download
.
42.
ACLED. Active combat deaths annually.
ACLED: Global Conflict Surged 2024 https://acleddata.com/2024/12/12/data-shows-global-conflict-surged-in-2024-the-washington-post/ (2024)
2024: 233,597 deaths (30% increase from 179,099 in 2023) Deadliest conflicts: Ukraine (67,000), Palestine (35,000) Nearly 200,000 acts of violence (25% higher than 2023, double from 5 years ago) One in six people globally live in conflict-affected areas Additional sources: https://acleddata.com/2024/12/12/data-shows-global-conflict-surged-in-2024-the-washington-post/ | https://acleddata.com/media-citation/data-shows-global-conflict-surged-2024-washington-post | https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/index-january-2024/
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43.
UCDP. State violence deaths annually.
UCDP: Uppsala Conflict Data Program https://ucdp.uu.se/ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): Tracks one-sided violence (organized actors attacking unarmed civilians) UCDP definition: Conflicts causing at least 25 battle-related deaths in calendar year 2023 total organized violence: 154,000 deaths; Non-state conflicts: 20,900 deaths UCDP collects data on state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence Specific "2,700 annually" figure for state violence not found in recent UCDP data; actual figures vary annually Additional sources: https://ucdp.uu.se/ | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uppsala_Conflict_Data_Program | https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-in-armed-conflicts-by-region
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44.
Data, O. W. in. Terror attack deaths (8,300 annually).
Our World in Data: Terrorism https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism (2024)
2023: 8,352 deaths (22% increase from 2022, highest since 2017) 2023: 3,350 terrorist incidents (22% decrease), but 56% increase in avg deaths per attack Global Terrorism Database (GTD): 200,000+ terrorist attacks recorded (2021 version) Maintained by: National Consortium for Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism (START), U. of Maryland Geographic shift: Epicenter moved from Middle East to Central Sahel (sub-Saharan Africa) - now >50% of all deaths Additional sources: https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism | https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2024 | https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ | https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/fatalities-from-terrorism
.
45.
Health Metrics, I. for & (IHME), E. IHME global burden of disease 2021 (2.88B DALYs, 1.13B YLD).
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-results/ (2024)
In 2021, global DALYs totaled approximately 2.88 billion, comprising 1.75 billion Years of Life Lost (YLL) and 1.13 billion Years Lived with Disability (YLD). This represents a 13% increase from 2019 (2.55B DALYs), largely attributable to COVID-19 deaths and aging populations. YLD accounts for approximately 39% of total DALYs, reflecting the substantial burden of non-fatal chronic conditions. Additional sources: https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-results/ | https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(24 | https://www.healthdata.org/research-analysis/about-gbd
.
46.
War, B. W. C. of. Environmental cost of war ($100B annually).
Brown Watson Costs of War: Environmental Cost https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/social/environment War on Terror emissions: 1.2B metric tons GHG (equivalent to 257M cars/year) Military: 5.5% of global GHG emissions (2X aviation + shipping combined) US DoD: World’s single largest institutional oil consumer, 47th largest emitter if nation Cleanup costs: $500B+ for military contaminated sites Gaza war environmental damage: $56.4B; landmine clearance: $34.6B expected Climate finance gap: Rich nations spend 30X more on military than climate finance Note: Military activities cause massive environmental damage through GHG emissions, toxic contamination, and long-term cleanup costs far exceeding current climate finance commitments Additional sources: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/social/environment | https://earth.org/environmental-costs-of-wars/ | https://transformdefence.org/transformdefence/stats/
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47.
ScienceDaily. Medical research lives saved annually (4.2 million).
ScienceDaily: Physical Activity Prevents 4M Deaths https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/06/200617194510.htm (2020)
Physical activity: 3.9M early deaths averted annually worldwide (15% lower premature deaths than without) COVID vaccines (2020-2024): 2.533M deaths averted, 14.8M life-years preserved; first year alone: 14.4M deaths prevented Cardiovascular prevention: 3 interventions could delay 94.3M deaths over 25 years (antihypertensives alone: 39.4M) Pandemic research response: Millions of deaths averted through rapid vaccine/drug development Additional sources: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/06/200617194510.htm | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9537923/ | https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.118.038160 | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9464102/
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48.
SIPRI. 36:1 disparity ratio of spending on weapons over cures.
SIPRI: Military Spending https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2016/opportunity-cost-world-military-spending (2016)
Global military spending: $2.7 trillion (2024, SIPRI) Global government medical research: $68 billion (2024) Actual ratio: 39.7:1 in favor of weapons over medical research Military R&D alone: $85B (2004 data, 10% of global R&D) Military spending increases crowd out health: 1% ↑ military = 0.62% ↓ health spending Note: Ratio actually worse than 36:1. Each 1% increase in military spending reduces health spending by 0.62%, with effect more intense in poorer countries (0.962% reduction) Additional sources: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2016/opportunity-cost-world-military-spending | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9174441/ | https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45403
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49.
Numbers, T. by. Lost human capital due to war ($270B annually).
Think by Numbers: War Costs $74 <https://thinkbynumbers.org/military/war/the-economic-case-for-peace-a-comprehensive-financial-analysis/> (2021)
Lost human capital from war: $300B annually (economic impact of losing skilled/productive individuals to conflict) Broader conflict/violence cost: $14T/year globally 1.4M violent deaths/year; conflict holds back economic development, causes instability, widens inequality, erodes human capital 2002: 48.4M DALYs lost from 1.6M violence deaths = $151B economic value (2000 USD) Economic toll includes: commodity prices, inflation, supply chain disruption, declining output, lost human capital Additional sources: <https://thinkbynumbers.org/military/war/the-economic-case-for-peace-a-comprehensive-financial-analysis/> | https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/02/war-violence-costs-each-human-5-a-day/ | https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19115548/
.
50.
PubMed. Psychological impact of war cost ($100B annually).
PubMed: Economic Burden of PTSD https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35485933/ PTSD economic burden (2018 U.S.): $232.2B total ($189.5B civilian, $42.7B military) Civilian costs driven by: Direct healthcare ($66B), unemployment ($42.7B) Military costs driven by: Disability ($17.8B), direct healthcare ($10.1B) Exceeds costs of other mental health conditions (anxiety, depression) War-exposed populations: 2-3X higher rates of anxiety, depression, PTSD; women and children most vulnerable Note: Actual burden $232B, significantly higher than "$100B" claimed Additional sources: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35485933/ | https://news.va.gov/103611/study-national-economic-burden-of-ptsd-staggering/ | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9957523/
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51.
CGDev. UNHCR average refugee support cost.
CGDev https://www.cgdev.org/blog/costs-hosting-refugees-oecd-countries-and-why-uk-outlier (2024)
The average cost of supporting a refugee is $1,384 per year. This represents total host country costs (housing, healthcare, education, security). OECD countries average $6,100 per refugee (mean 2022-2023), with developing countries spending $700-1,000. Global weighted average of $1,384 is reasonable given that 75-85% of refugees are in low/middle-income countries. Additional sources: https://www.cgdev.org/blog/costs-hosting-refugees-oecd-countries-and-why-uk-outlier | https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2024-11/UNHCR-WB-global-cost-of-refugee-inclusion-in-host-country-health-systems.pdf
.
52.
Bank, W. World bank trade disruption cost from conflict.
World Bank https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/trading-away-from-conflict Estimated $616B annual cost from conflict-related trade disruption. World Bank research shows civil war costs an average developing country 30 years of GDP growth, with 20 years needed for trade to return to pre-war levels. Trade disputes analysis shows tariff escalation could reduce global exports by up to $674 billion. Additional sources: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/trading-away-from-conflict | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11565 | http://blogs.worldbank.org/en/trade/impacts-global-trade-and-income-current-trade-disputes
.
53.
VA. Veteran healthcare cost projections.
VA https://department.va.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/2026-Budget-in-Brief.pdf (2026)
VA budget: $441.3B requested for FY 2026 (10% increase). Disability compensation: $165.6B in FY 2024 for 6.7M veterans. PACT Act projected to increase spending by $300B between 2022-2031. Costs under Toxic Exposures Fund: $20B (2024), $30.4B (2025), $52.6B (2026). Additional sources: https://department.va.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/2026-Budget-in-Brief.pdf | https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45615 | https://www.legion.org/information-center/news/veterans-healthcare/2025/june/va-budget-tops-400-billion-for-2025-from-higher-spending-on-mandated-benefits-medical-care
.
55.
size, D. from global market & ratios, public/private funding. Private industry clinical trial spending.
Private pharmaceutical and biotech industry spends approximately $75-90 billion annually on clinical trials, representing roughly 90% of global clinical trial spending.
56.
IHME Global Burden of Disease (2.55B DALYs), C. from & GDP per capita valuation, global. $109 trillion annual global disease burden.
The global economic burden of disease, including direct healthcare costs (\(8.2 trillion) and lost productivity (\)100.9 trillion from 2.55 billion DALYs × \(39,570 per DALY), totals approximately\)109.1 trillion annually.
57.
Trials, A. C. Global government spending on interventional clinical trials: $3-6 billion/year.
Applied Clinical Trials https://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/view/sizing-clinical-research-market Estimated range based on NIH ( $0.8-5.6B), NIHR ($1.6B total budget), and EU funding ( $1.3B/year). Roughly 5-10% of global market. Additional sources: https://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/view/sizing-clinical-research-market | https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20
.
58.
Suisse/UBS, C. Credit suisse global wealth report 2023.
Credit Suisse/UBS https://www.ubs.com/global/en/family-office-uhnw/reports/global-wealth-report-2023.html (2023)
Total global household wealth: USD 454.4 trillion (2022) Wealth declined by USD 11.3 trillion (-2.4%) in 2022, first decline since 2008 Wealth per adult: USD 84,718 Additional sources: https://www.ubs.com/global/en/family-office-uhnw/reports/global-wealth-report-2023.html
.
59.
budgets:, S. component country. Global government medical research spending ($67.5B, 2023–2024).
See component country budgets: NIH Budget #nih-budget-fy2025.
61.
budgets, E. from major foundation & activities. Nonprofit clinical trial funding estimate.
Nonprofit foundations spend an estimated $2-5 billion annually on clinical trials globally, representing approximately 2-5% of total clinical trial spending.
62.
IQVIA, I. reports: Global pharmaceutical r&d spending.
Total global pharmaceutical R&D spending is approximately $300 billion annually. Clinical trials represent 15-20% of this total ($45-60B), with the remainder going to drug discovery, preclinical research, regulatory affairs, and manufacturing development.
63.
UN. Global population reaches 8 billion.
UN: World Population 8 Billion Nov 15 2022 https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-population-reach-8-billion-15-november-2022 (2022)
Milestone: November 15, 2022 (UN World Population Prospects 2022) Day of Eight Billion" designated by UN Added 1 billion people in just 11 years (2011-2022) Growth rate: Slowest since 1950; fell under 1% in 2020 Future: 15 years to reach 9B (2037); projected peak 10.4B in 2080s Projections: 8.5B (2030), 9.7B (2050), 10.4B (2080-2100 plateau) Note: Milestone reached Nov 2022. Population growth slowing; will take longer to add next billion (15 years vs 11 years) Additional sources: https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-population-reach-8-billion-15-november-2022 | https://www.un.org/en/dayof8billion | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Day_of_Eight_Billion
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64.
School, H. K. 3.5% participation tipping point.
Harvard Kennedy School https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr/publications/35-rule-how-small-minority-can-change-world (2020)
The research found that nonviolent campaigns were twice as likely to succeed as violent ones, and once 3.5% of the population were involved, they were always successful. Chenoweth and Maria Stephan studied the success rates of civil resistance efforts from 1900 to 2006, finding that nonviolent movements attracted, on average, four times as many participants as violent movements and were more likely to succeed. Key finding: Every campaign that mobilized at least 3.5% of the population in sustained protest was successful (in their 1900-2006 dataset) Note: The 3.5% figure is a descriptive statistic from historical analysis, not a guaranteed threshold. One exception (Bahrain 2011-2014 with 6%+ participation) has been identified. The rule applies to regime change, not policy change in democracies. Additional sources: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr/publications/35-rule-how-small-minority-can-change-world | https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2024-05/Erica%20Chenoweth_2020-005.pdf | https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3.5%25_rule
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65.
NHGRI. Human genome project and CRISPR discovery.
NHGRI https://www.genome.gov/11006929/2003-release-international-consortium-completes-hgp (2003)
Your DNA is 3 billion base pairs Read the entire code (Human Genome Project, completed 2003) Learned to edit it (CRISPR, discovered 2012) Additional sources: https://www.genome.gov/11006929/2003-release-international-consortium-completes-hgp | https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry/2020/press-release/
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66.
PMC. Only 12% of human interactome targeted.
PMC https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10749231/ (2023)
Mapping 350,000+ clinical trials showed that only 12% of the human interactome has ever been targeted by drugs. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10749231/
.
67.
WHO. ICD-10 code count ( 14,000).
WHO https://icd.who.int/browse10/2019/en (2019)
The ICD-10 classification contains approximately 14,000 codes for diseases, signs and symptoms. Additional sources: https://icd.who.int/browse10/2019/en
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68.
Wikipedia. Longevity escape velocity (LEV) - maximum human life extension potential.
Wikipedia: Longevity Escape Velocity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longevity_escape_velocity Longevity escape velocity: Hypothetical point where medical advances extend life expectancy faster than time passes Term coined by Aubrey de Grey (biogerontologist) in 2004 paper; concept from David Gobel (Methuselah Foundation) Current progress: Science adds 3 months to lifespan per year; LEV requires adding >1 year per year Sinclair (Harvard): "There is no biological upper limit to age" - first person to live to 150 may already be born De Grey: 50% chance of reaching LEV by mid-to-late 2030s; SENS approach = damage repair rather than slowing damage Kurzweil (2024): LEV by 2029-2035, AI will simulate biological processes to accelerate solutions George Church: LEV "in a decade or two" via age-reversal clinical trials Natural lifespan cap: 120-150 years (Jeanne Calment record: 122); engineering approach could bypass via damage repair Key mechanisms: Epigenetic reprogramming, senolytic drugs, stem cell therapy, gene therapy, AI-driven drug discovery Current record: Jeanne Calment (122 years, 164 days) - record unbroken since 1997 Note: LEV is theoretical but increasingly plausible given demonstrated age reversal in mice (109% lifespan extension) and human cells (30-year epigenetic age reversal) Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longevity_escape_velocity | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC423155/ | https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/a36712084/can-science-cure-death-longevity/ | https://www.diamandis.com/blog/longevity-escape-velocity
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69.
OpenSecrets. Lobbyist statistics for washington d.c.
OpenSecrets: Lobbying in US https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobbying_in_the_United_States Registered lobbyists: Over 12,000 (some estimates); 12,281 registered (2013) Former government employees as lobbyists: 2,200+ former federal employees (1998-2004), including 273 former White House staffers, 250 former Congress members & agency heads Congressional revolving door: 43% (86 of 198) lawmakers who left 1998-2004 became lobbyists; currently 59% leaving to private sector work for lobbying/consulting firms/trade groups Executive branch: 8% were registered lobbyists at some point before/after government service Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobbying_in_the_United_States | https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving-door | https://www.citizen.org/article/revolving-congress/ | https://www.propublica.org/article/we-found-a-staggering-281-lobbyists-whove-worked-in-the-trump-administration
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70.
Vaccines, M. Measles vaccination ROI.
MDPI Vaccines https://www.mdpi.com/2076-393X/12/11/1210 (2024)
Single measles vaccination: 167:1 benefit-cost ratio. MMR (measles-mumps-rubella) vaccination: 14:1 ROI. Historical US elimination efforts (1966-1974): benefit-cost ratio of 10.3:1 with net benefits exceeding USD 1.1 billion (1972 dollars, or USD 8.0 billion in 2023 dollars). 2-dose MMR programs show direct benefit/cost ratio of 14.2 with net savings of $5.3 billion, and 26.0 from societal perspectives with net savings of $11.6 billion. Additional sources: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-393X/12/11/1210 | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14760584.2024.2367451
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73.
Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases (2024), C. from. Diseases getting first effective treatment each year.
Calculated from Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases (2024) https://ojrd.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13023-024-03398-1 (2024)
Under the current system, approximately 10-15 diseases per year receive their FIRST effective treatment. Calculation: 5% of 7,000 rare diseases ( 350) have FDA-approved treatment, accumulated over 40 years of the Orphan Drug Act = 9 rare diseases/year. Adding 5-10 non-rare diseases that get first treatments yields 10-20 total. FDA approves 50 drugs/year, but many are for diseases that already have treatments (me-too drugs, second-line therapies). Only 15 represent truly FIRST treatments for previously untreatable conditions.
74.
NIH. NIH budget (FY 2025).
NIH https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/organization/budget (2024)
The budget total of \(47.7 billion also includes\)1.412 billion derived from PHS Evaluation financing... Additional sources: https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/organization/budget | https://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/
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75.
al., B. et. NIH spending on clinical trials: 3.3%.
Bentley et al. https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/nih-spending-clinical-trials-reached-81b-over-decade (2023)
NIH spent $8.1 billion on clinical trials for approved drugs (2010-2019), representing 3.3% of relevant NIH spending. Additional sources: https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/nih-spending-clinical-trials-reached-81b-over-decade | https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/nih-spending-clinical-trials-reached-81b-over-decade
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76.
PMC. Standard medical research ROI ($20k-$100k/QALY).
PMC: Cost-effectiveness Thresholds Used by Study Authors https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10114019/ (1990)
Typical cost-effectiveness thresholds for medical interventions in rich countries range from $50,000 to $150,000 per QALY. The Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) uses a $100,000-$150,000/QALY threshold for value-based pricing. Between 1990-2021, authors increasingly cited $100,000 (47% by 2020-21) or $150,000 (24% by 2020-21) per QALY as benchmarks for cost-effectiveness. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10114019/ | https://icer.org/our-approach/methods-process/cost-effectiveness-the-qaly-and-the-evlyg/
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77.
Institute, M. RECOVERY trial 82× cost reduction.
Manhattan Institute: Slow Costly Trials https://manhattan.institute/article/slow-costly-clinical-trials-drag-down-biomedical-breakthroughs RECOVERY trial: $500 per patient ($20M for 48,000 patients = $417/patient) Typical clinical trial: $41,000 median per-patient cost Cost reduction: 80-82× cheaper ($41,000 ÷ $500 ≈ 82×) Efficiency: $50 per patient per answer (10 therapeutics tested, 4 effective) Dexamethasone estimated to save >630,000 lives Additional sources: https://manhattan.institute/article/slow-costly-clinical-trials-drag-down-biomedical-breakthroughs | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9293394/
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78.
Trials. Patient willingness to participate in clinical trials.
Trials: Patients’ Willingness Survey https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13063-015-1105-3 Recent surveys: 49-51% willingness (2020-2022) - dramatic drop from 85% (2019) during COVID-19 pandemic Cancer patients when approached: 88% consented to trials (Royal Marsden Hospital) Study type variation: 44.8% willing for drug trial, 76.2% for diagnostic study Top motivation: "Learning more about my health/medical condition" (67.4%) Top barrier: "Worry about experiencing side effects" (52.6%) Additional sources: https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13063-015-1105-3 | https://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/view/industry-forced-to-rethink-patient-participation-in-trials | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7183682/
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79.
CSDD, T. Cost of drug development.
Various estimates suggest $1.0 - $2.5 billion to bring a new drug from discovery through FDA approval, spread across 10 years. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development often cited for $1.0 - $2.6 billion/drug. Industry reports (IQVIA, Deloitte) also highlight $2+ billion figures.
80.
Health, V. in. Average lifetime revenue per successful drug.
Value in Health: Sales Revenues for New Therapeutic Agents02754-2/fulltext) https://www.valueinhealthjournal.com/article/S1098-3015(24 Study of 361 FDA-approved drugs from 1995-2014 (median follow-up 13.2 years): Mean lifetime revenue: $15.2 billion per drug Median lifetime revenue: $6.7 billion per drug Revenue after 5 years: $3.2 billion (mean) Revenue after 10 years: $9.5 billion (mean) Revenue after 15 years: $19.2 billion (mean) Distribution highly skewed: top 25 drugs (7%) accounted for 38% of total revenue ($2.1T of $5.5T) Additional sources: https://www.valueinhealthjournal.com/article/S1098-3015(24 | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1098301524027542
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81.
Lichtenberg, F. R.
How many life-years have new drugs saved? A three-way fixed-effects analysis of 66 diseases in 27 countries, 2000-2013.
International Health 11, 403–416 (2019)
Using 3-way fixed-effects methodology (disease-country-year) across 66 diseases in 22 countries, this study estimates that drugs launched after 1981 saved 148.7 million life-years in 2013 alone. The regression coefficients for drug launches 0-11 years prior (beta=-0.031, SE=0.008) and 12+ years prior (beta=-0.057, SE=0.013) on years of life lost are highly significant (p<0.0001). Confidence interval for life-years saved: 79.4M-239.8M (95 percent CI) based on propagated standard errors from Table 2.
82.
Deloitte. Pharmaceutical r&d return on investment (ROI).
Deloitte: Measuring Pharmaceutical Innovation 2025 https://www.deloitte.com/ch/en/Industries/life-sciences-health-care/research/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html (2025)
Deloitte’s annual study of top 20 pharma companies by R&D spend (2010-2024): 2024 ROI: 5.9% (second year of growth after decade of decline) 2023 ROI: 4.3% (estimated from trend) 2022 ROI: 1.2% (historic low since study began, 13-year low) 2021 ROI: 6.8% (record high, inflated by COVID-19 vaccines/treatments) Long-term trend: Declining for over a decade before 2023 recovery Average R&D cost per asset: $2.3B (2022), $2.23B (2024) These returns (1.2-5.9% range) fall far below typical corporate ROI targets (15-20%) Additional sources: https://www.deloitte.com/ch/en/Industries/life-sciences-health-care/research/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html | https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/deloittes-13th-annual-pharmaceutical-innovation-report-pharma-rd-return-on-investment-falls-in-post-pandemic-market-301738807.html | https://hitconsultant.net/2023/02/16/pharma-rd-roi-falls-to-lowest-level-in-13-years/
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83.
Discovery, N. R. D. Drug trial success rate from phase i to approval.
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery: Clinical Success Rates https://www.nature.com/articles/nrd.2016.136 (2016)
Overall Phase I to approval: 10-12.8% (conventional wisdom 10%, studies show 12.8%) Recent decline: Average LOA now 6.7% for Phase I (2014-2023 data) Leading pharma companies: 14.3% average LOA (range 8-23%) Varies by therapeutic area: Oncology 3.4%, CNS/cardiovascular lowest at Phase III Phase-specific success: Phase I 47-54%, Phase II 28-34%, Phase III 55-70% Note: 12% figure accurate for historical average. Recent data shows decline to 6.7%, with Phase II as primary attrition point (28% success) Additional sources: https://www.nature.com/articles/nrd.2016.136 | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6409418/ | https://academic.oup.com/biostatistics/article/20/2/273/4817524
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84.
SofproMed. Phase 3 cost per trial range.
SofproMed https://www.sofpromed.com/how-much-does-a-clinical-trial-cost Phase 3 clinical trials cost between $20 million and $282 million per trial, with significant variation by therapeutic area and trial complexity. Additional sources: https://www.sofpromed.com/how-much-does-a-clinical-trial-cost | https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57126
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85.
PMC. Pragmatic trial cost per patient (median $97).
PMC: Costs of Pragmatic Clinical Trials https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6508852/ The median cost per participant was $97 (IQR $19–$478), based on 2015 dollars. Systematic review of 64 embedded pragmatic clinical trials. 25% of trials cost <$19/patient; 10 trials exceeded $1,000/patient. U.S. studies median $187 vs non-U.S. median $27. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6508852/
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86.
WHO. Polio vaccination ROI.
WHO https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/sustaining-polio-investments-offers-a-high-return (2019)
For every dollar spent, the return on investment is nearly US$ 39." Total investment cost of US$ 7.5 billion generates projected economic and social benefits of US$ 289.2 billion from sustaining polio assets and integrating them into expanded immunization, surveillance and emergency response programmes across 8 priority countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen). Additional sources: https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/sustaining-polio-investments-offers-a-high-return
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88.
Hayek, F. A.
The use of knowledge in society.
American Economic Review 35, 519–530 (1945)
The knowledge of the circumstances which we must make use of never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.
89.
Kydland, F. E. & Prescott, E. C.
Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans.
Journal of Political Economy 85, 473–492 (1977)
Time-inconsistency describes situations where, with the passing of time, policies that were determined to be optimal yesterday are no longer perceived to be optimal today and are not implemented... This insight shifted the focus of policy analysis from the study of individual policy decisions to the design of institutions that mitigate the time consistency problem.
90.
ICRC. International campaign to ban landmines (ICBL) - ottawa treaty (1997).
ICRC https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jpjn.htm (1997)
ICBL: Founded 1992 by 6 NGOs (Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation) Started with ONE staff member: Jody Williams as founding coordinator Grew to 1,000+ organizations in 60 countries by 1997 Ottawa Process: 14 months (October 1996 - December 1997) Convention signed by 122 states on December 3, 1997; entered into force March 1, 1999 Achievement: Nobel Peace Prize 1997 (shared by ICBL and Jody Williams) Government funding context: Canada established $100M CAD Canadian Landmine Fund over 10 years (1997); International donors provided $169M in 1997 for mine action (up from $100M in 1996) Additional sources: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jpjn.htm | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Campaign_to_Ban_Landmines | https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1997/summary/ | https://un.org/press/en/1999/19990520.MINES.BRF.html | https://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2003/landmine-monitor-2003/mine-action-funding.aspx
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91.
OpenSecrets.
Revolving door: Former members of congress. (2024)
388 former members of Congress are registered as lobbyists. Nearly 5,400 former congressional staffers have left Capitol Hill to become federal lobbyists in the past 10 years. Additional sources: https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving-door
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92.
Kinch, M. S. & Griesenauer, R. H.
Lost medicines: A longer view of the pharmaceutical industry with the potential to reinvigorate discovery.
Drug Discovery Today 24, 875–880 (2019)
Research identified 1,600+ medicines available in 1962. The 1950s represented industry high-water mark with >30 new products in five of ten years; this rate would not be replicated until late 1990s. More than half (880) of these medicines were lost following implementation of Kefauver-Harris Amendment. The peak of 1962 would not be seen again until early 21st century. By 2016 number of organizations actively involved in R&D at level not seen since 1914.
93.
Wikipedia. US military spending reduction after WWII.
Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demobilization_of_United_States_Armed_Forces_after_World_War_II (2020)
Peaking at over $81 billion in 1945, the U.S. military budget plummeted to approximately $13 billion by 1948, representing an 84% decrease. The number of personnel was reduced almost 90%, from more than 12 million to about 1.5 million between mid-1945 and mid-1947. Defense spending exceeded 41 percent of GDP in 1945. After World War II, the US reduced military spending to 7.2 percent of GDP by 1948. Defense spending doubled from the 1948 low to 15 percent at the height of the Korean War in 1953. Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demobilization_of_United_States_Armed_Forces_after_World_War_II | https://www.americanprogress.org/article/a-historical-perspective-on-military-budgets/ | https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2020/february/war-highest-military-spending-measured | https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/defense_spending_history
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94.
Baily, M. N. Pre-1962 drug development costs (baily 1972).
Baily (1972) https://samizdathealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/hlthaff.1.2.6.pdf (1972)
Pre-1962: Average cost per new chemical entity (NCE) was $6.5 million (1980 dollars) Inflation-adjusted to 2024 dollars: $6.5M (1980) ≈ $22.5M (2024), using CPI multiplier of 3.46× Real cost increase (inflation-adjusted): $22.5M (pre-1962) → $2,600M (2024) = 116× increase Note: This represents the most comprehensive academic estimate of pre-1962 drug development costs based on empirical industry data Additional sources: https://samizdathealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/hlthaff.1.2.6.pdf
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95.
Numbers, T. by. Pre-1962 physician-led clinical trials.
Think by Numbers: How Many Lives Does FDA Save? https://thinkbynumbers.org/health/how-many-net-lives-does-the-fda-save/ (1966)
Pre-1962: Physicians could report real-world evidence directly 1962 Drug Amendments replaced "premarket notification" with "premarket approval", requiring extensive efficacy testing Impact: New regulatory clampdown reduced new treatment production by 70%; lifespan growth declined from 4 years/decade to 2 years/decade Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI): NAS/NRC evaluated 3,400+ drugs approved 1938-1962 for safety only; reviewed >3,000 products, >16,000 therapeutic claims FDA has had authority to accept real-world evidence since 1962, clarified by 21st Century Cures Act (2016) Note: Specific "144,000 physicians" figure not verified in sources Additional sources: https://thinkbynumbers.org/health/how-many-net-lives-does-the-fda-save/ | https://www.fda.gov/drugs/enforcement-activities-fda/drug-efficacy-study-implementation-desi | http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/history/archives/collections/des-1966-1969-1.html
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96.
GAO. 95% of diseases have 0 FDA-approved treatments.
GAO https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106774 (2025)
95% of diseases have no treatment Additional sources: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106774 | https://globalgenes.org/rare-disease-facts/
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98.
al., N. E. Á. et. RECOVERY trial global lives saved ( 1 million).
NHS England: 1 Million Lives Saved https://www.england.nhs.uk/2021/03/covid-treatment-developed-in-the-nhs-saves-a-million-lives/ (2021)
Dexamethasone saved 1 million lives worldwide (NHS England estimate, March 2021, 9 months after discovery). UK alone: 22,000 lives saved. Methodology: Águas et al. Nature Communications 2021 estimated 650,000 lives (range: 240,000-1,400,000) for July-December 2020 alone, based on RECOVERY trial mortality reductions (36% for ventilated, 18% for oxygen-only patients) applied to global COVID hospitalizations. June 2020 announcement: Dexamethasone reduced deaths by up to 1/3 (ventilated patients), 1/5 (oxygen patients). Impact immediate: Adopted into standard care globally within hours of announcement. Additional sources: https://www.england.nhs.uk/2021/03/covid-treatment-developed-in-the-nhs-saves-a-million-lives/ | https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-021-21134-2 | https://pharmaceutical-journal.com/article/news/steroid-has-saved-the-lives-of-one-million-covid-19-patients-worldwide-figures-show | https://www.recoverytrial.net/news/recovery-trial-celebrates-two-year-anniversary-of-life-saving-dexamethasone-result
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99.
Museum, N. S. 11. M. &.
September 11 attack facts. (2024)
2,977 people were killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks: 2,753 at the World Trade Center, 184 at the Pentagon, and 40 passengers and crew on United Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
100.
Bank, W. World bank singapore economic data.
World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/country/singapore (2024)
Singapore GDP per capita (2023): $82,000 - among highest in the world Government spending: 15% of GDP (vs US 38%) Life expectancy: 84.1 years (vs US 77.5 years) Singapore demonstrates that low government spending can coexist with excellent outcomes Additional sources: https://data.worldbank.org/country/singapore
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101.
Fund, I. M.
IMF singapore government spending data. (2024)
Singapore government spending is approximately 15% of GDP This is 23 percentage points lower than the United States (38%) Despite lower spending, Singapore achieves excellent outcomes: - Life expectancy: 84.1 years (vs US 77.5) - Low crime, world-class infrastructure, AAA credit rating Additional sources: https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SGP
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102.
Organization, W. H.
WHO life expectancy data by country. (2024)
Life expectancy at birth varies significantly among developed nations: Switzerland: 84.0 years (2023) Singapore: 84.1 years (2023) Japan: 84.3 years (2023) United States: 77.5 years (2023) - 6.5 years below Switzerland, Singapore Global average: 73 years Note: US spends more per capita on healthcare than any other nation, yet achieves lower life expectancy Additional sources: https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/mortality-and-global-health-estimates/ghe-life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy
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104.
PMC. Contribution of smoking reduction to life expectancy gains.
PMC: Benefits Smoking Cessation Longevity https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1447499/ (2012)
Population-level: Up to 14% (9% men, 14% women) of total life expectancy gain since 1960 due to tobacco control efforts Individual cessation benefits: Quitting at age 35 adds 6.9-8.5 years (men), 6.1-7.7 years (women) vs continuing smokers By cessation age: Age 25-34 = 10 years gained; age 35-44 = 9 years; age 45-54 = 6 years; age 65 = 2.0 years (men), 3.7 years (women) Cessation before age 40: Reduces death risk by 90% Long-term cessation: 10+ years yields survival comparable to never smokers, averts 10 years of life lost Recent cessation: <3 years averts 5 years of life lost Additional sources: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1447499/ | https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2012/11_0295.htm | https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(24 | https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1211128
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105.
ICER. Value per QALY (standard economic value).
ICER https://icer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Reference-Case-4.3.25.pdf (2024)
Standard economic value per QALY: $100,000–$150,000. This is the US and global standard willingness-to-pay threshold for interventions that add costs. Dominant interventions (those that save money while improving health) are favorable regardless of this threshold. Additional sources: https://icer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Reference-Case-4.3.25.pdf
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106.
GAO. Annual cost of u.s. Sugar subsidies.
GAO: Sugar Program https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106144 Consumer costs: $2.5-3.5 billion per year (GAO estimate) Net economic cost: $1 billion per year 2022: US consumers paid 2X world price for sugar Program costs $3-4 billion/year but no federal budget impact (costs passed directly to consumers via higher prices) Employment impact: 10,000-20,000 manufacturing jobs lost annually in sugar-reliant industries (confectionery, etc.) Multiple studies confirm: Sweetener Users Association ($2.9-3.5B), AEI ($2.4B consumer cost), Beghin & Elobeid ($2.9-3.5B consumer surplus) Additional sources: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106144 | https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/report/the-us-sugar-program-bad-consumers-bad-agriculture-and-bad-america | https://www.aei.org/articles/the-u-s-spends-4-billion-a-year-subsidizing-stalinist-style-domestic-sugar-production/
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107.
Bank, W. Swiss military budget as percentage of GDP.
World Bank: Military Expenditure https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=CH 2023: 0.70272% of GDP (World Bank) 2024: CHF 5.95 billion official military spending When including militia system costs: 1% GDP (CHF 8.75B) Comparison: Near bottom in Europe; only Ireland, Malta, Moldova spend less (excluding microstates with no armies) Additional sources: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=CH | https://www.avenir-suisse.ch/en/blog-defence-spending-switzerland-is-in-better-shape-than-it-seems/ | https://tradingeconomics.com/switzerland/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html
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108.
Bank, W. Switzerland vs. US GDP per capita comparison.
World Bank: Switzerland GDP Per Capita https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CH 2024 GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted): Switzerland $93,819 vs United States $75,492 Switzerland’s GDP per capita 24% higher than US when adjusted for purchasing power parity Nominal 2024: Switzerland $103,670 vs US $85,810 Additional sources: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CH | https://tradingeconomics.com/switzerland/gdp-per-capita-ppp | https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/USA/gdp_per_capita_ppp/
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109.
Economic Co-operation, O. for & Development.
OECD government spending as percentage of GDP. (2024)
OECD government spending data shows significant variation among developed nations: United States: 38.0% of GDP (2023) Switzerland: 35.0% of GDP - 3 percentage points lower than US Singapore: 15.0% of GDP - 23 percentage points lower than US (per IMF data) OECD average: approximately 40% of GDP Additional sources: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm
.
110.
Economic Co-operation, O. for & Development.
OECD median household income comparison. (2024)
Median household disposable income varies significantly across OECD nations: United States: $77,500 (2023) Switzerland: $55,000 PPP-adjusted (lower nominal but comparable purchasing power) Singapore: $75,000 PPP-adjusted Additional sources: https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-disposable-income.htm
.
111.
Institute, C. Chance of dying from terrorism statistic.
Cato Institute: Terrorism and Immigration Risk Analysis https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/terrorism-immigration-risk-analysis Chance of American dying in foreign-born terrorist attack: 1 in 3.6 million per year (1975-2015) Including 9/11 deaths; annual murder rate is 253x higher than terrorism death rate More likely to die from lightning strike than foreign terrorism Note: Comprehensive 41-year study shows terrorism risk is extremely low compared to everyday dangers Additional sources: https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/terrorism-immigration-risk-analysis | https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/you-re-more-likely-die-choking-be-killed-foreign-terrorists-n715141
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112.
Wikipedia. Thalidomide scandal: Worldwide cases and mortality.
Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalidomide_scandal The total number of embryos affected by the use of thalidomide during pregnancy is estimated at 10,000, of whom about 40% died around the time of birth. More than 10,000 children in 46 countries were born with deformities such as phocomelia. Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalidomide_scandal
.
113.
One, P. Health and quality of life of thalidomide survivors as they age.
PLOS One https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0210222 (2019)
Study of thalidomide survivors documenting ongoing disability impacts, quality of life, and long-term health outcomes. Survivors (now in their 60s) continue to experience significant disability from limb deformities, organ damage, and other effects. Additional sources: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0210222
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115.
NCBI, F. S. via. Trial costs, FDA study.
FDA Study via NCBI https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6248200/ Overall, the 138 clinical trials had an estimated median (IQR) cost of \(19.0 million (\)12.2 million-\(33.1 million)... The clinical trials cost a median (IQR) of\)41,117 (\(31,802-\)82,362) per patient. Additional sources: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6248200/
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116.
GBD 2019 Diseases and Injuries Collaborators.
Global burden of disease study 2019: Disability weights.
The Lancet 396, 1204–1222 (2020)
Disability weights for 235 health states used in Global Burden of Disease calculations. Weights range from 0 (perfect health) to 1 (death equivalent). Chronic conditions like diabetes (0.05-0.35), COPD (0.04-0.41), depression (0.15-0.66), and cardiovascular disease (0.04-0.57) show substantial variation by severity. Treatment typically reduces disability weights by 50-80 percent for manageable chronic conditions.
117.
WHO. Annual global economic burden of alzheimer’s and other dementias.
WHO: Dementia Fact Sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dementia (2019)
Global cost: $1.3 trillion (2019 WHO-commissioned study) 50% from informal caregivers (family/friends, 5 hrs/day) 74% of costs in high-income countries despite 61% of patients in LMICs $818B (2010) → $1T (2018) → $1.3T (2019) - rapid growth Note: Costs increased 35% from 2010-2015 alone. Informal care represents massive hidden economic burden Additional sources: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dementia | https://alz-journals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/alz.12901
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118.
Oncology, J. Annual global economic burden of cancer.
JAMA Oncology: Global Cost 2020-2050 https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaoncology/fullarticle/2801798 (2020)
2020-2050 projection: $25.2 trillion total ($840B/year average) 2010 annual cost: $1.16 trillion (direct costs only) Recent estimate: $3 trillion/year (all costs included) Top 5 cancers: lung (15.4%), colon/rectum (10.9%), breast (7.7%), liver (6.5%), leukemia (6.3%) Note: China/US account for 45% of global burden; 75% of deaths in LMICs but only 50.0% of economic cost Additional sources: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaoncology/fullarticle/2801798 | https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00634-9
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120.
Care, D. Annual global economic burden of diabetes.
Diabetes Care: Global Economic Burden https://diabetesjournals.org/care/article/41/5/963/36522/Global-Economic-Burden-of-Diabetes-in-Adults 2015: $1.3 trillion (1.8% of global GDP) 2030 projections: $2.1T-2.5T depending on scenario IDF health expenditure: $760B (2019) → $845B (2045 projected) 2/3 direct medical costs ($857B), 1/3 indirect costs (lost productivity) Note: Costs growing rapidly; expected to exceed $2T by 2030 Additional sources: https://diabetesjournals.org/care/article/41/5/963/36522/Global-Economic-Burden-of-Diabetes-in-Adults | https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landia/article/PIIS2213-8587(17
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121.
World Bank, B. of E. A. US GDP 2024 ($28.78 trillion).
World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US (2024)
US GDP reached $28.78 trillion in 2024, representing approximately 26% of global GDP. Additional sources: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US | https://www.bea.gov/news/2024/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2024-advance-estimate
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122.
Cardiology, I. J. of. Annual global economic burden of heart disease.
Int’l Journal of Cardiology: Global Heart Failure Burden02238-9/abstract) https://www.internationaljournalofcardiology.com/article/S0167-5273(13 (2050)
Heart failure alone: $108 billion/year (2012 global analysis, 197 countries) US CVD: $555B (2016) → projected $1.8T by 2050 LMICs total CVD loss: $3.7T cumulative (2011-2015, 5-year period) CVD is costliest disease category in most developed nations Note: No single $2.1T global figure found; estimates vary widely by scope and year Additional sources: https://www.internationaljournalofcardiology.com/article/S0167-5273(13 | https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/10.1161/CIR.0000000000001258
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123.
CSV, S. U. L. E. F. B. 1543-2019.
US life expectancy growth 1880-1960: 3.82 years per decade. (2019)
Pre-1962: 3.82 years/decade Post-1962: 1.54 years/decade Reduction: 60% decline in life expectancy growth rate Additional sources: https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy | https://www.mortality.org/ | https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality_tables.htm
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124.
CSV, S. U. L. E. F. B. 1543-2019.
Post-1962 slowdown in life expectancy gains. (2019)
Pre-1962 (1880-1960): 3.82 years/decade Post-1962 (1962-2019): 1.54 years/decade Reduction: 60% decline Temporal correlation: Slowdown occurred immediately after 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment See detailed calculation: [life-expectancy-increase-pre-1962](#life-expectancy-increase-pre-1962) Additional sources: https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy | https://www.mortality.org/ | https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality_tables.htm
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125.
Disease Control, C. for & Prevention.
US life expectancy 2023. (2024)
US life expectancy at birth was 77.5 years in 2023 Male life expectancy: 74.8 years Female life expectancy: 80.2 years This is 6-7 years lower than peer developed nations despite higher healthcare spending Additional sources: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/life-expectancy.htm
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126.
Bureau, U. C.
US median household income 2023. (2024)
US median household income was $77,500 in 2023 Real median household income declined 0.8% from 2022 Gini index: 0.467 (income inequality measure) Additional sources: https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2024/demo/p60-282.html
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127.
Statista. US military budget as percentage of GDP.
Statista https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/ (2024)
U.S. military spending amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 2024. In 2024, the U.S. spent nearly $1 trillion on its military budget, equal to 3.4% of GDP. Additional sources: https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/ | https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf
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128.
Bureau, U. C. Number of registered or eligible voters in the u.s.
US Census Bureau https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/2024-presidential-election-voting-registration-tables.html (2024)
73.6% (or 174 million people) of the citizen voting-age population was registered to vote in 2024 (Census Bureau). More than 211 million citizens were active registered voters (86.6% of citizen voting age population) according to the Election Assistance Commission. Additional sources: https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/2024-presidential-election-voting-registration-tables.html | https://www.eac.gov/news/2025/06/30/us-election-assistance-commission-releases-2024-election-administration-and-voting
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129.
Senate, U. S. Treaties.
U.S. Senate https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/treaties.htm The Constitution provides that the president ’shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur’ (Article II, section 2). Treaties are formal agreements with foreign nations that require two-thirds Senate approval. 67 senators (two-thirds of 100) must vote to ratify a treaty for it to take effect. Additional sources: https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/treaties.htm
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130.
Commission, F. E.
Statistical summary of 24-month campaign activity of the 2023-2024 election cycle. (2023)
Presidential candidates raised $2 billion; House and Senate candidates raised $3.8 billion and spent $3.7 billion; PACs raised $15.7 billion and spent $15.5 billion. Total federal campaign spending approximately $20 billion. Additional sources: https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-of-24-month-campaign-activity-of-the-2023-2024-election-cycle/
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131.
OpenSecrets.
Federal lobbying hit record $4.4 billion in 2024. (2024)
Total federal lobbying reached record $4.4 billion in 2024. The $150 million increase in lobbying continues an upward trend that began in 2016. Additional sources: https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2025/02/federal-lobbying-set-new-record-in-2024/
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132.
Kirk (2011), H. &.
Valley of death in drug development. (2011)
The overall failure rate of drugs that passed into Phase 1 trials to final approval is 90%. This lack of translation from promising preclinical findings to success in human trials is known as the "valley of death." Estimated 30-50% of promising compounds never proceed to Phase 2/3 trials primarily due to funding barriers rather than scientific failure. The late-stage attrition rate for oncology drugs is as high as 70% in Phase II and 59% in Phase III trials.
133.
DOT. DOT value of statistical life ($13.6M).
DOT: VSL Guidance 2024 https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis (2024)
Current VSL (2024): $13.7 million (updated from $13.6M) Used in cost-benefit analyses for transportation regulations and infrastructure Methodology updated in 2013 guidance, adjusted annually for inflation and real income VSL represents aggregate willingness to pay for safety improvements that reduce fatalities by one Note: DOT has published VSL guidance periodically since 1993. Current $13.7M reflects 2024 inflation/income adjustments Additional sources: https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis | https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/economic-values-used-in-analysis
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134.
ONE, P. Cost per DALY for vitamin a supplementation.
PLOS ONE: Cost-effectiveness of "Golden Mustard" for Treating Vitamin A Deficiency in India (2010) https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0012046 (2010)
India: $23-$50 per DALY averted (least costly intervention, $1,000-$6,100 per death averted) Sub-Saharan Africa (2022): $220-$860 per DALY (Burkina Faso: $220, Kenya: $550, Nigeria: $860) WHO estimates for Africa: $40 per DALY for fortification, $255 for supplementation Uganda fortification: $18-$82 per DALY (oil: $18, sugar: $82) Note: Wide variation reflects differences in baseline VAD prevalence, coverage levels, and whether intervention is supplementation or fortification Additional sources: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0012046 | https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0266495
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136.
PMC. Cost-effectiveness threshold ($50,000/QALY).
PMC https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5193154/ The $50,000/QALY threshold is widely used in US health economics literature, originating from dialysis cost benchmarks in the 1980s. In US cost-utility analyses, 77.5% of authors use either $50,000 or $100,000 per QALY as reference points. Most successful health programs cost $3,000-10,000 per QALY. WHO-CHOICE uses GDP per capita multiples (1× GDP/capita = "very cost-effective", 3× GDP/capita = "cost-effective"), which for the US ( $70,000 GDP/capita) translates to $70,000-$210,000/QALY thresholds. Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5193154/ | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9278384/
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137.
Institute, I. B. Chronic illness workforce productivity loss.
Integrated Benefits Institute 2024 https://www.ibiweb.org/resources/chronic-conditions-in-the-us-workforce-prevalence-trends-and-productivity-impacts (2024)
78.4% of U.S. employees have at least one chronic condition (7% increase since 2021) 58% of employees report physical chronic health conditions 28% of all employees experience productivity loss due to chronic conditions Average productivity loss: $4,798 per employee per year Employees with 3+ chronic conditions miss 7.8 days annually vs 2.2 days for those without Note: 28% productivity loss translates to roughly 11 hours per week (28% of 40-hour workweek) Additional sources: https://www.ibiweb.org/resources/chronic-conditions-in-the-us-workforce-prevalence-trends-and-productivity-impacts | https://www.onemedical.com/mediacenter/study-finds-more-than-half-of-employees-are-living-with-chronic-conditions-including-1-in-3-gen-z-and-millennial-employees/ | https://debeaumont.org/news/2025/poll-the-toll-of-chronic-health-conditions-on-employees-and-workplaces/
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138.
Columbia/NBER. Odds of a single vote being decisive in a u.s. Presidential election.
Columbia/NBER: What Is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference? https://sites.stat.columbia.edu/gelman/research/published/probdecisive2.pdf (2012)
National average: 1 in 60 million chance (2008 election analysis by Gelman, Silver, Edlin) Swing states (NM, VA, NH, CO): 1 in 10 million chance Non-competitive states: 34 states >1 in 100 million odds; 20 states >1 in 1 billion Washington DC: 1 in 490 billion odds Methodology: Probability state is necessary for electoral college win × probability state vote is tied Additional sources: https://sites.stat.columbia.edu/gelman/research/published/probdecisive2.pdf | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00272.x
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139.
Annenberg. Survey of american civic literacy (congress’s function).
Annenberg: Americans’ Civic Knowledge https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-know-surprisingly-little-about-their-government-survey-finds/ 64% can’t name or describe three branches of government Only 25% can name all three branches (down from 38% in 2011) 27% know 2/3 vote needed to override veto 70%+ fail basic civic literacy quiz Note: Elected officials score worse (44%) than general public (49%). 54% of elected officials don’t know Congress has power to declare war Additional sources: https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-know-surprisingly-little-about-their-government-survey-finds/ | https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/civics/new-study-finds-alarming-lack-of-civic-literacy-among-americans
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140.
Princeton. Princeton study on policy outcomes and influence of elites vs. Average citizens.
Princeton: Testing Theories of American Politics (PDF) https://archive.org/details/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc (2014)
Study by Martin Gilens (Princeton) and Benjamin I. Page (Northwestern): Analyzed 1,779 policy outcomes (1981-2002) Finding: "Economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens have little or no independent influence Rich, well-connected individuals steer the country’s direction, regardless of or even against the will of the majority of voters Note: Specific "78 percent" and "zero percent correlation" statistics not found in sources Additional sources: https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf | https://act.represent.us/sign/usa-oligarchy-research-explained | https://archive.org/details/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc
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141.
Defense, D. of. U.s. Military budget.
Department of Defense https://www.military.gov/Spotlights/FY2024-Defense-Budget/ (2024)
The fiscal year 2024 (FY2024) military budget was signed into law on December 22, 2023 at $841.4 billion. The Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Appropriations Act provides $831.781 billion in total funding. Additional sources: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/FY2024-Defense-Budget/ | https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47582
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142.
PMC. Pharmaceutical industry annual profits.
PMC: Profitability of Large Pharmaceutical Companies https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7054843/ Net income (2000-2018): 35 large pharma companies earned $1.9T cumulative net income on $11.5T revenue 2022 profits: Major pharma companies made >$112B in profits Profit margins: Pharma companies 13.8% median vs 7.7% for other S&P 500 companies Largest 25 companies: 15-20% annual average profit margin vs 4-9% for non-drug companies globally Profitability: Pharma significantly more profitable than most S&P 500 companies Additional sources: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7054843/ | https://www.bentley.edu/news/new-research-shows-pharma-companies-are-more-profitable-most-sp-500-companies | https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-40
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143.
Treasury. Troubled asset relief program (TARP) of 2008.
Treasury: TARP About https://home.treasury.gov/data/troubled-assets-relief-program/about-tarp Authorized: $700 billion (later reduced to $475 billion by Dodd-Frank) Actual disbursed: $443.5 billion to stabilize financial institutions Bank rescue: $236 billion to 707 financial institutions in 48 states Breakdown: $250B banking, $82B auto industry, $70B AIG, $46B foreclosure programs Net lifetime cost: $31.1 billion (after repayments, sales, dividends, interest); most attributable to foreclosure programs Passed October 3, 2008 (signed by President Bush); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act Additional sources: https://home.treasury.gov/data/troubled-assets-relief-program/about-tarp | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troubled_Asset_Relief_Program | https://www.propublica.org/article/the-bailout-was-11-years-ago-were-still-tracking-every-penny
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144.
ScienceDirect. How campaign contributions influence politicians.
ScienceDirect: Campaign Contributions & Legislative Behavior https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272725000179 (2010)
Research: Only 1 in 4 studies support notion that contributions directly "buy votes Influence mechanism: Access, agenda-setting, keeping bills off floor, earmarks, key language in legislation (not direct votes) Average winner costs (2022): House $2.79M, Senate $26.53M; Competitive races much higher Internal party fundraising requirements: $100K-$30M annually; Committee positions cost $450K 95% of House races since 2004 won by highest spender Contribution limits: $3,300 per candidate per election (individuals); PACs gave $289.3M total (2021-2022) Additional sources: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272725000179 | https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/10/how-much-does-it-cost-to-buy-a-vote.html | https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/cost-of-election | https://issueone.org/articles/the-118th-congress-fundraising-treadmill/
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145.
Stern, N. Lobbying spending and returns for disease advocacy groups.
NYU Stern: Lobbying Influences NIH Funding https://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/news-events/new-research-finds-special-interest-lobbying-does-influence-nih-research-funding (2024)
Each $1,000 spent on lobbying correlated with $25,000 funding increase following year (53 diseases, 19 years) Rare disease advocates increased NIH rare-disease funding 3-15%/year (1998-2008) via millions in lobbying Specific examples: Alzheimer’s Association secured $100M NIH increase (FY2024); ME/CFS Initiative helped secure >$1B for long-COVID General ratio: Disease advocacy lobbying yields significant ROI, though specific "$100M → $1.8B" not verified Additional sources: https://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/news-events/new-research-finds-special-interest-lobbying-does-influence-nih-research-funding | https://www.nature.com/articles/515019a | https://www.alz.org/news/2024/congress-bipartisan-funding-alzheimers-research
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146.
Minutes, C. 60. Percentage of time members of congress spend fundraising.
CBS 60 Minutes: Congressional Telemarketers https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-are-members-of-congress-becoming-telemarketers/ Recommended: 4 hours "call time" + 1 hour "strategic outreach" = 5 hours/day out of 9-10 hour workday New members told to spend 30 hours/week on fundraising calls since Citizens United Tom Daschle: 67% of schedule is money-gathering in 2 years before election Only 3-4 hours/day for actual Congressional work (hearings, votes, constituents) Note: By law, members cannot fundraise from offices; parties set up call centers near Capitol Additional sources: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-are-members-of-congress-becoming-telemarketers/ | https://www.huffpost.com/entry/call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291
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147.
Wikipedia. Passage of the USA PATRIOT act.
Wikipedia: Patriot Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_Act (2001)
Introduced: October 23, 2001 by Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) as H.R. 3162 Passed House: October 24, 2001 (357-66 vote, Democrats majority of "no" votes) Passed Senate: October 25, 2001 (98-1 vote, only Russ Feingold D-WI voted "no") Signed into law: October 26, 2001 by President George W. Bush Length: 342 pages, passed hastily without public opportunity for review ACLU concern: Senate forced to vote on legislation it hadn’t had opportunity to read (offices closed, staff couldn’t access papers) Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_Act | https://www.britannica.com/topic/USA-PATRIOT-Act | https://www.ala.org/advocacy/chronology-usa-patriot-act-2001
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148.
Congress.gov. Passage of the affordable care act and pelosi quote.
Congress.gov https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/3590/text The Affordable Care Act: 2,700 pages, "we have to pass it to see what’s in it. Additional sources: https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/3590/text | https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/pelosi-healthcare-pass-the-bill-to-see-what-is-in-it/
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149.
One, I. Congressional committee assignments have explicit fundraising price tags.
Issue One: The Price of Power https://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/price-of-power-final.pdf (2017)
DCCC (Democratic): Speaker $31 million, "A" Committee Chairs $1.8 million, Regular members $150,000 minimum NRCC (Republican): Speaker $20 million, Power Committee Chairs $1.2 million, Transportation Chair $875,000 Members display "giant tally sheet" showing who has/hasn’t paid their party dues Members who don’t pay dues get bills killed, amendments ignored, worse offices Rep. Brett Guthrie: Paid $2.5 million (53% of campaign funds) for Energy & Commerce Chair Rep. Rosa DeLauro: Paid $690,000 (39% of campaign funds) for Appropriations Note: System criticized as "recipe for corruption" disconnecting members from constituents Additional sources: https://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/price-of-power-final.pdf | https://theintercept.com/2019/09/03/dccc-house-committees-dues/ | https://www.brookings.edu/articles/problems-with-the-committee-tax-in-congress/ | https://rollcall.com/2023/02/09/gavels-for-top-house-committees-dont-always-come-cheap/
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150.
Prize, N. James buchanan nobel prize in economics, 1986.
Nobel Prize: 1986 Economic Sciences https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/press-release/ (1986)
James McGill Buchanan: 1986 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences Citation: "for his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making Field: Public choice theory (leading researcher & cofounder with Gordon Tullock) Key work: "The Calculus of Consent" (with Tullock) - now considered a classic, started the field Contribution: Transferred concept of gain from mutual exchange between individuals to political decision-making; applied economic analysis to public sector Inspiration: Swedish economist Knut Wicksell (described as "most exciting intellectual moment" of career) Additional sources: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/press-release/ | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_M._Buchanan | https://www.britannica.com/money/James-M-Buchanan | https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Buchanan.html
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151.
Parliament, U. Winston churchill quote on democracy.
UK Parliament https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1947/nov/11/parliament-bill (1947)
Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others. Additional sources: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1947/nov/11/parliament-bill | https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/quotes/the-worst-form-of-government/
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152.
Miller, G. A. Cognitive limit in short-term memory (miller’s law).
George A. Miller https://doi.org/10.1037/h0043158 (1956)
Short-term memory capacity: 7 ± 2 items (Miller’s Law) The "magical number seven" - humans can hold approximately 7 chunks of information in working memory Note: This classic psychology paper has been cited over 40,000 times and fundamentally shaped our understanding of human cognitive limitations Additional sources: https://doi.org/10.1037/h0043158
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153.
Foundation, T. Length of the u.s. Tax code.
Tax Foundation https://taxfoundation.org/blog/how-many-words-are-tax-code/ (2024)
The Internal Revenue Code comprises 6,871 pages. When including federal tax regulations, federal tax laws and regulations together total over 10 million words (IRC: 2,412,000 words; regulations: 7,655,000 words). Additional sources: https://taxfoundation.org/blog/how-many-words-are-tax-code/ | https://www.ntu.org/foundation/detail/tax-complexity-2024-it-takes-americans-billions-of-hours-to-do-their-taxes
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155.
USASpending.gov. U.s. Federal government spending on education.
USASpending.gov https://www.usaspending.gov/agency/department-of-education (2024)
The Department of Education spent $268.4 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2024. About $80 billion consisted of discretionary appropriations that Congress allocates annually. Additional sources: https://www.usaspending.gov/agency/department-of-education | https://www.ed.gov/sites/ed/files/about/overview/budget/budget24/summary/24summary.pdf
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157.
Treasury, U. U.s. National debt.
US Treasury https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-debt/ The gross national debt of the United States reached $36 trillion in November 2024, and has now reached $38 trillion as of late October 2025. Additional sources: https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-debt/ | https://www.crfb.org/press-releases/gross-national-debt-reaches-36-trillion
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159.
Senate, U. S. Salary of a u.s. congressman.
U.S. Senate: Salaries https://www.senate.gov/senators/SenateSalariesSince1789.htm Members of Congress: $174,000/year (2009-present) Speaker of the House: $223,500/year Majority/Minority Leaders: $193,400/year Note: Congressional salary has been frozen at $174,000 since 2009, unchanged for over 15 years Additional sources: https://www.senate.gov/senators/SenateSalariesSince1789.htm | https://crsreports.congress.gov
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160.
Wikipedia. Pharmaceutical lobby influence on medicare modernization act of 2003.
Wikipedia: Medicare Modernization Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medicare_Prescription_Drug,_Improvement,_and_Modernization_Act Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (P.L. 108-173): Signed Dec 8, 2003 by President Bush; created voluntary Part D prescription drug benefit Noninterference provision": Prohibits HHS Secretary from negotiating drug prices or establishing preferred drug list Instead: Drug prices negotiated between manufacturers & insurance companies administering Part D plans Pharma industry role in writing: "Noninterference clause" written with major industry involvement; drug manufacturers had major role writing & getting it through Congress Industry lobbying: $231M spent on lobbying in 2003 (more than any other industry since 1998) Rep. Billy Tauzin example: 2004 appointed PhRMA chief lobbyist ($2M/year rumored); responsible for including price negotiation prohibition 2022 change: Inflation Reduction Act removed ban; Medicare can negotiate starting 2026 Additional sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medicare_Prescription_Drug,_Improvement,_and_Modernization_Act | https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/politics-medicare-and-drug-price-negotiation-updated | https://www.congress.gov/crs-products/product/pdf/R/R47872
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161.
Snopes. History of insulin patent and modern price disparities.
Snopes: Insulin Patent Dollar https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/insulin-patent-dollar/ (2019)
1923: Frederick Banting, Charles Best, James Collip sold insulin patent to U. of Toronto for $1 each (total $3) Banting: Unethical for doctor to profit from life-saving discovery; wanted everyone to afford it Manufacturing cost: $6 per vial US retail price: $300-332 per vial (Humalog: $21 in 1999 → $332 in 2019 = 1,000%+ increase) Price increases: 600% over 20 years; 200% between 2007-2018 Patients without insurance: Up to $1,000/month Contributing factors: Patent evergreening, barriers to biosimilar entry, market concentration (Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, Sanofi) Additional sources: https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/insulin-patent-dollar/ | https://www.t1international.com/100years/ | https://pnhp.org/news/why-insulin-is-overpriced/ | https://www.npr.org/2019/06/18/733742630/desperate-measures-the-skyrocketing-price-of-insulin-in-america
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162.
United States, S. C. of the. Impact of citizens united supreme court decision on campaign finance.
Citizens United v. FEC https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/558/310/ Citizens United v. FEC (2010): 5-4 Supreme Court decision allowing unlimited corporate/union political spending Overruled restrictions on independent expenditures, citing First Amendment Led to creation of super PACs and massive increases in dark money Dramatically expanded influence of wealthy donors, corporations, special interest groups Note: Overwhelming majorities of Americans disapprove; 22+ states voted to support constitutional amendment to overturn Additional sources: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/558/310/ | https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/citizens-united-explained
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163.
OpenSecrets. Lockheed martin’s political donations, contracts, and state operations in 2022.
OpenSecrets: Lockheed Martin Summary https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/lockheed-martin/summary?id=d000000104 (2022)
Political contributions 2022: $3,946,639 (PAC + individuals); PAC alone: $1,542,500 to federal candidates (2021-2022 cycle) Lobbying 2022: $13.6M expenditure (focused on military appropriations, foreign military sales) Geographic footprint: Operations in over half of states; employs 1,000-20,000+ per state Additional sources: https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/lockheed-martin/summary?id=d000000104 | https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/lockheed-martin/C00303024/candidate-recipients/2022 | https://www.taxpayer.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Oct-2024-Political-Footprint-of-the-Military-Industry.pdf
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164.
GAO. F-35 program lifetime cost: $1.7 trillion.
GAO: F-35 Sustainment Costs https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106703 (2024)
F-35 Program lifetime cost: $2.1 trillion (updated April 2024) Sustainment costs: $1.58 trillion (44% increase from 2018 estimate) Procurement costs: $422 billion Covers 94 years of operation (through 2088) for 2,456 aircraft Note: About half the cost increase is due to inflation. This makes the F-35 one of the most expensive military acquisition programs in modern history Additional sources: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106703 | https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/f-35-programs-lifetime-price-tag-tops-2-trillion-pentagon-wants-jets-to-fly-longer/
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165.
Military.com. Congress adding funds to military budget not requested by the pentagon.
Military.com: $15B Unrequested Weapons https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/04/03/capitol-hill-wants-15-billion-weapons-pentagon-didnt-seek-report.html (2025)
FY2025: $15 billion unrequested for hundreds of military programs FY2023: $61.4 billion for all categories of military spending (not requested) FY2022: $58 billion worth of military projects (not requested) Past 4 years: >$100 billion for 2,000+ weapons programs (no public debate) Note: Bipartisan phenomenon; most additions <$30M but add up substantially Additional sources: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/04/03/capitol-hill-wants-15-billion-weapons-pentagon-didnt-seek-report.html | https://rollcall.com/2025/09/16/hill-added-100-billion-plus-since-2022-on-unrequested-weapons/
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166.
Commune, T. Pentagon audit failures ($2.46T unaccounted).
The Commune https://thecommunemag.com/the-pentagon-misplaced-2-46-trillion-an-in-depth-look-at-the-financial-audit-failures (2024)
In the most recent audit, the Department of Defense (DoD) could not account for approximately 60% of its \(4.1 trillion in assets, amounting to\)2.46 trillion unaccounted for. Alternative title: Pentagon unsupported accounting adjustments (\(6.5T, single year, US Army) In 2015, the Department of Defense's Inspector General reported that the Army could not adequately support\)6.5 trillion in year-end adjustments, indicating severe accounting discrepancies. Additional sources: https://thecommunemag.com/the-pentagon-misplaced-2-46-trillion-an-in-depth-look-at-the-financial-audit-failures | https://accmag.com/audit-pentagon-cannot-account-for-6-5-trillion-dollars-is-taxpayer-money/
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167.
OpenSecrets. Pharmaceutical industry lobbying statistics.
OpenSecrets: Pharmaceuticals/Health Products https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus?ind=H04 Pharmaceutical and health products industry spent $388 million on federal lobbying in 2024 ($6.1 billion since 1999) Employs roughly 3 lobbyists for every member of Congress Note: The industry has consistently been among the top spenders on lobbying in Washington D.C., with major pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer, AbbVie, and PhRMA leading expenditures Additional sources: https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus?ind=H04
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168.
CRS. Evidence of FDA regulatory capture by pharmaceutical industry.
CRS: FDA Human Medical Product User Fees https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44750 FY2023: User fees = 75% of PDUFA program costs (vs 7% in FY1993) FY2022: User fees = 66% ($1.4B) of human drugs program budget FY2022: User fees = 46% ($2.9B) of FDA’s total $6.2B budget Pharma finances 75% of FDA’s drug division (New York Times) Concerns: Budgetary dependence, urgency of PDUFA reauthorizations, required industry participation in negotiations Most PDUFA policy changes favor industry: decreased regulatory standards, shorter approval times, increased industry involvement FDA maintains decisions based on science, not fee collection ability Note: Regulatory capture concerns well-documented. Industry funding grew from 7% (1993) to 75% (2023) of drug review program. No evidence found for "10x government salary" claim for FDA reviewers Additional sources: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44750 | https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/e4a7910607c0dd76c40aa61151d154f9/FDA-User-Fee-Issue-Brief.pdf | https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8917050/
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