Treaty Feasibility & Cost Analysis

Abstract
A Practical Guide: Get 500 Years of Clinical Research in 20, Avoid the Apocalypse, and Make Humanity Filthy Rich by Giving Papers
Keywords

war-on-disease, 1-percent-treaty, medical-research, public-health, peace-dividend, decentralized-trials, dfda, dih, victory-bonds, health-economics, cost-benefit-analysis, clinical-trials, drug-development, regulatory-reform, military-spending, peace-economics, decentralized-governance, wishocracy, blockchain-governance, impact-investing

“Getting 195 countries to agree costs billions and takes forever.”

No. Getting countries to implement things costs billions. Getting them to sign papers is surprisingly cheap. Humans love signing papers. It makes them feel important.

What Treaties Actually Cost

NGO campaign budgets are rarely disclosed publicly, but we know enough about organizational structure and government funding to establish that treaty campaigns operate on remarkably modest resources:

Treaty Timeline Campaign Structure Government Support Outcome
Ottawa Treaty (Landmines, 1997) 14 months (Oct ’96 - Dec ’97) ICBL: Started with 1 staff member (Jody Williams), grew to 1,000+ orgs in 60 countries Canada: $100M CAD Landmine Fund over 10 years; International donors: $169M in 1997 for mine action 122 states signed; Nobel Peace Prize 1997
Cluster Munitions (2008) ~2 years (Feb ’07 - Dec ’08) CMC Coalition of NGOs; Core Group of 7 governments Norway: Funded UNIDIR research project 2004-2008; hosted Oslo conferences 94 states signed; 1.4M stockpiled munitions destroyed
Arms Trade Treaty (2013) 10 years (2003-2013) Control Arms: 100+ organizations (Oxfam, Amnesty); published 50+ reports UK, Australia led diplomatic process; UN conferences Started with 3 supporting govts → 130 signatories
Nuclear Ban (TPNW, 2017) 10 years (2007-2017) ICAN: 5 staff (3 full-time + 2 part-time) in Geneva coordinating 468 partner orgs Norwegian govt grant funded Geneva office (2011); Austria hosted conferences 122 states voted yes; Nobel Peace Prize 2017

Pattern: These campaigns succeed with tiny staff (1-5 people) coordinating large coalitions. The NGO campaign costs are minimal - a few million dollars per year at most. Government support for conferences and delegate travel adds another $10-30M. Total “getting the treaty signed” costs: $15-50M over the campaign period.

Inflation-Adjusted to 2024 Dollars

Using BLS CPI data:

Treaty (Year) Original Cost Estimate 2024 Dollars Inflation Multiplier
Ottawa (1997) $15-25M $30-50M ~2.0x
Cluster Munitions (2008) $15-25M $23-38M ~1.5x
Arms Trade Treaty (2013) $20-30M $27-41M ~1.35x
Nuclear Ban (2017) $10-20M $13-25M ~1.25x

In today’s money: Treaty campaigns cost roughly $25-50M (2024 USD) for the “getting it signed” phase.

That’s less than 0.2% of the implementation cost. Banning landmines: ~$40M in campaigning and diplomacy (2024 dollars), $5B+ to actually remove them. The signing part is the cheap part.

Cost for a 1% Health Treaty

This one touches military budgets - the sacred cow of national sovereignty. Governments get nervous when you suggest moving their explosion money. So budget 3-4× what landmines cost.

Phase Duration Estimated Cost Who Pays
1. Pre-negotiations
(Coalition building, expert drafts)		 18–24 months $8–12M Philanthropy (Gates, Open Philanthropy, etc.) + Champion Governments
2. Global Campaign
(Platform, 3.5% consent, media)		 3–5 years $45–80M Philanthropy + Crowd-funding
3. Diplomatic Process
(Conferences, delegate travel)		 18–30 months $15–25M Host Governments + UN Trust Fund
4. Ratification Drive
(Legal reviews, parliamentary aid)		 2–4 years $5–8M Philanthropy
5. Contingency
(Opposition management)		 Ongoing $10–15M Strategic Comms / Lobbying

Total: $90–140 Million

The Math

Signing the treaty: ~$90M. What the treaty unlocks: $27 Billion/year. Forever.

The diplomatic process costs ~0.3% of a single year’s funding. Three days of the future annual flow. You’re buying a $27B/year annuity for $90M. That’s a 300:1 return on paperwork.

How to Make Governments Sign Things

Politicians move when they see (a) voters demanding it and (b) political safety. Give them both:

  1. Prove public demand: Get 3.5% of the population (280M people) to say “yes” with verified identity. Harvard researcher Erica Chenoweth found that every nonviolent campaign with 3.5%+ participation succeeded. That’s not activism - that’s a mandate. Hard to ignore 280 million verified humans.
  2. Prove it’s safe: Peer-reviewed modeling showing every nation gains more in health savings than it loses in military spending. Politicians need cover. Give them studies to wave around.

Timeline to “Governments Can’t Ignore This”

With ~$60M in seed funding, we can reach “Treaty-Ready” status in 2–3 years:

  • Platform: 280M verified supporters (3.5% threshold)
  • Modeling: Country-by-country impact analysis
  • Coalition: 120+ supportive NGOs and 5-10 champion governments

Once these assets exist, formal negotiations become inevitable.

Conclusion

We aren’t trying to buy the treaty. We are buying the machinery that makes the treaty inevitable. And that machinery costs about $90M, a rounding error compared to the $140 Trillion/year problem we are solving.

Political Success Probability: Economic Analysis

For expected value calculations, we need to estimate the probability that a 1% treaty campaign actually succeeds. This section documents the rationale for our 1% central estimate with a 0.1%-25% confidence interval.

Key insight: Even at 1% probability of success, this intervention’s expected cost per DALY ($13) is still 7.07x more cost-effective than malaria bed nets ($89/DALY), the gold standard of global health interventions.

Historical Precedents for International Financial Commitments

Commitment Target Actual Compliance Duration Notes
0.7% ODA Target 0.7% of GNI to foreign aid 5-6 of ~30 DAC countries (~20%) 50+ years Only Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Germany consistently meet it
Kyoto Protocol Binding emissions targets ~55% coverage initially 1997-2012 US never ratified, Canada withdrew, many missed targets
Paris Agreement NDCs Non-binding pledges ~15-25% on track 2015-present High adoption (195 countries) but low compliance
NATO 2% GDP Defense 2% of GDP on defense ~10 of 31 members (~32%) Since 2014 Even with security pressure, most miss target
EU Stability Pact 3% deficit, 60% debt Routinely violated Since 1997 France, Germany themselves violated it

Pattern: Binding international financial commitments requiring ongoing budget reallocation achieve <25% meaningful compliance, even with strong institutional pressure.

Why a 1% Treaty is Harder Than Most Precedents

  1. Touches military budgets: The most politically sensitive area of national sovereignty
  2. Requires ongoing annual allocation: Not a one-time action like banning a weapon
  3. No immediate security threat: Unlike NATO spending increases post-Ukraine
  4. Novel mechanism: Military→health reallocation is unprecedented
  5. Coordination problem: Benefits require critical mass of participants

Why a 1% Treaty Might Beat the Odds

  1. Self-funding mechanism: Creates health dividends that exceed the “cost”
  2. Bipartisan appeal: Health spending polls better than military across political spectrum
  3. Referendum pathway: Can bypass government resistance through direct democracy
  4. Visible beneficiaries: 150,000 daily disease deaths creates moral urgency
  5. Network effects: Each signing country makes the next more likely

Probability Estimates

Based on this analysis, economists would find the following defensible:

Scenario Probability Rationale
Pessimistic floor 0.1% Near-impossible - complete political gridlock, competing global crises
Conservative central

1%

 Assumes 99% failure rate - yet still 7.07x better than bed nets
Optimistic ceiling 25% Major crisis creates political window; unique self-funding advantage

Our model uses: Central estimate 1%, 95% CI [0.1%, 25%]

This is deliberately ultra-conservative. An economist reviewing our expected value calculations should find:

  • The 1% central estimate assumes a 99% chance of complete failure
  • The 0.1% floor admits this could be nearly impossible
  • Even at 1%, expected cost/DALY ($13) beats bed nets ($89) by 7.07x
  • The 25% ceiling reflects that partial success or crisis-driven adoption is possible

Expected Value Implications

At 1% probability of success:

  • Expected ROI: 11.9k:1 (still positive)
  • Expected cost per DALY: $13 (still 7.07x better than bed nets)

The intervention remains economically justified even assuming a 99% chance of failure because: 1. The conditional benefits (1.19M:1 ROI if successful) are enormous 2. Even the expected value at 1% success beats the best alternative by 7.07x 3. The downside is capped at campaign cost (~$1B), while upside is unbounded

Why The Treaty Won’t Stop at 1%

Most international commitments stagnate after initial signing. The table above shows 0.7% ODA targets unmet for 50+ years, Kyoto Protocol abandoned, Paris Agreement goals missed. Why expect different from a 1% health treaty?

Because we’ve built a scaling engine into the mechanism.

The 80/10/10 funding structure allocates 10%% of treaty funding ($2.7B/year at 1%) to Incentive Alignment Bonds - securities that pay out when treaties expand, not just maintain.

The Expansion Mechanism

Treaty Level Annual IAB Pool Political Pressure Historical Comparison
1% $2.7B/year Strong 10× largest NGO budgets
2% $5.4B/year Very strong Nation-state level
5% $13.5B/year Overwhelming Major industry lobby
10% $27B/year Unstoppable No precedent

Why This Differs from Stagnant Treaties

0.7% ODA failed because there was no financial mechanism incentivizing expansion. The NGOs pushing for compliance have small budgets and compete with each other.

The 1% health treaty creates its own expansion lobby - bond holders who profit when the treaty expands to 2%, then 5%, then 10%. These aren’t activists who can be ignored. They’re investors with returns tied to treaty growth.

The Ratchet Effect

Once 1% passes: 1. $2.7B/year flows to IAB holders pushing for 2% 2. When 2% passes → $5.4B/year pushing for 5%
3. When 5% passes → $13.5B/year pushing for 10% 4. The political pressure for expansion accelerates with each success

This is the opposite of typical treaties where political momentum fades after signing. The IAB mechanism ensures that the constituency for expansion grows rather than shrinks over time.

Long-Term Feasibility

The $90M campaign gets the 1% treaty signed. But the real question isn’t “Can we get 1%?” - it’s “Can we eventually redirect most military spending to health?”

With IABs: Yes. The 10% allocation creates a perpetual political engine that makes expansion inevitable once the initial treaty passes. Each percentage point adds more fuel to the engine.

Without IABs: Probably not. We’d join the long list of international commitments that achieved initial success but stagnated because there was no mechanism to sustain political pressure for expansion.

The $90M buys more than a 1% treaty - it buys the seed of a scaling mechanism that can eventually unlock $2.7 trillion/year.

Sources

For detailed citations and source documentation, see References: