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Treaty Feasibility & Cost Analysis

Keywords

war-on-disease, 1-percent-treaty, medical-research, public-health, peace-dividend, decentralized-trials, dfda, dih, victory-bonds, health-economics, cost-benefit-analysis, clinical-trials, drug-development, regulatory-reform, military-spending, peace-economics, decentralized-governance, wishocracy, blockchain-governance, impact-investing

“Getting 195 countries to agree costs billions and takes forever.”

No. Getting countries to implement things costs billions. Getting them to sign papers is surprisingly cheap. Humans love signing papers. It makes them feel important.

What Treaties Actually Cost

NGO campaign budgets are rarely disclosed publicly, but we know enough about organizational structure and government funding to establish that treaty campaigns operate on remarkably modest resources:

Treaty Timeline Campaign Structure Government Support Outcome
Ottawa Treaty90 (Landmines, 1997) 14 months (Oct ’96 - Dec ’97) ICBL90: Started with 1 staff member (Jody Williams), grew to 1,000+ orgs in 60 countries Canada: $100M CAD Landmine Fund over 10 years; International donors: $169M in 1997 for mine action 122 states signed; Nobel Peace Prize 1997
Cluster Munitions138 (2008) ~2 years (Feb ’07 - Dec ’08) CMC Coalition138 of NGOs; Core Group of 7 governments Norway: Funded UNIDIR research project 2004-2008; hosted Oslo conferences 94 states signed; 1.4M stockpiled munitions destroyed
Arms Trade Treaty139 (2013) 10 years (2003-2013) Control Arms140: 100+ organizations (Oxfam, Amnesty); published 50+ reports UK, Australia led diplomatic process; UN conferences Started with 3 supporting govts → 130 signatories
Nuclear Ban141 (TPNW, 2017) 10 years (2007-2017) ICAN141: 5 staff (3 full-time + 2 part-time) in Geneva coordinating 468 partner orgs Norwegian govt grant funded Geneva office (2011); Austria hosted conferences 122 states voted yes; Nobel Peace Prize 2017

Pattern: These campaigns succeed with tiny staff (1-5 people) coordinating large coalitions. The NGO campaign costs are minimal - a few million dollars per year at most. Government support for conferences and delegate travel adds another $10-30M. Total “getting the treaty signed” costs: $15-50M over the campaign period.

Inflation-Adjusted to 2024 Dollars

Using BLS CPI data:

Treaty (Year) Original Cost Estimate 2024 Dollars Inflation Multiplier
Ottawa (1997) $15-25M $30-50M ~2.0x
Cluster Munitions (2008) $15-25M $23-38M ~1.5x
Arms Trade Treaty (2013) $20-30M $27-41M ~1.35x
Nuclear Ban (2017) $10-20M $13-25M ~1.25x

In today’s money: Treaty campaigns cost roughly $25-50M (2024 USD) for the “getting it signed” phase.

That’s less than 0.2% of the implementation cost. Banning landmines: ~$40M in campaigning and diplomacy (2024 dollars), $5B+ to actually remove them90. The signing part is the cheap part.

Cost for a 1% Health Treaty

This one touches military budgets - the sacred cow of national sovereignty. Governments get nervous when you suggest moving their explosion money. So budget 3-4× what landmines cost.

Phase Duration Estimated Cost Who Pays
1. Pre-negotiations
(Coalition building, expert drafts)		 18–24 months $8–12M Philanthropy (Gates, Open Philanthropy, etc.) + Champion Governments
2. Global Campaign
(Platform, 3.5% consent, media)		 3–5 years $45–80M Philanthropy + Crowd-funding
3. Diplomatic Process
(Conferences, delegate travel)		 18–30 months $15–25M Host Governments + UN Trust Fund
4. Ratification Drive
(Legal reviews, parliamentary aid)		 2–4 years $5–8M Philanthropy
5. Contingency
(Opposition management)		 Ongoing $10–15M Strategic Comms / Lobbying

Total: $90–140 Million

Phased roadmap for the treaty campaign, detailing duration and funding requirements per stage.

Phased roadmap for the treaty campaign, detailing duration and funding requirements per stage.

The Math

Signing the treaty: ~$90M. What the treaty unlocks: $27.2B/year. Forever.

A cost-benefit visualization comparing the 90M one-time treaty cost to the 27.2B recurring annual benefit, highlighting the 300:1 return on investment.

A cost-benefit visualization comparing the 90M one-time treaty cost to the 27.2B recurring annual benefit, highlighting the 300:1 return on investment.

The diplomatic process costs ~0.3% of a single year’s funding. Three days of the future annual flow. You’re buying a $27.2B/year annuity for $90M. That’s a 300:1 return on paperwork.

How to Make Governments Sign Things

Politicians move when they see (a) voters demanding it and (b) political safety. Give them both:

  1. Prove public demand: Get 3.5% of the population64 (280M people) to say “yes” with verified identity. Harvard researcher Erica Chenoweth found that every nonviolent campaign64 with 3.5%+ participation succeeded. That’s not activism - that’s a mandate. Hard to ignore 280 million verified humans.
  2. Prove it’s safe: Peer-reviewed modeling showing every nation gains more in health savings than it loses in military spending. Politicians need cover. Give them studies to wave around.

A strategic framework showing how the combination of 3.5 percent public demand and peer-reviewed economic safety models creates the necessary conditions for political mandates.

A strategic framework showing how the combination of 3.5 percent public demand and peer-reviewed economic safety models creates the necessary conditions for political mandates.

Timeline to “Governments Can’t Ignore This”

With ~$60M in seed funding, we can reach “Treaty-Ready” status in 2–3 years:

  • Platform: 280M verified supporters (3.5% threshold)
  • Modeling: Country-by-country impact analysis
  • Coalition: 120+ supportive NGOs and 5-10 champion governments

Once these assets exist, formal negotiations become inevitable.

A strategic roadmap showing the 2-3 year progression from seed funding through three core pillars (Platform, Modeling, and Coalition) to achieve Treaty-Ready status and formal negotiations.

A strategic roadmap showing the 2-3 year progression from seed funding through three core pillars (Platform, Modeling, and Coalition) to achieve Treaty-Ready status and formal negotiations.

Conclusion

We aren’t trying to buy the treaty. We are buying the machinery that makes the treaty inevitable. And that machinery costs about $90M, a rounding error compared to the $140 Trillion/year problem we are solving.

Political Success Probability: Economic Analysis

For expected value calculations, we need to estimate the probability that a 1% treaty campaign actually succeeds. This section documents the rationale for our 1% (95% CI: 0.1%-10%) central estimate with a 0.1%-25% confidence interval.

A comparison of cost-effectiveness showing that the proposed intervention is 503 times more cost-effective than malaria bed nets, even with a low 1 percent probability of success.

A comparison of cost-effectiveness showing that the proposed intervention is 503 times more cost-effective than malaria bed nets, even with a low 1 percent probability of success.

Even at 1% (95% CI: 0.1%-10%) probability of success, this intervention’s expected cost per DALY ($0.177 (95% CI: $0.029-$3.20)) is still 503x (95% CI: 29.9x-3.0kx) more cost-effective than malaria bed nets ($89 (95% CI: $78-$100)/DALY), the gold standard of global health interventions.

Historical Precedents for International Financial Commitments

Commitment Target Actual Compliance Duration Notes
0.7% ODA Target 0.7% of GNI to foreign aid 5-6 of ~30 DAC countries (~20%) 50+ years Only Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Germany consistently meet it
Kyoto Protocol Binding emissions targets ~55% coverage initially 1997-2012 US never ratified, Canada withdrew, many missed targets
Paris Agreement NDCs Non-binding pledges ~15-25% on track 2015-present High adoption (195 countries) but low compliance
NATO 2% GDP Defense 2% of GDP on defense ~10 of 31 members (~32%) Since 2014 Even with security pressure, most miss target
EU Stability Pact 3% deficit, 60% debt Routinely violated Since 1997 France, Germany themselves violated it

Pattern: Binding international financial commitments requiring ongoing budget reallocation achieve <25% meaningful compliance, even with strong institutional pressure.

Why a 1% Treaty is Harder Than Most Precedents

  1. Touches military budgets: The most politically sensitive area of national sovereignty
  2. Requires ongoing annual allocation: Not a one-time action like banning a weapon
  3. No immediate security threat: Unlike NATO spending increases post-Ukraine
  4. Novel mechanism: Military→health reallocation is unprecedented
  5. Coordination problem: Benefits require critical mass of participants

Why a 1% Treaty Might Beat the Odds

A conceptual map showing the five strategic drivers (financial, political, legal, moral, and social) that support the adoption of a 1 percent global health treaty.

A conceptual map showing the five strategic drivers (financial, political, legal, moral, and social) that support the adoption of a 1 percent global health treaty.
  1. Self-funding mechanism: Creates health dividends that exceed the “cost”
  2. Bipartisan appeal: Health spending polls better than military across political spectrum
  3. Referendum pathway: Can bypass government resistance through direct democracy
  4. Visible beneficiaries: 150,000 daily disease deaths creates moral urgency
  5. Network effects: Each signing country makes the next more likely

Probability Estimates

Based on this analysis, economists would find the following defensible:

Scenario Probability Rationale
Pessimistic floor 0.1% Near-impossible - complete political gridlock, competing global crises
Conservative central

1% (95% CI: 0.1%-10%)

 Assumes 99% failure rate - yet still 503x (95% CI: 29.9x-3.0kx) better than bed nets
Optimistic ceiling 25% Major crisis creates political window; unique self-funding advantage

Our model uses: Central estimate 1% (95% CI: 0.1%-10%), 95% CI [0.1%, 25%]

This is deliberately conservative. An economist reviewing our expected value calculations should find:

Expected Value Implications

A visualization of the asymmetric risk-reward profile comparing the intervention’s expected value at a 1 percent success rate against bed nets, showing the capped downside versus the massive potential ROI.

A visualization of the asymmetric risk-reward profile comparing the intervention’s expected value at a 1 percent success rate against bed nets, showing the capped downside versus the massive potential ROI.

At 1% (95% CI: 0.1%-10%) probability of success:

The intervention remains economically justified even assuming a 99% chance of failure because: 1. The conditional benefits (84.8M:1 (95% CI: 46.6M:1-144M:1) ROI if successful) are enormous 2. Even the expected value at 1% (95% CI: 0.1%-10%) success beats the best alternative by 503x (95% CI: 29.9x-3.0kx) 3. The downside is capped at campaign cost (~$1B), while upside is unbounded

Why The Treaty Won’t Stop at 1%

Most international commitments stagnate after initial signing. The table above shows 0.7% ODA targets unmet for 50+ years, Kyoto Protocol abandoned, Paris Agreement goals missed. Why expect different from a 1% health treaty?

A flowchart illustrating the ‘scaling engine’ where 10 percent of treaty funding is directed into Incentive Alignment Bonds to drive political incentives and treaty expansion.

A flowchart illustrating the ‘scaling engine’ where 10 percent of treaty funding is directed into Incentive Alignment Bonds to drive political incentives and treaty expansion.

Because we’ve built a scaling engine into the mechanism.

The 80/10/10 funding structure allocates 10% of treaty funding ($2.72B/year at 1%) to Incentive Alignment Bonds - securities that pay out when treaties expand, not just maintain.

The Expansion Mechanism

Treaty Level Annual IAB Pool Political Pressure Historical Comparison
1% $2.7B/year Strong 10× largest NGO budgets
2% $5.4B/year Very strong Nation-state level
5% $13.5B/year Overwhelming Major industry lobby
10% $27B/year Unstoppable No precedent

Why This Differs from Stagnant Treaties

0.7% ODA failed because there was no financial mechanism incentivizing expansion. The NGOs pushing for compliance have small budgets and compete with each other.

A comparison between the traditional NGO-led treaty model and an investor-driven model where financial incentives create a self-reinforcing growth loop.

A comparison between the traditional NGO-led treaty model and an investor-driven model where financial incentives create a self-reinforcing growth loop.

The 1% health treaty creates its own expansion lobby - bond holders who profit when the treaty expands to 2%, then 5%, then 10%. These aren’t activists who can be ignored. They’re investors with returns tied to treaty growth.

The Ratchet Effect

Once 1% passes: 1. $2.7B/year flows to IAB holders pushing for 2% 2. When 2% passes → $5.4B/year pushing for 5%
3. When 5% passes → $13.5B/year pushing for 10% 4. The political pressure for expansion accelerates with each success

This is the opposite of typical treaties where political momentum fades after signing. The IAB mechanism ensures that the constituency for expansion grows rather than shrinks over time.

Long-Term Feasibility

The $90M campaign gets the 1% treaty signed. But the real question isn’t “Can we get 1%?” - it’s “Can we eventually redirect most military spending to health?”

A comparison of two paths: one where the 1 percent treaty stagnates without a scaling mechanism, and another where Incentive Alignment Bonds create a self-reinforcing flywheel that expands funding toward 2.7 trillion.

A comparison of two paths: one where the 1 percent treaty stagnates without a scaling mechanism, and another where Incentive Alignment Bonds create a self-reinforcing flywheel that expands funding toward 2.7 trillion.

With IABs: Yes. The 10% allocation creates a perpetual political engine that makes expansion inevitable once the initial treaty passes. Each percentage point adds more fuel to the engine.

Without IABs: Probably not. We’d join the long list of international commitments that achieved initial success but stagnated because there was no mechanism to sustain political pressure for expansion.

The $90M buys more than a 1% treaty - it buys the seed of a scaling mechanism that can eventually unlock $2.7 trillion/year.

Sources

For detailed citations and source documentation, see References:

  • 3.5% Rule64 - Chenoweth’s research on nonviolent movement success thresholds
  • Ottawa Treaty / ICBL90 - Landmines ban campaign (1992-1997)
  • Cluster Munitions Convention138 - Oslo Process (2007-2008)
  • Arms Trade Treaty139 - UN arms trade regulation (2003-2013)
  • 140 - NGO campaign structure and tactics
  • ICAN / Nuclear Ban Treaty141 - Nuclear weapons prohibition (2007-2017)