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Making Friends with the Military-Industrial Complex

Keywords

war-on-disease, 1-percent-treaty, medical-research, public-health, peace-dividend, decentralized-trials, dfda, dih, victory-bonds, health-economics, cost-benefit-analysis, clinical-trials, drug-development, regulatory-reform, military-spending, peace-economics, decentralized-governance, wishocracy, blockchain-governance, impact-investing

Defense lobbyists spend $127M on lobbying and get $181B in government contracts back. That’s a 1,810:1 ROI138.

They will kill any treaty that threatens this. Not because they’re evil (though that helps), but because murder is profitable and they like money.

The Solution

Pay them more to lobby FOR the treaty.

A conceptual comparison showing the ‘Current State’ where financial incentives favor opposing a treaty versus the ‘Proposed Solution’ where the same incentives are moved to favor supporting it.

A conceptual comparison showing the ‘Current State’ where financial incentives favor opposing a treaty versus the ‘Proposed Solution’ where the same incentives are moved to favor supporting it.

Lobbyists are like pigeons. They go where the food is. Currently the food is in opposing the treaty. You could try convincing them that saving lives is noble, or you could just move the food.

Moving the food seems easier.

The Offer

A visualization of ‘The Offer’ framework, illustrating how high-yield bonds, early access, and strategic roles are bundled together to create an irresistible incentive package.

A visualization of ‘The Offer’ framework, illustrating how high-yield bonds, early access, and strategic roles are bundled together to create an irresistible incentive package.

You give them:

  1. VICTORY Incentive Alignment Bonds paying 272% annually (vs their current salary/stock options)
  2. Early access (get rich before everyone else)
  3. “Consulting fees” (legal bribery has a name)
  4. Strategic advisor positions (fake job, real money)

The Math

Their current job (lobbying against treaty):

  • Pay: $500K-$2M/year
  • Job security: Depends on military budget staying huge
  • Upside: Salary + stock options worth maybe 2x salary
  • Legacy: “Made orphans for money”

Your offer (lobbying for treaty):

  • Pay: $5-20M in bonds
  • Returns: 272% annually, forever
  • Job security: Better (99% of military budget still exists)
  • Upside: Generational wealth
  • Legacy: “Accidentally saved humanity while getting rich”

Most people can do this math. You hope.

Comparison of financial incentives and legacy outcomes between current lobbying roles and the proposed bond-incentivized model.

Comparison of financial incentives and legacy outcomes between current lobbying roles and the proposed bond-incentivized model.

Why They Take It

It’s More Papers

272% > whatever they’re making now.

That’s it. That’s the whole reason.

The Treaty Doesn’t Actually Hurt Them

  • Military budget drops 1% (from $2.72T to $2.69T)
  • They still have 99% to protect
  • Defense contracts still flow
  • Jobs stay
  • Weapons still get built
  • Wars probably still happen (just 1% fewer wars, which is still too many wars)

You’re not asking them to become pacifists. You’re asking them to accept slightly less murder funding in exchange for becoming extremely wealthy.

A comparison showing a 1 percent reduction in military budget relative to the 99 percent that remains, illustrating the trade-off between a minor funding cut and significant wealth generation.

A comparison showing a 1 percent reduction in military budget relative to the 99 percent that remains, illustrating the trade-off between a minor funding cut and significant wealth generation.

Political Cover

“I support life-saving medical research” sounds better at dinner parties than “I lobby for bombs.”

Their kids might even respect them. Probably not, but maybe.

How You Do This

Step 1: Identify Targets

A breakdown of the four target groups for Step 1, showing the distribution of lobbyists, CEOs, investors, and former officials.

A breakdown of the four target groups for Step 1, showing the distribution of lobbyists, CEOs, investors, and former officials.
  • Top 50 military lobbyists (ranked by how much democracy they’ve corrupted)
  • 20 defense contractor CEOs (the people who make the bombs and stuff)
  • 10 major investors (pension funds, family offices, rich people who like more money)
  • 5 former Pentagon officials (revolving door goes both ways)

Step 2: The Meeting

Private. No witnesses. Simple pitch:

“This treaty might happen. You can support it and become wealthy. Here are VICTORY Incentive Alignment Bonds paying 272% annually. Forever. Your clients keep 99% of their budgets. What’s your price?”

A diagram illustrating the incentive alignment structure: supporting the treaty results in 272 percent annual bond yields for the individual while allowing the defense sector to retain 99 percent of its budget.

A diagram illustrating the incentive alignment structure: supporting the treaty results in 272 percent annual bond yields for the individual while allowing the defense sector to retain 99 percent of its budget.

Step 3: The Flip

Once enough key players flip, momentum shifts.

A visualization of the tipping point dynamic, showing a group of individual entities shifting from holdouts to participants as the momentum threshold is crossed.

A visualization of the tipping point dynamic, showing a group of individual entities shifting from holdouts to participants as the momentum threshold is crossed.

Nobody wants to be the last holdout fighting a treaty with strong momentum while everyone else gets rich.

It’s like a bank run, except instead of withdrawing money, they’re depositing principles.

Whether “enough” is 10 or 50 or 100, nobody knows. This has never been tried before. But the theory seems sound, assuming humans behave like humans usually do.

Step 4: Active Support

Now they don’t just stop opposing - they actively lobby FOR it:

  • Testifying to Congress: “This strengthens national security” (technically true: healthy soldiers fight better)
  • Op-eds: “A strong military requires a healthy population” (also true: can’t draft corpses)
  • Behind-the-scenes: Convincing other lobbyists to flip (misery loves company, wealth loves more wealth)

Operational flowchart detailing the four-stage strategy to convert opposition into support, from targeting to active lobbying.

Operational flowchart detailing the four-stage strategy to convert opposition into support, from targeting to active lobbying.

Budget

You allocate a significant portion of the $1B incentive alignment budget to this.

A strategic diagram showing the allocation of the incentive budget toward key stakeholders to influence treaty passage, illustrating the ‘buy vs. fight’ cost-benefit logic.

A strategic diagram showing the allocation of the incentive budget toward key stakeholders to influence treaty passage, illustrating the ‘buy vs. fight’ cost-benefit logic.

It’s the most important money you’ll spend. These humans can kill the treaty or pass it. Buying them is cheaper than fighting them.

Why This Works

You’re Using Their Own Playbook

Defense contractors spend $127M on lobbying and get $181B back.

A comparison showing the current 127M to 181B return on investment for defense lobbying versus a proposed, higher-return model focused on curing diseases.

A comparison showing the current 127M to 181B return on investment for defense lobbying versus a proposed, higher-return model focused on curing diseases.

You’re offering them BETTER returns to lobby for something else.

It’s not revolutionary. It’s just capitalism but pointed at diseases instead of humans.

It Might Work

Once you demonstrate credible funding and serious intent, some players might flip early for better terms.

A visual mapping of player responses to a funding offer, showing the spectrum from early adoption for better terms to late adoption or total rejection.

A visual mapping of player responses to a funding offer, showing the spectrum from early adoption for better terms to late adoption or total rejection.

Others might flip later for worse terms.

Some might never flip at all.

But when you offer people significantly more money to do something that could significantly reduce human suffering, it seems likely they’ll at least think about it.

What You’re NOT Asking

You’re NOT asking them to:

  • Close factories (keep building bombs)
  • Lay off workers (everyone keeps their jobs)
  • Stop making weapons (weapons stay profitable)
  • Convert to medical equipment (too hard, not necessary)
  • Change their business model (keep doing exactly what you’re doing)
  • Feel bad about anything (guilt is not required)

You’re ONLY asking them to:

  • Accept higher returns on investment
  • Stop blocking the treaty
  • Maybe say nice things about it publicly

That’s it. They keep 99% of their current income PLUS get rich from bonds.

A comparative visual showing that the defense sector retains its core business operations and 99 percent of its income while gaining additional financial returns through bonds by supporting the treaty.

A comparative visual showing that the defense sector retains its core business operations and 99 percent of its income while gaining additional financial returns through bonds by supporting the treaty.

The Irony

You’re using the corrupt rules of a corrupt system to protect and promote the general welfare.

A conceptual diagram illustrating how the same system of incentive structures and human nature can be pivoted from producing the military-industrial complex to curing diseases.

A conceptual diagram illustrating how the same system of incentive structures and human nature can be pivoted from producing the military-industrial complex to curing diseases.

The same incentive structures that created the military-industrial complex get pointed at curing disease instead.

No moral evolution required. No conscience necessary. Just different math.

Human nature stays exactly the same. Only the incentives change.

This is either brilliant or ridiculous. Possibly both. You won’t know until you try.

What They Tell Their Boards

Defense Contractor CEO (to board members):

“We diversified into bonds paying 272% returns. If the treaty passes, we profit enormously. If it fails, we still have our defense contracts. It’s a hedge. I’m being prudent. You’re welcome.”

A stakeholder perspective map showing the differing motivations and risk strategies of a defense CEO, private investor, and lobbyist regarding high-yield treaty bonds.

A stakeholder perspective map showing the differing motivations and risk strategies of a defense CEO, private investor, and lobbyist regarding high-yield treaty bonds.

Private Investor (to partners):

“These bonds pay 272% vs market’s 10%. Treaty passes = we’re rich. Treaty fails = we take the loss. But I ran the numbers. It’s passing. Get in early.”

Lobbyist (to military contractor):

“My new client offers better returns than you do. Support the treaty or I switch sides permanently. Your choice. Make it fast.”

Optimistic Timeline (If This Works)

Months 1-12 (Early Phase):

  • Some key lobbyists flip
  • A few major investors commit
  • Treaty goes from “impossible” to “controversial”
  • Media notices

Months 13-24 (Mid Phase):

  • More lobbyists actively supporting
  • Defense contractor trade associations might go neutral (hard to oppose when members support it)
  • Treaty becomes “bipartisan opportunity”
  • Politicians start claiming they always supported it

Months 25-36 (Late Phase):

  • Former opponents now taking credit
  • “I always cared about medical research” (they discovered this yesterday)
  • Treaty passes
  • Everyone pretends they were always on the right side

Projected 36-month timeline showing the shift in political sentiment and stakeholder support from initial controversy to treaty passage.

Projected 36-month timeline showing the shift in political sentiment and stakeholder support from initial controversy to treaty passage.

Pessimistic Timeline (If This Doesn’t Work)

You and everyone you’ve ever loved slowly deteriorate into dust

Summary

You can’t fight the military-industrial complex.

It’s too big. Too entrenched. Too profitable.

But you might be able to buy it.

Cost: Strategic allocation from the incentive alignment budget

Possible Result: Some of the most powerful lobbying infrastructure in history working FOR the treaty instead of against it

ROI: Hard to calculate, but not having the military-industrial complex destroy you seems valuable

Defense lobbyists work for whoever pays them.

So you try paying them more.

Then maybe they convince Congress that curing disease is actually about national security.

Which is probably true. Whether they care is irrelevant. You’re not paying them to care. You’re paying them to lobby.

Will this work? Nobody knows. But it seems worth trying.